Dual effects of conformity on the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas.

Human beings are easily impacted by social influences, due to their social nature. As an essential manifestation of social influences, conformity is associated with the frequency witnessed in others' behavior, involving normative conformity and informational conformity according to the reaction of individuals. The former comes from the fear of a normative environment, while the latter means most behaviors are followed due to information asymmetry. Normative conformity significantly enhances network reciprocity, producing optimal cooperation at a moderate proportion, which induces within-cluster behavioral homogeneity and between-cluster behavioral diversity. On the contrary, informational conformity has an inhibitory effect on the evolution of cooperation for a low proportion of the conformity population, which contributes to the formation of defectors' clusters. The symmetry and duality of the two types of conformity on cooperation evolution provide an interesting and unexplored approach for future research, revealing the mechanism of conformity in evolutionary games.

Deterrence through punishment can resolve collective risk dilemmas in carbon emission games.

Collective risk social dilemmas are at the heart of the most pressing global challenges we are facing today, including climate change mitigation and the overuse of natural resources. Previous research has framed this problem as a public goods game (PGG), where a dilemma arises between short-term interests and long-term sustainability. In the PGG, subjects are placed in groups and asked to choose between cooperation and defection, while keeping in mind their personal interests as well as the commons. Here, we explore how and to what extent the costly punishment of defectors is successful in enforcing cooperation by means of human experiments. We show that an apparent irrational underestimation of the risk of being punished plays an important role, and that for sufficiently high punishment fines, this vanishes and the threat of deterrence suffices to preserve the commons. Interestingly, however, we find that high fines not only avert freeriders, but they also demotivate some of the most generous altruists. As a consequence, the tragedy of the commons is predominantly averted due to cooperators that contribute only their "fair share" to the common pool. We also find that larger groups require larger fines for the deterrence of punishment to have the desired prosocial effect.

Directed transport of symmetrically periodic system induced by "color" breaking of noise.

In general, no transport can emerge in a spatially symmetric periodic system subjected to an unbiased dichotomous periodic driving. Here, we used a noise, which switches synchronously with the driving in three cases [switch between Gaussian white noise and colored noise, two colored noises with different colors (e.g., autocorrelation rate), and Gaussian white noise and harmonic velocity noise], to drive such a symmetric system. Numerical results for the cases indicate that the directed transport of the symmetric system can be induced merely by the color breaking (the difference in two autocorrelation rates) of the switch noise. The amplitude of current depends on the difference, i.e., the greater the difference, the greater the current. Also, the greater autocorrelation rate between the two noises determines the direction of current. The current as a function of the noise intensity for all cases has in common that appropriate noise intensity induces optimal transport. Further investigations show that the color breaking comes from the difference of barrier heights between the left and right-tilted potentials induced by the different autocorrelation rates.

Effect of correlations on controllability transition in network control.

The network control problem has recently attracted an increasing amount of attention, owing to concerns including the avoidance of cascading failures of power-grids and the management of ecological networks. It has been proven that numerical control can be achieved if the number of control inputs exceeds a certain transition point. In the present study, we investigate the effect of degree correlation on the numerical controllability in networks whose topological structures are reconstructed from both real and modeling systems, and we find that the transition point of the number of control inputs depends strongly on the degree correlation in both undirected and directed networks with moderately sparse links. More interestingly, the effect of the degree correlation on the transition point cannot be observed in dense networks for numerical controllability, which contrasts with the corresponding result for structural controllability. In particular, for directed random networks and scale-free networks, the influence of the degree correlation is determined by the types of correlations. Our approach provides an understanding of control problems in complex sparse networks.

Multiple effect of social influence on cooperation in interdependent network games.

The social influence exists widely in the human society, where individual decision-making process (from congressional election to electronic commerce) may be affected by the attitude and behavior of others belonging to different social networks. Here, we couple the snowdrift (SD) game and the prisoner's dilemma (PD) game on two interdependent networks, where strategies in both games are associated by social influence to mimick the majority rule. More accurately, individuals' strategies updating refers to social learning (based on payoff difference) and above-mentioned social influence (related with environment of interdependent group), which is controlled by social influence strength s. Setting s = 0 decouples the networks and returns the traditional network game; while its increase involves the interactions between networks. By means of numerous Monte Carlo simulations, we find that such a mechanism brings multiple influence to the evolution of cooperation. Small s leads to unequal cooperation level in both games, because social learning is still the main updating rule for most players. Though intermediate and large s guarantees the synchronized evolution of strategy pairs, cooperation finally dies out and reaches a completely dominance in both cases. Interestingly, these observations are attributed to the expansion of cooperation clusters. Our work may provide a new understanding to the emergence of cooperation in intercorrelated social systems.

Bidirectional selection between two classes in complex social networks.

The bidirectional selection between two classes widely emerges in various social lives, such as commercial trading and mate choosing. Until now, the discussions on bidirectional selection in structured human society are quite limited. We demonstrated theoretically that the rate of successfully matching is affected greatly by individuals' neighborhoods in social networks, regardless of the type of networks. Furthermore, it is found that the high average degree of networks contributes to increasing rates of successful matches. The matching performance in different types of networks has been quantitatively investigated, revealing that the small-world networks reinforces the matching rate more than scale-free networks at given average degree. In addition, our analysis is consistent with the modeling result, which provides the theoretical understanding of underlying mechanisms of matching in complex networks.

Cyclic dominance in evolutionary games: a review.

Rock is wrapped by paper, paper is cut by scissors and scissors are crushed by rock. This simple game is popular among children and adults to decide on trivial disputes that have no obvious winner, but cyclic dominance is also at the heart of predator-prey interactions, the mating strategy of side-blotched lizards, the overgrowth of marine sessile organisms and competition in microbial populations. Cyclical interactions also emerge spontaneously in evolutionary games entailing volunteering, reward, punishment, and in fact are common when the competing strategies are three or more, regardless of the particularities of the game. Here, we review recent advances on the rock-paper-scissors (RPS) and related evolutionary games, focusing, in particular, on pattern formation, the impact of mobility and the spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance. We also review mean-field and zero-dimensional RPS models and the application of the complex Ginzburg-Landau equation, and we highlight the importance and usefulness of statistical physics for the successful study of large-scale ecological systems. Directions for future research, related, for example, to dynamical effects of coevolutionary rules and invasion reversals owing to multi-point interactions, are also outlined.

Spreading of cooperative behaviour across interdependent groups.

Recent empirical research has shown that links between groups reinforce individuals within groups to adopt cooperative behaviour. Moreover, links between networks may induce cascading failures, competitive percolation, or contribute to efficient transportation. Here we show that there in fact exists an intermediate fraction of links between groups that is optimal for the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game. We consider individual groups with regular, random, and scale-free topology, and study their different combinations to reveal that an intermediate interdependence optimally facilitates the spreading of cooperative behaviour between groups. Excessive between-group links simply unify the two groups and make them act as one, while too rare between-group links preclude a useful information flow between the two groups. Interestingly, we find that between-group links are more likely to connect two cooperators than in-group links, thus supporting the conclusion that they are of paramount importance.

If cooperation is likely punish mildly: insights from economic experiments based on the snowdrift game.

Punishment may deter antisocial behavior. Yet to punish is costly, and the costs often do not offset the gains that are due to elevated levels of cooperation. However, the effectiveness of punishment depends not only on how costly it is, but also on the circumstances defining the social dilemma. Using the snowdrift game as the basis, we have conducted a series of economic experiments to determine whether severe punishment is more effective than mild punishment. We have observed that severe punishment is not necessarily more effective, even if the cost of punishment is identical in both cases. The benefits of severe punishment become evident only under extremely adverse conditions, when to cooperate is highly improbable in the absence of sanctions. If cooperation is likely, mild punishment is not less effective and leads to higher average payoffs, and is thus the much preferred alternative. Presented results suggest that the positive effects of punishment stem not only from imposed fines, but may also have a psychological background. Small fines can do wonders in motivating us to chose cooperation over defection, but without the paralyzing effect that may be brought about by large fines. The later should be utilized only when absolutely necessary.

Synchronization in a chaotic neural network with time delay depending on the spatial distance between neurons.

The synchronization is investigated in a two-dimensional Hindmarsh-Rose neuronal network by introducing a global coupling scheme with time delay, where the length of time delay is proportional to the spatial distance between neurons. We find that the time delay always disturbs synchronization of the neuronal network. When both the coupling strength and length of time delay per unit distance (i.e., enlargement factor) are large enough, the time delay induces the abnormal membrane potential oscillations in neurons. Specifically, the abnormal membrane potential oscillations for the symmetrically placed neurons form an antiphase, so that the large coupling strength and enlargement factor lead to the desynchronization of the neuronal network. The complete and intermittently complete synchronization of the neuronal network are observed for the right choice of parameters. The physical mechanism underlying these phenomena is analyzed.

Effects of competition on pattern formation in the rock-paper-scissors game.

We investigate the impact of cyclic competition on pattern formation in the rock-paper-scissors game. By separately considering random and prepared initial conditions, we observe a critical influence of the competition rate p on the stability of spiral waves and on the emergence of biodiversity. In particular, while increasing values of p promote biodiversity, they may act detrimentally on spatial pattern formation. For random initial conditions, we observe a phase transition from biodiversity to an absorbing phase, whereby the critical value of mobility grows linearly with increasing values of p on a log-log scale but then saturates as p becomes large. For prepared initial conditions, we observe the formation of single-armed spirals, but only for values of p that are below a critical value. Once above that value, the spirals break up and form disordered spatial structures, mainly because of the percolation of vacant sites. Thus there exists a critical value of the competition rates p(c) for stable single-armed spirals in finite populations. Importantly though, p(c) increases with increasing system size because noise reinforces the disintegration of ordered patterns. In addition, we also find that p(c) increases with the mobility. These phenomena are reproduced by a deterministic model that is based on nonlinear partial differential equations. Our findings indicate that competition is vital for the sustenance of biodiversity and the emergence of pattern formation in ecosystems governed by cyclical interactions.

Role of adaptive migration in promoting cooperation in spatial games.

Recent work has revealed that success-driven migration can promote cooperation among selfish individuals in evolutionary games. This migration mechanism relies, however, on nonlocal information about the states of the individuals and their computational capabilities for prediction. We investigate the role of adaptive migration in cooperative behavior in the framework of spatial game by proposing an alternative migration strategy that requires only local information obtainable through game interactions. Our results demonstrate that adaptive migration can be effective in promoting cooperation in two ways. First, there exists an optimal degree of migration associated with the density of empty sites and migration speed, which leads to the highest level of cooperation. Second, adaptive migration can induce an outbreak of cooperation from an environment dominated by defectors. These findings hold for common types of evolutionary games that involve pairwise interactions.

Reducing the heterogeneity of payoffs: an effective way to promote cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game.

In this paper, the accumulated payoff of each agent is regulated so as to reduce the heterogeneity of the distribution of all such payoffs. It is found that there exists an optimal regulation strength at which cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game is optimally promoted. If the heterogeneity is regulated to be either too weak or too strong, the promotive effect disappears and the evolution of cooperation may even be impaired if compared to the absence of the proposed regulatory mechanism. An explanation of the observed results is provided. In particular, it is found that cooperators on the spatial grid are not isolated but form compact clusters and that the distribution of these clusters is crucial for the promotion of cooperation. Our work provides insights into relations between the distribution of payoffs and the evolution of cooperative behavior in situations constituting a social dilemma.