RESUMO
When mentally simulating life events, people may visualize them from either an actor's 1st-person or observer's 3rd-person visual perspective. Two experiments demonstrated that visual perspective differentially determines reliance on 2 distinct forms of self-knowledge: associative evaluations of the simulated environment and propositional self-beliefs about relevant values and preferences. Implicit measures indexed associative evaluations of environmental stimuli (political candidates, outgroups); explicit measures indexed propositional self-beliefs about relevant personal values or preferences. A separate session manipulated participants' visual perspective for mentally simulating a pertinent event (voting, interracial interaction) as they forecasted their behavior or feelings if that event occurred. Forecasts corresponded more closely with associative evaluations from the 1st-person than 3rd-person perspective but more closely with propositional self-beliefs from the 3rd-person than 1st-person. Results have practical implications for channeling the power of mental simulation to desired ends and theoretical implications for understanding the pathways by which imagery and mental simulation shape cognition.
