Flexible adaptation of task-positive brain networks predicts efficiency of evidence accumulation.

Efficiency of evidence accumulation (EEA), an individual's ability to selectively gather goal-relevant information to make adaptive choices, is thought to be a key neurocomputational mechanism associated with cognitive functioning and transdiagnostic risk for psychopathology. However, the neural basis of individual differences in EEA is poorly understood, especially regarding the role of largescale brain network dynamics. We leverage data from 5198 participants from the Human Connectome Project and Adolescent Brain Cognitive Development Study to demonstrate a strong association between EEA and flexible adaptation to cognitive demand in the "task-positive" frontoparietal and dorsal attention networks. Notably, individuals with higher EEA displayed divergent task-positive network activation across n-back task conditions: higher activation under high cognitive demand (2-back) and lower activation under low demand (0-back). These findings suggest that brain networks' flexible adaptation to cognitive demands is a key neural underpinning of EEA.

Using group level factor models to resolve high dimensionality in model-based sampling.

Joint modeling of decisions and neural activation poses the potential to provide significant advances in linking brain and behavior. However, methods of joint modeling have been limited by difficulties in estimation, often due to high dimensionality and simultaneous estimation challenges. In the current article, we propose a method of model estimation that draws on state-of-the-art Bayesian hierarchical modeling techniques and uses factor analysis as a means of dimensionality reduction and inference at the group level. This hierarchical factor approach can adopt any model for the individual and distill the relationships of its parameters across individuals through a factor structure. We demonstrate the significant dimensionality reduction gained by factor analysis and good parameter recovery, and illustrate a variety of factor loading constraints that can be used for different purposes and research questions, as well as three applications of the method to previously analyzed data. We conclude that this method provides a flexible and usable approach with interpretable outcomes that are primarily data-driven, in contrast to the largely hypothesis-driven methods often used in joint modeling. Although we focus on joint modeling methods, this model-based estimation approach could be used for any high dimensional modeling problem. We provide open-source code and accompanying tutorial documentation to make the method accessible to any researchers. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Joint Modelling of Latent Cognitive Mechanisms Shared Across Decision-Making Domains.

Decision-making behavior is often understood using the framework of evidence accumulation models (EAMs). Nowadays, EAMs are applied to various domains of decision-making with the underlying assumption that the latent cognitive constructs proposed by EAMs are consistent across these domains. In this study, we investigate both the extent to which the parameters of EAMs are related between four different decision-making domains and across different time points. To that end, we make use of the novel joint modelling approach, that explicitly includes relationships between parameters, such as covariances or underlying factors, in one combined joint model. Consequently, this joint model also accounts for measurement error and uncertainty within the estimation of these relations. We found that EAM parameters were consistent between time points on three of the four decision-making tasks. For our between-task analysis, we constructed a joint model with a factor analysis on the parameters of the different tasks. Our two-factor joint model indicated that information processing ability was related between the different decision-making domains. However, other cognitive constructs such as the degree of response caution and urgency were only comparable on some domains.

The effects of non-diagnostic information on confidence and decision making.

Many decision-making tasks are characterized by a combination of diagnostic and non-diagnostic information, yet models of responding and confidence almost exclusively focus on the contribution of diagnostic information (e.g., evidence associated with stimulus discriminability), largely ignoring the contribution of non-diagnostic information. An exception is Baranski and Petrusic's Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 24(3), 929-945, (1998) doubt-scaling model, which predicts a negative relationship between non-diagnostic information and confidence, and between non-diagnostic information and accuracy. In two perceptual-choice tasks, we tested the effects of manipulating non-diagnostic information on confidence, accuracy and response time (RT). In Experiment 1, participants viewed a dynamic grid consisting of flashing blue, orange and white pixels and indicated whether the stimulus was predominantly blue or orange (using a response scale ranging from low-confidence blue to high-confidence orange), with the white pixels constituting non-diagnostic information. Increasing non-diagnostic information reduced both confidence and accuracy, generally slowed RTs, and led to an increase in the speed of errors. Experiment 2 replicated these results for a decision-only task, providing further support for the doubt-scaling model of confidence.

A unified account of simple and response-selective inhibition.

Response inhibition is a key attribute of human executive control. Standard stop-signal tasks require countermanding a single response; the speed at which that response can be inhibited indexes the efficacy of the inhibitory control networks. However, more complex stopping tasks, where one or more components of a multi-component action are cancelled (i.e., response-selective stopping) cannot be explained by the independent-race model appropriate for the simple task (Logan and Cowan 1984). Healthy human participants (n=28; 10 male; 19-40 years) completed a response-selective stopping task where a 'go' stimulus required simultaneous (bimanual) button presses in response to left and right pointing green arrows. On a subset of trials (30%) one, or both, arrows turned red (constituting the stop signal) requiring that only the button-press(es) associated with red arrows be cancelled. Electromyographic recordings from both index fingers (first dorsal interosseous) permitted the assessment of both voluntary motor responses that resulted in overt button presses, and activity that was cancelled prior to an overt response (i.e., partial, or covert, responses). We propose a simultaneously inhibit and start (SIS) model that extends the independent race model and provides a highly accurate account of response-selective stopping data. Together with fine-grained EMG analysis, our model-based analysis offers converging evidence that the selective-stop signal simultaneously triggers a process that stops the bimanual response and triggers a new unimanual response corresponding to the green arrow. Our results require a reconceptualisation of response-selective stopping and offer a tractable framework for assessing such tasks in healthy and patient populations. Significance Statement Response inhibition is a key attribute of human executive control, frequently investigated using the stop-signal task. After initiating a motor response to a go signal, a stop signal occasionally appears at a delay, requiring cancellation of the response. This has been conceptualised as a 'race' between the go and stop processes, with the successful (or failed) cancellation determined by which process wins the race. Here we provide a novel computational model for a complex variation of the stop-signal task, where only one component of a multicomponent action needs to be cancelled. We provide compelling muscle activation data that support our model, providing a robust and plausible framework for studying these complex inhibition tasks in both healthy and pathological cohorts.

A hybrid approach to dynamic cognitive psychometrics : Dynamic cognitive psychometrics.

Dynamic cognitive psychometrics measures mental capacities based on the way behavior unfolds over time. It does so using models of psychological processes whose validity is grounded in research from experimental psychology and the neurosciences. However, these models can sometimes have undesirable measurement properties. We propose a "hybrid" modeling approach that achieves good measurement by blending process-based and descriptive components. We demonstrate the utility of this approach in the stop-signal paradigm, in which participants make a series of speeded choices, but occasionally are required to withhold their response when a "stop signal" occurs. The stop-signal paradigm is widely used to measure response inhibition based on a modeling framework that assumes a race between processes triggered by the choice and the stop stimuli. However, the key index of inhibition, the latency of the stop process (i.e., stop-signal reaction time), is not directly observable, and is poorly estimated when the choice and the stop runners are both modeled by psychologically realistic evidence-accumulation processes. We show that using a descriptive account of the stop process, while retaining a realistic account of the choice process, simultaneously enables good measurement of both stop-signal reaction time and the psychological factors that determine choice behavior. We show that this approach, when combined with hierarchical Bayesian estimation, is effective even in a complex choice task that requires participants to perform only a relatively modest number of test trials.

Greater target or lure variability? An exploration on the effects of stimulus types and memory paradigms.

In recognition memory, the variance of the target distribution is almost universally found to be greater than that of the lure distribution. However, these estimates commonly come from long-term memory paradigms where words are used as stimuli. Two exceptions to this rule have found evidence for greater lure variability: a short-term memory task (Yotsumoto et al., Memory & Cognition, 36, 282-294 2008) and in an eyewitness memory paradigm (Wixted et al., Cognitive Psychology, 105, 81-114 2018). In the present work, we conducted a series of recognition memory experiments using different stimulus (faces vs. words) along with different paradigms (long-term vs. short-term paradigms) to evaluate whether either of these conditions would result in greater variability in lure items. Greater target variability was observed across stimulus types and memory paradigms. This suggests that factors other than stimuli and retention interval might be responsible for cases where variability is less for targets than lures.

Proactive cues facilitate faster action reprogramming, but not stopping, in a response-selective stop signal task.

The ability to stop simple ongoing actions has been extensively studied using the stop signal task, but less is known about inhibition in more complex scenarios. Here we used a task requiring bimanual responses to go stimuli, but selective inhibition of only one of those responses following a stop signal. We assessed how proactive cues affect the nature of both the responding and stopping processes, and the well-documented stopping delay (interference effect) in the continuing action following successful stopping. In this task, estimates of the speed of inhibition based on a simple-stopping model are inappropriate, and have produced inconsistent findings about the effects of proactive control on motor inhibition. We instead used a multi-modal approach, based on improved methods of detecting and interpreting partial electromyographical responses and the recently proposed SIS (simultaneously inhibit and start) model of selective stopping behaviour. Our results provide clear and converging evidence that proactive cues reduce the stopping delay effect by slowing bimanual responses and speeding unimanual responses, with a negligible effect on the speed of the stopping process.

What mechanisms mediate prior probability effects on rapid-choice decision-making?

Rapid-choice decision-making is biased by prior probability of response alternatives. Conventionally, prior probability effects are assumed to selectively affect, response threshold, which determines the amount of evidence required to trigger a decision. However, there may also be effects on the rate at which evidence is accumulated and the time required for non-decision processes (e.g., response production). Healthy young (n = 21) and older (n = 20) adults completed a choice response-time task requiring left- or right-hand responses to imperative stimuli. Prior probability was manipulated using a warning stimulus that informed participants that a particular response was 70% likely (i.e., the imperative stimulus was either congruent or incongruent with the warning stimulus). In addition, prior probability was either fixed for blocks of trials (block-wise bias) or varied from trial-to-trial (trial-wise bias). Response time and accuracy data were analysed using the racing diffusion evidence-accumulation model to test the selective influence assumption. Response times for correct responses were slower on incongruent than congruent trials, and older adults' responses were slower, but more accurate, than young adults. Evidence-accumulation modelling favoured an effect of prior probability on both response thresholds and nondecision time. Overall, the current results cast doubt on the selective threshold influence assumption in the racing diffusion model.

Inclusion Bayes factors for mixed hierarchical diffusion decision models.

Cognitive models provide a substantively meaningful quantitative description of latent cognitive processes. The quantitative formulation of these models supports cumulative theory building and enables strong empirical tests. However, the nonlinearity of these models and pervasive correlations among model parameters pose special challenges when applying cognitive models to data. Firstly, estimating cognitive models typically requires large hierarchical data sets that need to be accommodated by an appropriate statistical structure within the model. Secondly, statistical inference needs to appropriately account for model uncertainty to avoid overconfidence and biased parameter estimates. In the present work, we show how these challenges can be addressed through a combination of Bayesian hierarchical modeling and Bayesian model averaging. To illustrate these techniques, we apply the popular diffusion decision model to data from a collaborative selective influence study. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Calibration of cognitive tests to address the reliability paradox for decision-conflict tasks.

Standard, well-established cognitive tasks that produce reliable effects in group comparisons also lead to unreliable measurement when assessing individual differences. This reliability paradox has been demonstrated in decision-conflict tasks such as the Simon, Flanker, and Stroop tasks, which measure various aspects of cognitive control. We aim to address this paradox by implementing carefully calibrated versions of the standard tests with an additional manipulation to encourage processing of conflicting information, as well as combinations of standard tasks. Over five experiments, we show that a Flanker task and a combined Simon and Stroop task with the additional manipulation produced reliable estimates of individual differences in under 100 trials per task, which improves on the reliability seen in benchmark Flanker, Simon, and Stroop data. We make these tasks freely available and discuss both theoretical and applied implications regarding how the cognitive testing of individual differences is carried out.

Automated decision aids: When are they advisors and when do they take control of human decision making?

We applied a computational model to examine the extent to which participants used an automated decision aid as an advisor, as compared to a more autonomous trigger of responding, at varying levels of decision aid reliability. In an air traffic control conflict detection task, we found higher accuracy when the decision aid was correct, and more errors when the decision aid was incorrect, as compared to a manual condition (no decision aid). Responses that were correct despite incorrect automated advice were slower than matched manual responses. Decision aids set at lower reliability (75%) had smaller effects on choices and response times, and were subjectively trusted less, than decision aids set at higher reliability (95%). We fitted an evidence accumulation model to choices and response times to measure how information processing was affected by decision aid inputs. Participants primarily treated low-reliability decision aids as an advisor rather than directly accumulating evidence based on its advice. Participants directly accumulated evidence based upon the advice of high-reliability decision aids, consistent with granting decision aids more autonomous influence over decisions. Individual differences in the level of direct accumulation correlated with subjective trust, suggesting a cognitive mechanism by which trust impacts human decisions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Multifactorial structure of cognitive assessment tests in the UK Biobank: A combined exploratory factor and structural equation modeling analyses.

Introduction: The UK Biobank cognitive assessment data has been a significant resource for researchers looking to investigate predictors and modifiers of cognitive abilities and associated health outcomes in the general population. Given the diverse nature of this data, researchers use different approaches - from the use of a single test to composing the general intelligence score, g, across the tests. We argue that both approaches are suboptimal - one being too specific and the other one too general - and suggest a novel multifactorial solution to represent cognitive abilities. Methods: Using a combined Exploratory Factor (EFA) and Exploratory Structural Equation Modeling Analyses (ESEM) we developed a three-factor model to characterize an underlying structure of nine cognitive tests selected from the UK Biobank using a Cattell-Horn-Carroll framework. We first estimated a series of probable factor solutions using the maximum likelihood method of extraction. The best solution for the EFA-defined factor structure was then tested using the ESEM approach with the aim of confirming or disconfirming the decisions made. Results: We determined that a three-factor model fits the UK Biobank cognitive assessment data best. Two of the three factors can be assigned to fluid reasoning (Gf) with a clear distinction between visuospatial reasoning and verbal-analytical reasoning. The third factor was identified as a processing speed (Gs) factor. Discussion: This study characterizes cognitive assessment data in the UK Biobank and delivers an alternative view on its underlying structure, suggesting that the three factor model provides a more granular solution than g that can further be applied to study different facets of cognitive functioning in relation to health outcomes and to further progress examination of its biological underpinnings.

A cognitive process modeling framework for the ABCD study stop-signal task.

The Adolescent Brain Cognitive Development (ABCD) Study is a longitudinal neuroimaging study of unprecedented scale that is in the process of following over 11,000 youth from middle childhood though age 20. However, a design feature of the study's stop-signal task violates "context independence", an assumption critical to current non-parametric methods for estimating stop-signal reaction time (SSRT), a key measure of inhibitory ability in the study. This has led some experts to call for the task to be changed and for previously collected data to be used with caution. We present a cognitive process modeling framework, the RDEX-ABCD model, that provides a parsimonious explanation for the impact of this design feature on "go" stimulus processing and successfully accounts for key behavioral trends in the ABCD data. Simulation studies using this model suggest that failing to account for the context independence violations in the ABCD design can lead to erroneous inferences in several realistic scenarios. However, we demonstrate that RDEX-ABCD effectively addresses these violations and can be used to accurately measure SSRT along with an array of additional mechanistic parameters of interest (e.g., attention to the stop signal, cognitive efficiency), advancing investigators' ability to draw valid and nuanced inferences from ABCD data. AVAILABILITY OF DATA AND MATERIALS: Data from the ABCD Study are available through the NIH Data Archive (NDA): nda.nih.gov/abcd. Code for all analyses featured in this study is openly available on the Open Science Framework (OSF): osf.io/2h8a7/.

Dynamic workload measurement and modeling: Driving and conversing.

Tillman et al. (2017) used evidence-accumulation modeling to ascertain the effects of a conversation (either with a passenger or on a hands-free cell phone) on a drivers' mental workload. They found that a concurrent conversation increased the response threshold but did not alter the rate of evidence accumulation. However, this earlier research collapsed across speaking and listening components of a natural conversation, potentially masking any dynamic fluctuations associated with this dual-task combination. In the present study, a unique implementation of the detection response task was used to simultaneously measure the demands on the driver and the nondriver when they were speaking or when they were listening. We found that the natural ebb and flow of a conversation altered both the rate of evidence accumulation and the response threshold for drivers and nondrivers alike. The dynamic fluctuations in cognitive workload observed with this novel method illustrate how quickly the parameters of cognition are altered by real-time task demands. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

A unified theory of discrete and continuous responding.

Understanding the cognitive processes underlying choice requires theories that can disentangle the representation of stimuli from the processes that map these representations onto observed responses. We develop a dynamic theory of how stimuli are mapped onto discrete (choice) and onto continuous response scales. It proposes that the mapping from a stimulus to an internal representation and then to an evidence accumulation process is accomplished using multiple reference points or "anchors." Evidence is accumulated until a threshold amount for a particular response is obtained, with the relative balance of support for each anchor at that time determining the response. We tested this multiple anchored accumulation theory (MAAT) using the results of two experiments requiring discrete or continuous responses to line length and color stimuli. We manipulated the number of options for discrete responses, the number of different stimuli, and the similarity among them, and compared the outcomes to continuous response conditions. We show that MAAT accounts for several key phenomena: more accurate, faster, and more skewed distributions of responses near the ends of a response scale; lower accuracy and slower responses as the number of discrete choice options increases; and longer response times and lower accuracy when alternative responses are more similar to the target response. Our empirical and modeling results suggest that discrete and continuous response tasks can share a common evidence representation, and that the decision process is sensitive to the perceived similarity among the response options. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Evidence accumulation modelling in the wild: understanding safety-critical decisions.

Evidence accumulation models (EAMs) are a class of computational cognitive model used to understand the latent cognitive processes that underlie human decisions and response times (RTs). They have seen widespread application in cognitive psychology and neuroscience. However, historically, the application of these models was limited to simple decision tasks. Recently, researchers have applied these models to gain insight into the cognitive processes that underlie observed behaviour in applied domains, such as air-traffic control (ATC), driving, forensic and medical image discrimination, and maritime surveillance. Here, we discuss how this modelling approach helps researchers understand how the cognitive system adapts to task demands and interventions, such as task automation. We also discuss future directions and argue for wider adoption of cognitive modelling in Human Factors research.

Comparing models of learning and relearning in large-scale cognitive training data sets.

Practice in real-world settings exhibits many idiosyncracies of scheduling and duration that can only be roughly approximated by laboratory research. Here we investigate 39,157 individuals' performance on two cognitive games on the Lumosity platform over a span of 5 years. The large-scale nature of the data allows us to observe highly varied lengths of uncontrolled interruptions to practice and offers a unique view of learning in naturalistic settings. We enlist a suite of models that grow in the complexity of the mechanisms they postulate and conclude that long-term naturalistic learning is best described with a combination of long-term skill and task-set preparedness. We focus additionally on the nature and speed of relearning after breaks in practice and conclude that those components must operate interactively to produce the rapid relearning that is evident even at exceptionally long delays (over 2 years). Naturalistic learning over long time spans provides a strong test for the robustness of theoretical accounts of learning, and should be more broadly used in the learning sciences.

An app-enhanced cognitive fitness training program for athletes: The rationale and validation protocol.

The core dimensions of cognitive fitness, such as attention and cognitive control, are emerging through a transdisciplinary expert consensus on what has been termed the Cognitive Fitness Framework (CF2). These dimensions represent key drivers of cognitive performance under pressure across many occupations, from first responders to sport, performing arts and the military. The constructs forming the building blocks of CF2 come from the RDoC framework, an initiative of the US National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) aimed at identifying the cognitive processes underlying normal and abnormal behavior. Similar to physical conditioning, cognitive fitness can be improved with deliberate practice. This paper reports the development of a prototype cognitive fitness training program for competitive athletes and the protocol for its evaluation. The program is focused on primary cognitive capacities and subtending skills for adjusting training rhythms and enhancing readiness for competition. The project is driven by the Australian Psychological Society's College of Sport & Exercise Psychology and includes the development of a Cognitive Gym program for a smartphone app-enhanced implementation. Its key building blocks are training protocols (drills) connected by a periodized training plan. A website with background supporting resources has also been developed as part of the project. National-level training squads will participate in a three-week pilot evaluation protocol, assessing the program's efficacy and usability through gamified cognitive assessment of participants' training gains and coaching staff evaluations, respectively. Both near and far transfer of training effects will be examined.

Self-reported mind wandering reflects executive control and selective attention.

Mind wandering is ubiquitous in everyday life and has a pervasive and profound impact on task-related performance. A range of psychological processes have been proposed to underlie these performance-related decrements, including failures of executive control, volatile information processing, and shortcomings in selective attention to critical task-relevant stimuli. Despite progress in the development of such theories, existing descriptive analyses have limited capacity to discriminate between the theories. We propose a cognitive-model based analysis that simultaneously explains self-reported mind wandering and task performance. We quantitatively compare six explanations of poor performance in the presence of mind wandering. The competing theories are distinguished by whether there is an impact on executive control and, if so, how executive control acts on information processing, and whether there is an impact on volatility of information processing. Across two experiments using the sustained attention to response task, we find quantitative evidence that mind wandering is associated with two latent factors. Our strongest conclusion is that executive control is impaired: increased mind wandering is associated with reduced ability to inhibit habitual response tendencies. Our nuanced conclusion is that executive control deficits manifest in reduced ability to selectively attend to the information value of rare but task-critical events.