Emergence of swine influenza A virus, porcine respirovirus 1 and swine orthopneumovirus in porcine respiratory disease in Germany.

Respiratory disease is a significant economic issue in pig farming, with a complex aetiology that includes swine influenza A viruses (swIAV), which are common in European domestic pig populations. The most recent human influenza pandemic in 2009 showed swIAV's zoonotic potential. Monitoring pathogens and disease control are critical from a preventive standpoint, and are based on quick, sensitive, and specific diagnostic assays capable of detecting and distinguishing currently circulating swIAV in clinical samples. For passive surveillance, a set of multiplex quantitative reverse transcription real-time PCRs (mRT-qPCR) and MinION-directed sequencing was updated and deployed. Several lineages and genotypes of swIAV were shown to be dynamically developing, including novel reassortants between human pandemic H1N1 and the avian-derived H1 lineage of swIAV. Despite this, nearly 70% (842/1216) of individual samples from pigs with respiratory symptoms were swIAV-negative, hinting to different aetiologies. The complex and synergistic interactions of swIAV infections with other viral and bacterial infectious agents contribute to the aggravation of pig respiratory diseases. Using a newly developed mRT-qPCR for the combined detection of swIAV and the recently described porcine respirovirus 1 (PRV1) and swine orthopneumovirus (SOV) widespread co-circulation of PRV1 (19.6%, 238/1216 samples) and SOV (14.2%, 173/1216 samples) was evident. Because of the high incidence of PRV1 and SOV infections in pigs with respiratory disease, these viruses may emerge as new allies in the porcine respiratory disease syndrome.

Mass mortality among colony-breeding seabirds in the German Wadden Sea in 2022 due to distinct genotypes of HPAIV H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b.

Mass mortality was observed among colony-breeding seabirds in the German Wadden Sea area of the North Sea during the summer months of 2022. Several species' colonies were affected, most notably sandwich terns (Thalasseus sandvicensis), common terns (Sterna hirundo) and Germany's only northern gannet (Morus bassanus) colony on the island of Heligoland. Mortality in some tern colonies reached 40%, while other colonies were almost spared. In all cases, infections with the high-pathogenicity avian influenza virus (HPAIV) subtype H5N1 of clade 2.3.4.4b were identified to have caused the epidemic. Phylogenetic analysis of whole-genome sequences revealed that the outbreaks were dominated by two genotypes, Ger-10-21 N1.2 and Ger-10-21 N1.5, previously identified in Germany. Spatiotemporal analyses of phylogenetic data suggested that these viruses could have entered the continental North Sea coastal region via the British Isles. A close linkage of viruses from tern colonies in the German Wadden Sea was evident with further connections to breeding colonies in Belgium and the Netherlands, and further spread to Denmark and Poland. Several of the affected species are endangered, such that negative effects of epizootic HPAIV infections on populations are feared, with uncertain long-term consequences.

Are pigs overestimated as a source of zoonotic influenza viruses?

BACKGROUND: Swine influenza caused by influenza A viruses (IAV) directly affects respiratory health and indirectly impairs reproduction rates in pigs causing production losses. In Europe, and elsewhere, production systems have intensified featuring fewer holdings but, in turn, increased breeding herd and litter sizes. This seems to foster swine IAV (swIAV) infections with respect to the entrenchment within and spread between holdings. Disease management of swine influenza is difficult and relies on biosecurity and vaccination measures. Recently discovered and widely proliferating forms of self-sustaining modes of swIAV infections in large swine holdings challenge these preventive concepts by generating vaccine-escape mutants in rolling circles of infection. MAIN BODY: The most recent human IAV pandemic of 2009 rooted at least partly in IAV of porcine origin highlighting the zoonotic potential of swIAV. Pigs constitute a mixing vessel of IAV from different species including avian and human hosts. However, other host species such as turkey and quail but also humans themselves may also act in this way; thus, pigs are not essentially required for the generation of IAV reassortants with a multispecies origin. Since 1918, all human pandemic influenza viruses except the H2N2 virus of 1958 have been transmitted in a reverse zoonotic mode from human into swine populations. Swine populations act as long-term reservoirs of these viruses. Human-derived IAV constitute a major driver of swIAV epidemiology in pigs. Swine-to-human IAV transmissions occurred rarely and mainly sporadically as compared to avian-to-human spill-over events of avian IAV. Yet, new swIAV variants that harbor zoonotic components continue to be detected. This increases the risk that such components might eventually reassort into viruses with pandemic potential. CONCLUSIONS: Domestic pig populations should not be globally stigmatized as the only or most important reservoir of potentially zoonotic IAV. The likely emergence from swine of the most recent human IAV pandemic in 2009, however, emphasized the principal risks of swine populations in which IAV circulate unimpededly. Implementation of regular and close-meshed IAV surveillance of domestic swine populations to follow the dynamics of swIAV evolution is clearly demanded. Improved algorithms for directly inferring zoonotic potential from whole IAV genome sequences as well as improved vaccines are still being sought.