Effects of Instrumentality and Personal Force on Deontological and Utilitarian Inclinations in Harm-Related Moral Dilemmas.

Moral dilemmas often concern actions that involve causing harm to others in the attempt to prevent greater harm. But not all actions of this kind are equal in terms of their moral evaluation. In particular, a harm-causing preventive action is typically regarded as less acceptable if the harm is a means to achieve the goal of preventing greater harm than if it is a foreseen but unintended side-effect of the action. Likewise, a harm-causing preventive action is typically deemed less acceptable if it directly produces the harm than if it merely initiates a process that brings about the harmful consequence by its own dynamics. We report three experiments that investigated to which degree these two variables, the instrumentality of the harm (harm as means vs. side-effect; Experiments 1, 2, and 3) and personal force (personal vs. impersonal dilemmas; Experiments 2 and 3) influence deontological (harm-rejection) and utilitarian (outcome-maximization) inclinations that have been hypothesized to underly moral judgments in harm-related moral dilemmas. To measure these moral inclinations, the process dissociation procedure was used. The results suggest that the instrumentality of the harm and personal force affect both inclinations, but in opposite ways. Personal dilemmas and dilemmas characterized by harm as a means evoked higher deontological tendencies and lower utilitarian tendencies, than impersonal dilemmas and dilemmas where the harm was a side-effect. These distinct influences of the two dilemma conceptualization variables went undetected if the conventional measure of moral inclinations, the proportion of harm-accepting judgments, was analyzed. Furthermore, although deontological and utilitarian inclinations were found to be largely independent overall, there was some evidence that their correlation depended on the experimental conditions.

Development of the Greifswald questionnaire for the measurement of interprofessional attitudes.

Introduction: The implementation of interprofessional education (IPE) could be a potential approach to dealing with increasing complexity in health care. And thus, encouraging interprofessional collaborations to minimize errors in patient care. However, empirical evidence regarding the effectiveness of IPE is inconclusive. One reason for this is a lack of valid and reliable evaluation instruments. This study aims to illustrate the first steps of the development and validation of a German evaluation instrument for the measurement of interprofessional attitudes. Methods: To achieve high psychometric quality, we first selected relevant attitude dimensions and specified criteria for the wording of the items. The a priori developed factor structure was evaluated via factor analysis and the internal consistencies of the scales were analysed in a sample of medical students and nursing trainees, both participants of an IPE course (n=338). Stability was evaluated in an additional sample of nursing trainees (n=14). Results: The Factor analysis revealed three dimensions. Whereby, the two factors "Relevance of learning interprofessional communicational techniques" (German: Wichtigkeit Techniken interprofessioneller Kommunikation zu lernen) (α=.85) and "Doubts, dismissal and perceived barriers" (German: Zweifel, Ablehnung und wahrgenommene Barrieren) (α=.73) revealed good to acceptable internal consistency. Third-factor "Attitude towards another profession" (German: Einstellung zur anderen Berufsgruppe) (α=.62) remained below a desired internal consistency of α>.70. Factors "Doubts, dismissal and perceived barriers", as well as "Attitude towards another profession" showed sufficient stability for pre-/post-measurements. Discussion: The Greifswald Questionnaire for the Measurement of Interprofessional Attitudes is the first version of a three-dimensional tool to evaluate IPE in German-speaking countries. Results showed insufficient item difficulty in the tested sample, which resulted in an insufficient internal consistency, and retest reliability for some factors. Further studies are required to investigate item difficulty, internal consistency and retest reliability in a postgraduate sample.

Functional Freedom: A Psychological Model of Freedom in Decision-Making.

The freedom of a decision is not yet sufficiently described as a psychological variable. We present a model of functional decision freedom that aims to fill that role. The model conceptualizes functional freedom as a capacity of people that varies depending on certain conditions of a decision episode. It denotes an inner capability to consciously shape complex decisions according to one's own values and needs. Functional freedom depends on three compensatory dimensions: it is greatest when the decision-maker is highly rational, when the structure of the decision is highly underdetermined, and when the decision process is strongly based on conscious thought and reflection. We outline possible research questions, argue for psychological benefits of functional decision freedom, and explicate the model's implications on current knowledge and research. In conclusion, we show that functional freedom is a scientific variable, permitting an additional psychological foothold in research on freedom, and that is compatible with a deterministic worldview.

The experience of freedom in decisions - Questioning philosophical beliefs in favor of psychological determinants.

Six experiments tested two competing models of subjective freedom during decision-making. The process model is mainly based on philosophical conceptions of free will and assumes that features of the process of choosing affect subjective feelings of freedom. In contrast, the outcome model predicts that subjective freedom is due to positive outcomes that can be expected or are achieved by a decision. Results heavily favored the outcome model over the process model. For example, participants felt freer when choosing between two equally good than two equally bad options. Process features including number of options, complexity of decision, uncertainty, having the option to defer the decision, conflict among reasons, and investing high effort in choosing generally had no or even negative effects on subjective freedom. In contrast, participants reported high freedom with good outcomes and low freedom with bad outcomes, and ease of deciding increased subjective freedom, consistent with the outcome model.

Mindsets in social anxiety: a new look at selective information processing.

According to the Rubicon Model of Action Phases (in: J. Gollwitzer, 1996), Motivation, volition, and action, Enzyclopedia of psychology, series "motivation and emotion", Vol. 4, Hogrefe, Göttingen, 1996, pp. 531-582), different stages in goal pursuit are accompanied by different mindsets that enhance processing of mindset-congruous information. Before people engage in action, they usually deliberate possible goals for a given situation (deliberative mindset). Once a goal is chosen, they plan how to achieve this particular goal (implemental mindset). The present experiments tested the hypothesis that people with social anxiety show a reversal of mindsets when approaching social situations. In Experiment 1, 20 students were asked to either deliberate goals for a hypothetical social conflict (deliberation), or to think about steps to solve the conflict (implementation). An unexpected recognition test demonstrated different recognition memory for deliberation-related versus implementation-related information in the two groups, consistent with the hypothesis of different mindsets. In Experiment 2, 48 students who were either high or low in social anxiety were randomly assigned to either the deliberation or the implementation condition. Participants high in social anxiety showed a pattern in the recognition test that was consistent with a reversal of mindsets. When asked to plan social situations, they showed an inappropriate deliberative mindset. In contrast, they lacked a deliberative mindset when deliberating goals for the social situation. The result indicate that socially anxious people engage in information processing that interferes with successful goal attainment when approaching social situations.