Developmental risk sensitivity theory: the effects of socio-economic status on children's risky gain and loss decisions.

Evolutionary developmental theories propose that early environments shape human risk preferences. Developmental risk sensitivity theory (D-RST) focuses on the plasticity of risk preferences during childhood and makes predictions about the effect of reward size based on a child's social environment. By contrast, prospect theory predicts risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for losses regardless of environment or status. We presented 4 to 10-year-olds (n = 194) with a set of trials in which they chose between a certain amount and a chance to receive more or nothing. Two trials were equal expected value choices that differed by stake size and two were unequal expected value choices. Children either received gain trials or loss trials. Social environment was assessed using socio-economic status (SES) and subjective social status. Results confirmed the predictions of D-RST for gains based on SES. Children from lower-SES families differentiated between the high- and low-value trials and made more risky decisions for the high-value reward compared with higher-SES children. Children from higher-SES families were more risk averse for both trial types. Decisions for loss trials did not conform completely to either theory. We discuss the results in relation to evolutionary developmental theories.

From "haves" to "have nots": Developmental declines in subjective social status reflect children's growing consideration of what they do not have.

Subjective social status (SSS), or a person's view of their own socioeconomic status, has important consequences for social cognition and wellbeing, yet little is known about its development before adolescence. Previous research finds that SSS declines during childhood. We sought to replicate this finding, and also to extend it by investigating what aspects of children's reasoning drive this developmental decline. To do so, we assessed four- to ten-year-old children's SSS using a MacArthur Ladder Task (n = 377), which has been validated for use with children in this age range. We then assessed children's open-ended rationales for their SSS judgments. Results indicated that SSS declined over child development, replicating previous work. We also confirmed that this decline corresponded with improvements in SSS accuracy; young children overestimated their SSS relative to their objective SES, but were relatively accurate by age ten. Moreover, trends in children's rationales revealed that developmental shifts in both SSS and SSS accuracy corresponded with children's references to what they do not have, but not with references to what they do have, nor with references to any particular status cues (e.g., houses, lifestyle). Thus, children may increasingly consider what they lack to determine their status. Implications for self-evaluation and social cognition are discussed.

Socioeconomic status predicts children's moral judgments of novel resource distributions.

Children's moral judgments of resource distributions as having "fair" or "unfair" origins play an important role in early social cognition. What factors shape these judgments? The present study advances research on this question in two primary ways: First, while prior work has typically assigned children to an advantaged or disadvantaged position in an experimental setting, here we also investigated how relative objective and Subjective Socioeconomic Status (OSS and SSS) predicted children's judgments. Second, while prior work has asked children to judge distributions with known origins, here we presented children with novel and causally ambiguous distributions, thereby simulating children's initial encounter of resource distributions in the social world. We assessed participants' (n = 113, 6- to 9-year-olds) OSS and SSS and then introduced them to a machine that distributed Skittles on an unknown basis. Participants received half as many, twice as many, or the same number of Skittles as a peer in three between-subjects conditions, and then rated the machine's fairness. Results revealed that children who rated their families as wealthier relative to their neighborhoods (higher SSS) rated the machine as more fair. However, children from families that were actually wealthier relative to their neighborhoods (higher OSS) were more likely to rate the disadvantage-giving machine as unfair. Together, results represent the first evidence that OSS and SSS shape children's moral judgments of resource distributions, consistent with evidence that these two forms of socioeconomic status have unique impacts on adults' judgments of inequality. Implications for moral and social development are discussed.

Varieties of Young Children's Prosocial Behavior in Zambia: The Role of Cognitive Ability, Wealth, and Inequality Beliefs.

By the 3rd year of life, young children engage in a variety of prosocial behaviors, including helping others attain their goals (instrumental helping), responding to others' emotional needs (comforting), and sharing resources (costly giving). Recent work suggests that these behaviors emerge early, during the first 2 years of life (Svetlova et al., 2010; Thompson and Newton, 2012; Dunfield and Kuhlmeier, 2013). To date, however, work investigating early varieties of prosocial behavior has largely focused on Western samples and has not assessed the impact of poverty and inequality. In this work, we investigate prosocial behavior in 3-year-olds in Zambia, a lower-middle income country with high wealth inequality. Experiments were integrated into a larger public health study along with both objective and subjective (parent) measures of wealth and inequality. Three-hundred-seventy-seven children (Mean age = 36.77 months; SD = 2.26 months) were presented with an instrumental helping task, comforting task, and two steps of a giving task - one with higher cost (children could give away their only resource) and one with lower cost (children had three resources to give). As predicted, rates of prosociality varied hierarchically by the cost of the action: instrumental helping was the most common followed by comforting, lower cost giving, and higher cost giving. All prosocial behaviors were significantly correlated with one another (with the exception of high cost giving), and with general cognitive ability. Objective family wealth did not predict any of the child's prosocial behaviors. However, subjective beliefs showed that mothers who believed that they had more than others in their village had children who were more likely to engage in instrumental helping, and mothers who believed that village inequality was a problem had children who were more likely to engage in low cost giving. Low cost giving was also more likely for children whose parents reported reading storybooks to them. This suggests that costly giving in the context of pretend play may relate to children's experience with using stories as representations of real life events. The results suggest both cultural differences and universalities in the development of prosociality and point to environmental factors that influence prosociality.

Young children will lie to prevent a moral transgression.

Children believe that it is wrong to tell lies, yet they are willing to lie prosocially to adhere to social norms and to protect a listener's feelings. However, it is not clear whether children will lie instrumentally to intervene on behalf of a third party when a moral transgression is likely to occur. In three studies (N=270), we investigated the conditions under which 5- to 8-year-olds would tell an "interventional lie" in order to misdirect one child who was seeking another child in a park. In Study 1, older children lied more when the seeker intended to steal a toy from another child than when the seeker intended to give cookies to the child. In Study 2, the transgression (stealing) was held constant, but harm to the victim was either emphasized or deemphasized. Children at all ages were more likely to lie to prevent the theft when harm was emphasized. In Study 3, harm to the victim was held constant and the act of taking was described as either theft or a positive action. Children at all ages were more likely to lie when the transgression was emphasized. We conclude that by 5years of age, children are capable of lying to prevent a moral transgression but that this is most likely to occur when both the transgression and the harm to the victim are salient.

The effect of spatial frequency information and visual similarity in threat detection.

In the current research, we sought to examine the role of spatial frequency on the detection of threat using a speeded visual search paradigm. Participants searched for threat-relevant (snakes or spiders) or non-threat-relevant (frogs or cockroaches) targets in an array of neutral (flowers or mushrooms) distracters, and we measured search performance with images filtered to contain different levels (high and low) of spatial frequency information. The results replicate previous work demonstrating more rapid detection of threatening versus non-threatening stimuli [e.g. LoBue, V. & DeLoache, J. S. (2008). Detecting the snake in the grass: Attention to fear-relevant stimuli by adults and young children. Psychological Science, 19, 284-289. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02081.x]. Most importantly, the results suggest that low spatial frequency or relatively coarse levels of visual information is sufficient for the rapid and accurate detection of threatening stimuli. Furthermore, the results also suggest that visual similarity between the stimuli used in the search tasks plays a significant role in speeded detection. The results are discussed in terms of the theoretical implications for the rapid detection of threat and methodological implications for properly accounting for similarity between the stimuli in visual search studies.

What accounts for the rapid detection of threat? Evidence for an advantage in perceptual and behavioral responding from eye movements.

Countless studies have reported that adults detect a variety of threatening stimuli more quickly than positive or neutral stimuli. Despite speculation about what factors drive this bias in detection, very few studies have examined the exact search strategies adults use to detect threatening stimuli in visual search. The current research uses an eye-tracker in a classic visual search paradigm in attempt to elucidate the factors that lead to rapid threat detection. Our results replicate previous work, demonstrating that adults detect threatening targets (snakes and spiders) more quickly and accurately than nonthreatening targets (flowers and mushrooms). Results from the eye-tracker extend these findings, suggesting that the bias for threat in detection tasks is driven by both an advantage in perception, or bottom up processing (faster fixations to threats vs. nonthreats), and an advantage in behavioral responding, or top down processing (faster behavioral responding to threats once a target is first fixated). Together, the results present a more complete picture of the mechanisms that drive rapid threat detection, suggesting that multiple factors can lead to an advantage for threat in visual search.

Pick on someone your own size: the detection of threatening facial expressions posed by both child and adult models.

For decades, researchers have documented a bias for the rapid detection of angry faces in adult, child, and even infant participants. However, despite the age of the participant, the facial stimuli used in all of these experiments were schematic drawings or photographs of adult faces. The current research is the first to examine the detection of both child and adult emotional facial expressions. In our study, 3- to 5-year-old children and adults detected angry, sad, and happy faces among neutral distracters. The depicted faces were of adults or of other children. As in previous work, children detected angry faces more quickly than happy and neutral faces overall, and they tended to detect the faces of other children more quickly than the faces of adults. Adults also detected angry faces more quickly than happy and sad faces even when the faces depicted child models. The results are discussed in terms of theoretical implications for the development of a bias for threat in detection.