COVID-Dynamic: A large-scale longitudinal study of socioemotional and behavioral change across the pandemic.

The COVID-19 pandemic has caused enormous societal upheaval globally. In the US, beyond the devastating toll on life and health, it triggered an economic shock unseen since the great depression and laid bare preexisting societal inequities. The full impacts of these personal, social, economic, and public-health challenges will not be known for years. To minimize societal costs and ensure future preparedness, it is critical to record the psychological and social experiences of individuals during such periods of high societal volatility. Here, we introduce, describe, and assess the COVID-Dynamic dataset, a within-participant longitudinal study conducted from April 2020 through January 2021, that captures the COVID-19 pandemic experiences of >1000 US residents. Each of 16 timepoints combines standard psychological assessments with novel surveys of emotion, social/political/moral attitudes, COVID-19-related behaviors, tasks assessing implicit attitudes and social decision-making, and external data to contextualize participants' responses. This dataset is a resource for researchers interested in COVID-19-specific questions and basic psychological phenomena, as well as clinicians and policy-makers looking to mitigate the effects of future calamities.

Filled/non-filled pairs: An empirical challenge to the integrated information theory of consciousness.

Perceptual filling-in for vision is the insertion of visual properties (e.g., color, contour, luminance, or motion) into one's visual field, when those properties have no corresponding retinal input. This paper introduces and provides preliminary empirical support for filled/non-filled pairs, pairs of images that appear identical, yet differ by amount of filling-in. It is argued that such image pairs are important to the experimental testing of theories of consciousness. We review recent experimental research and conclude that filling-in involves brain activity with relatively high integrated information (Φ) compared to veridical visual perceptions. We then present filled/non-filled pairs as an empirical challenge to the integrated information theory of consciousness, which predicts that phenomenologically identical experiences depend on brain processes with identical Φ.