Enhancing compliance with waste sorting regulations through inspections and motivational interviewing.

This field experiment investigates the effect of first-time inspections of restaurants' waste sorting and explores whether motivational interviewing (MI) training of inspectors in this specific setting enhances the propensity of restaurants to be compliant with regulations. Our results show strong positive effects of first inspections with an average improvement of 55%. Also, the MI training of inspectors seems to affect compliance. However, this may also be a combined effect of the first inspection, MI training and more days between inspections. Further research is needed.

Assessing the consequences of quarantines during a pandemic.

This paper analyzes the epidemiological and economic effects of quarantines. We use a basic epidemiological model, a SEIR-model, that is calibrated to roughly resemble the COVID-19 pandemic, and we assume that individuals that become infected or are isolated on average lose a share of their productivity. An early quarantine postpones but does not alter the course of the pandemic at a cost that increases in the duration and the extent of the quarantine. For quarantines at later stages of the pandemic there is a trade-off between lowering the peak level of infectious people on the one hand and minimizing fatalities and economic losses on the other hand. A longer quarantine dampens the peak level of infectious people and also reduces the total number of infected persons but increases economic losses. Both the peak level of infectious individuals and the total share of the population that will have been infected are U-shaped in relation to the share of the population in quarantine, while economic costs increase in this share. In particular, a quarantine covering a moderate share of the population leads to a lower peak, fewer deaths and lower economic costs, but it implies that the peak of the pandemic occurs earlier.

On the optimal production capacity for influenza vaccine.

This paper analyzes the profit maximizing capacity choice of a monopolistic vaccine producer facing the uncertain event of a pandemic in a homogenous population of forward-looking individuals. For any capacity level, the monopolist solves the intertemporal price discrimination problem within the dynamic setting generated by the standard mathematical epidemiological model of infectious diseases. Even though consumers are assumed to be identical, the monopolist will be able to exploit the ex post heterogeneity between infected and susceptible individuals by raising the price of vaccine in response to the increasing hazard rate. The monopolist thus bases its investment decision on the expected profits from the optimal price path given the infection dynamics. It is shown that the monopolist will always choose to invest in a lower production capacity than the social planner. Through numerical simulation, it is demonstrated how the loss to society of having a monopoly producer decreases with the speed of infection transmission. Moreover, it is illustrated how the monopolist's optimal vaccination rate increases as its discount rate rises for cost parameters based on Swedish data. However, the effect of the firm discount rate on its investment decision is sensitive to assumptions regarding the cost of production capacity.