An outbreak of scabies in a teaching hospital: lessons learned.

OBJECTIVE: To investigate an outbreak of scabies in an inner-city teaching hospital, identify pathways of transmission, institute effective control measures to end the outbreak, and prevent future occurrences. DESIGN: Outbreak investigation, case-control study, and chart review. SETTING: Large tertiary acute-care hospital. RESULTS: A patient with unrecognized Norwegian (crusted) scabies was admitted to the acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) service of a 940-bed acute-care hospital. Over 4 months, 773 healthcare workers (HCWs) and 204 patients were exposed to scabies. Of the exposed HCWs, 147 (19%) worked on the AIDS service. Risk factors for being infested with scabies among HCWs included working on the AIDS service (odds ratio [OR], 5.3; 95% confidence interval [CI95], 2.17-13.15) and being a nurse, physical therapist, or HCW with extensive physical contact with infected patients (OR, 4.5; CI95, 1.26-17.45). Aggressive infection control precautions beyond Centers for Disease Control and Prevention barrier and isolation recommendations were instituted, including the following: (1) early identification of infected patients; (2) prophylactic treatment with topical applications for all exposed HCWs; (3) use of two treatments 1 week apart for all cases of Norwegian scabies; (4) maintaining isolation for 8 days and barrier precautions for 24 hours after completing second treatment for a diagnosis of Norwegian scabies; and (5) oral ivermectin for treatment of patients who failed conventional therapy. CONCLUSIONS: HCWs with the most patient contact are at highest risk of acquiring scabies. Because HCWs who used traditionally accepted barriers while caring for patients with Norwegian scabies continued to develop scabies, we found additional measures were required in the acute-care hospital. HCWs with skin exposure to patients with scabies should receive prophylactic treatment. We recommend (1) using heightened barrier precautions for care of patients with scabies and (2) extending the isolation period for 8 days or 24 hours after the second treatment with a scabicide for those patients with Norwegian scabies. Oral ivermectin was well tolerated for treating patients and HCWs who failed conventional treatment. Finally, we developed a surveillance system that provides a "barometric measure" of the infection rate in the community. If scabies increases in the community, a tiered triage system is activated to protect against transmission among HCWs or hospital patients.

An outbreak of vancomycin-dependent Enterococcus faecium in a bone marrow transplant unit.

Outbreaks of vancomycin-resistant enterococci (VRE) are well described. The presence of mutants of VRE, such as vancomycin-dependent enterococci (VDE), in individual patients has been documented, but their potential to spread nosocomially has not been known. We present the first cluster of patients who acquired VDE nosocomially. Five bone marrow transplantation patients were infected or colonized by a genotypically indistinguishable multiantibiotic-resistant strain of Enterococcus faecium. Vancomycin dependence in 3 of the 5 isolates was demonstrated. All cluster patients had received protracted prophylactic treatment with vancomycin (mean, 22.6 days), and specimens from >/=2 body sites were repeatedly culture-positive for the outbreak strain. The outbreak was controlled with aggressive infection control strategies, and prophylactic antibiotic policies were revised. Awareness of the potential for nosocomial spread of multiantibiotic-resistant VDE is vital for the care of immunocompromised patients, especially those receiving prophylactic antibiotics.

Prevention and control of epidemic keratoconjunctivitis in a teaching eye institute.

PURPOSE: To determine if an ongoing infection control program is associated with a reduction in rates of nosocomial outbreaks of epidemic keratoconjunctivitis (EKC) and outbreak morbidity from nosocomial EKC in a large teaching eye institute. METHODS: The number of nosocomial EKC outbreaks, the number of affected patients, and the total number of patient visits were collected for each year between 1984 and 1997. An infection control program was implemented in 1992. The program included specified methods of patient screening and isolation, handwashing, instrument disinfection, medication distribution, and furlough of infected employees. The program included two levels of intensity of infection control measures, for non-outbreak and outbreak conditions. We compared rates per 100,000 patient visits of nosocomial outbreaks of EKC and affected patients for the 6-year period after the program was implemented, 1992-1997, with corresponding rates for 1984-1991. RESULTS: One, to three nosocomial outbreaks of EKC occurred annually in the period 1984-1991. After the implementation of the infection control program, no nosocomial outbreaks occurred in three of six years studied. In the pre-infection control years 1984-1991, there were 3.89 outbreaks and 54.09 affected patients per 100,000 visits, respectively. For the post-infection control years 1992-1997, the corresponding rates were 0.54 outbreaks and 5.66 affected patients per 100,000 patient visits. Rates for both outbreaks and affected patients were significantly lower for the post-implementation period (p < 0.005 and p < 0.0005, respectively). CONCLUSIONS: An ongoing infection control program was associated with decreased rates of nosocomial EKC outbreaks and outbreak morbidity from nosocomial EKC in our institute. Although several reports have described infection control measures that terminated individual outbreaks of nosocomial EKC, this study demonstrates that an ongoing infection control program may preemptively reduce nosocomial EKC outbreaks.

Reducing the rate of nosocomially transmitted respiratory syncytial virus.

BACKGROUND: A large number (17) of nosocomial respiratory syncytial virus cases led to the development of control measures to prevent transmission of respiratory syncytial virus (RSV) within the Johns Hopkins Hospital's Children's Center. METHODS: The control plan is based on a 2-stage process. In stage 1, the staff are notified that RSV is in the community, and information is distributed through a communication tree. Stage 2 requires that nasopharyngeal aspirates be obtained from all children <3 years of age who have respiratory symptoms. The aspirates are tested directly for RSV antigen and cultured for RSV. The children are placed on pediatric droplet precautions pending those results. RESULTS: The proportion of nosocomial RSV cases dropped from 16.5% before the use of RSV control measures to 7.2% after the initiation of the control program. A case of RSV identified in the hospital was 2.6 times more likely to be nosocomially acquired before the intervention compared with after the intervention. Approximately 14 cases of RSV are prevented each year, which results in a savings of 56 hospital-days and more than $84,000 in direct hospital-related charges alone. CONCLUSIONS: The nosocomial spread of RSV can be reduced by a specific and feasible control plan that includes early identification and rapid isolation of potential RSV cases.

A cluster of vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus faecium in an intensive care unit.

OBJECTIVE: To describe the epidemiology of a cluster of vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus faecium (VAREC) in a cardiothoracic surgery intensive care unit. DESIGN: A case series of patients identified through review of surveillance data on nosocomial infections, review of microbiologic records, and culture survey of patients in the unit. RESULTS: Six patients in the cardiothoracic surgery intensive care unit had VAREC with identical antimicrobic susceptibility patterns over a 6-month period. Four patients were identified with VAREC through prospective surveillance and 2 through retrospective review. Prior vancomycin use was seen more commonly in patients with VAREC (6/6, 100%) than in those without VAREC (3/12, 25%) (Fisher's exact test, p = .01). Six of the 7 patients with prior infection developed VAREC (85.7%). A prior nosocomial infection and prior exposure to vancomycin were found to be important variables in a logistic regression analysis. VAREC also was isolated from the environment. A combination of cohorting of patients and staff, and modifications of standard contact isolation practices eliminated the presence of VAREC from the cardiothoracic surgery intensive care unit. CONCLUSIONS: The results suggest that prior administration of vancomycin, especially in the patient who develops nosocomial infection, can influence the acquisition of vancomycin-resistant enterococci and that VAREC may be transmitted from patient to patient. Using a modification of the standard infection control practice of isolation, we were able to control the spread of this resistant strain of E faecium.

Risk-specific nosocomial infection rates.

Because nosocomial infection rates vary by hospital area and service, most infection control programs calculate area-specific rates to augment the reporting of their hospital-wide data. Rate development is often limited by the availability of appropriate specific denominator data to support important comparisons. Our university hospital reports a 20 month experience in which numerator data was collected as per the National Nosocomial Infections Surveillance System criteria for hospital-wide, high-risk nursery and ICU surveillance. These data were then combined with data in our hospital's patient-specific denominator file. This has enabled the development of risk-specific infection rates based on the analytic control of important variables available in both the numerator and denominator files. We found rate differences that were length of stay cohort specific, hospital day specific, age specific, birthweight specific, and survival cohort specific when examining our data by both the cumulative incidence and incidence density methods.

Strategies for the management of varicella-susceptible healthcare workers after a known exposure.

Three different sequentially applied post-varicella zoster virus (VZV) exposure management strategies were employed over a 43-month period. We began by using a standard post-exposure protocol in which 50 susceptible healthcare workers (HCW) involved in hospital exposures were furloughed from work at a loss to the hospital of 424 workdays and $46,000. Of the eight nosocomial cases of VZV infection in HCWs, four (50%) caused future HCW and patient exposure. In trial I, we substituted a post-exposure screening procedure for the standard work furlough procedure. We screened 77 exposed staff resulting in one nosocomial VZV infection that was the source of another exposure incident. No secondary cases of varicella resulted from this exposure and only 20 days of furlough time were used during trial I. As VZV resulting from a home exposure source was responsible for most hospital exposures in which HCWs were the source, our trial II protocol added the Centers for Disease Control's (CDC) off-duty procedure, but limited its use to susceptibles exposed at home. The 43-month overall attack rate of nosocomial varicella was 4.7%, while the true home exposure attack rate was 79% (p less than .00001). There was an average of 42.4 lost workdays charged to the hospital per incident under the standard protocol and three days per incident in the combined experience of trials I and II (p less than .0001).(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS)

The relationship between intravenous fluid contamination and the frequency of tubing replacement.

Medical patients receiving IV therapy were randomly assigned to one of two IV tubing change groups. One group had a 48-hour tubing change and the other had no tubing change for the remainder of the cannula placement. A daily IV fluid specimen was processed microbiologically. To complete the study, a minimum of 3 continuous days of therapy and three fluid specimens was required. There were two contaminated specimens, one in each tubing change group. The contamination rate in the 48-hour change group was 0.87% and 0.96% in the no change group. The rate difference of 0.09% has a 95% confidence interval (-0.035 to +0.036) which includes zero. Survival analysis also revealed no significant difference in the cumulative probability of survival, however the mean duration of continuous tubing use of 4.3 days in the no change group and 1.8 days in the 48 hour change group were significantly different (p less than 0.05). The cumulative probability of surviving contamination free was 0.988 in the 48-hour group and 0.987 in the no-change group. We conclude that it is safe to change IV tubing at intervals up to but not exceeding 4 days.