Six propositions on public participation and their relevance for risk communication.

New societal obligations for communicating risk information are emerging in a variety of contexts. This article draws upon the lengthy societal experience with citizen participation programs to identify how risk communication efforts may be effectively structured and implemented. Six major propositions address such themes as means/ends differences in expectations, the timing of the program, the role of credibility and trust, the need for technical and analytical resources, differing thresholds of public involvement, and limitations upon current understandings. Key conclusions for the design of risk communication programs are set forth.

Acceptability of human risk.

This paper has three objectives: to explore the nature of the problem implicit in the term "risk acceptability," to examine the possible contributions of scientific information to risk standard-setting, and to argue that societal response is best guided by considerations of process rather than formal methods of analysis. Most technological risks are not accepted but are imposed. There is also little reason to expect consensus among individuals on their tolerance of risk. Moreover, debates about risk levels are often at base debates over the adequacy of the institutions which manage the risks. Scientific information can contribute three broad types of analyses to risk-setting deliberations: contextual analysis, equity assessment, and public preference analysis. More effective risk-setting decisions will involve attention to the process used, particularly in regard to the requirements of procedural justice and democratic responsibility.

The distrust of nuclear power.

Society seems content to strike a more moderate or uncertain balance with other technologies than with nuclear power. This attitude is traced to the social history of nuclear power, the genuine uncertainty and complexity of safety issues, underestimation of the regulatory task, and the rancorous nature of the debate. Nuclear power is not just another problem of technology, of environment, or of health. It is unique in our time. To be more demanding of nuclear safety may be to apply a double standard, but not necessarily an irrational one. Our best course appears to be to keep the nuclear option open, work toward the rapid resolution of problems such as waste disposal, but postpone recycling and the breeder reactor. Time is needed to resolve immediate problems such as transport and disposal of nuclear wastes; to come to terms with trans-scientific issues such as plutonium toxicity, sabotage, and weapons proliferation; and to evaluate long-term energy alternatives.