Developmental reversals in false memory: Development is complementary, not compensatory.

We report the 1st example of a true complementarity effect in memory development-a situation in which memory for the same event simultaneously becomes more and less accurate between early childhood and adulthood. We investigated this paradoxical effect because fuzzy-trace theory predicts that it can occur in paradigms that produce developmental reversals in false memory, which are circumstances in which adults are more likely than children to remember new events as old. The complementarity prediction is this: If subjects separately judge whether those same events are new but similar to old ones, adults will be more accurate than children, even though adults are less accurate when they judge whether the items are old. We report 4 experiments in which children (6- and 10-year-olds), adolescents (14-year-olds), and adults encoded the modal developmental reversal materials: Deese-Roediger-McDermott lists. Then, they responded to memory tests on which half the subjects judged whether test items were old and half judged whether the same items were new-similar. The paradoxical complementarity effect was detected in all experiments: The tendency to falsely remember new-similar items as being old increased with development, but so did the tendency to correctly remember them as being new-similar. (PsycINFO Database Record

Overdistribution illusions: Categorical judgments produce them, confidence ratings reduce them.

Overdistribution is a form of memory distortion in which an event is remembered as belonging to too many episodic states, states that are logically or empirically incompatible with each other. We investigated a response formatting method of suppressing 2 basic types of overdistribution, disjunction and conjunction illusions, which parallel some classic illusions in the judgment and decision making literature. In this method, subjects respond to memory probes by rating their confidence that test cues belong to specific episodic states (e.g., presented on List 1, presented on List 2), rather than by making the usual categorical judgments about those states. The central prediction, which was derived from the task calibration principle of fuzzy-trace theory, was that confidence ratings should reduce overdistribution by diminishing subjects' reliance on noncompensatory gist memories. The data of 3 experiments agreed with that prediction. In Experiment 1, there were reliable disjunction illusions with categorical judgments but not with confidence ratings. In Experiment 2, both response formats produced reliable disjunction illusions, but those for confidence ratings were much smaller than those for categorical judgments. In Experiment 3, there were reliable conjunction illusions with categorical judgments but not with confidence ratings. Apropos of recent controversies over confidence-accuracy correlations in memory, such correlations were positive for hits, negative for correct rejections, and the 2 types of correlations were of equal magnitude. (PsycINFO Database Record

Overdistribution in source memory.

Semantic false memories are confounded with a second type of error, overdistribution, in which items are attributed to contradictory episodic states. Overdistribution errors have proved to be more common than false memories when the 2 are disentangled. We investigated whether overdistribution is prevalent in another classic false memory paradigm: source monitoring. It is. Conventional false memory responses (source misattributions) were predominantly overdistribution errors, but unlike semantic false memory, overdistribution also accounted for more than half of true memory responses (correct source attributions). Experimental control of overdistribution was achieved via a series of manipulations that affected either recollection of contextual details or item memory (concreteness, frequency, list order, number of presentation contexts, and individual differences in verbatim memory). A theoretical model was used to analyze the data (conjoint process dissociation) that predicts that (a) overdistribution is directly proportional to item memory but inversely proportional to recollection and (b) item memory is not a necessary precondition for recollection of contextual details. The results were consistent with both predictions.

Developmental reversals in false memory: Effects of emotional valence and arousal.

Do the emotional valence and arousal of events distort children's memories? Do valence and arousal modulate counterintuitive age increases in false memory? We investigated those questions in children, adolescents, and adults using the Cornell/Cortland Emotion Lists, a word list pool that induces false memories and in which valence and arousal can be manipulated factorially. False memories increased with age for unpresented semantic associates of word lists, and net accuracy (the ratio of true memory to total memory) decreased with age. These surprising developmental trends were more pronounced for negatively valenced materials than for positively valenced materials, they were more pronounced for high-arousal materials than for low-arousal materials, and developmental increases in the effects of arousal were small in comparison with developmental increases in the effects of valence. These findings have ramifications for legal applications of false memory research; materials that share the emotional hallmark of crimes (events that are negatively valenced and arousing) produced the largest age increases in false memory and the largest age declines in net accuracy.

Behavioral measurement of remembering phenomenologies: so simple a child can do it.

Two remembering phenomenologies, vivid recollection and vague familiarity, have been extensively studied in adults using introspective self-report tasks, such as remember-know. Because such tasks are beyond the capabilities of young children, there is no database on how these phenomenologies first develop and what factors affect them. In experiments with 5- to 14-year-olds, a child-appropriate behavioral methodology (conjoint recognition) was used to measure these phenomenologies. For both true and false memory, there were marked age increases in vivid recollective experiences, coupled with only slight increases in vague familiarity experiences. Thus, there is a vague-to-vivid developmental shift in the mental states that accompany remembering, a finding that is predicted by fuzzy-trace theory's explanation of recollection and familiarity.

Dissociating automatic and intentional processes in children's eyewitness memory.

Two experiments investigated the contribution of automatic and intentional memory processes to 5- and 8-year-old children's acceptance of misinformation. Children were presented with a picture story followed by misleading postevent details that either were read to participants or were self-generated in response to semantic and perceptual hints. Children were then given a recognition test under 2 instructional conditions. In the inclusion condition children reported whether they remembered items from either of the previous phases. In the exclusion condition children were instructed to exclude postevent suggestions. Children were more likely to accept misled-generate items compared to misled-read items in the inclusion condition, but the opposite was the case under exclusion instructions. Both automaticity and recollection (cf. L. L. Jacoby, 1991) influenced misinformation acceptance, but the role of automatic processes declined with age.