A program to support the construction and evaluation of resilience indicators.

The main objective of this work is to propose a method and a tool to support the development of indicators able to inform an organization about the state of its resilience through a cyclical process of identifying its resilience factors, proposing resilience indicators, assessing its organizational resilience followed by assessing and improving the resilience indicators. The research uses concepts from complex adaptive systems and from resilience engineering to establish an initial set of indicators able to assess elements that contribute to organizational resilience, and structures them temporarily as a hierarchy. A software application to support indicator definition and structuring, questionnaire generation, and result assessment activities was built to assist in speeding up the experiment-adjust cycle. Prototype indicators were instantiated with helicopter operating companies in mind, and were reviewed by a domain expert.

Normal people working in normal organizations with normal equipment: system safety and cognition in a mid-air collision.

A fundamental challenge in improving the safety of complex systems is to understand how accidents emerge in normal working situations, with equipment functioning normally in normally structured organizations. We present a field study of the en route mid-air collision between a commercial carrier and an executive jet, in the clear afternoon Amazon sky in which 154 people lost their lives, that illustrates one response to this challenge. Our focus was on how and why the several safety barriers of a well structured air traffic system melted down enabling the occurrence of this tragedy, without any catastrophic component failure, and in a situation where everything was functioning normally. We identify strong consistencies and feedbacks regarding factors of system day-to-day functioning that made monitoring and awareness difficult, and the cognitive strategies that operators have developed to deal with overall system behavior. These findings emphasize the active problem-solving behavior needed in air traffic control work, and highlight how the day-to-day functioning of the system can jeopardize such behavior. An immediate consequence is that safety managers and engineers should review their traditional safety approach and accident models based on equipment failure probability, linear combinations of failures, rules and procedures, and human errors, to deal with complex patterns of coincidence possibilities, unexpected links, resonance among system functions and activities, and system cognition.