Wired for society? From ego-logy to eco-logy.

Somewhat questioning Elizabeth Spelke's attempt to account for infants' social knowledge, our commentary argues that social cognition might be divided into several specialized systems. In addition to the core system dedicated to the intersubjective dimension of close relationships, infants could be prewired to process social relationships, such as dominance, characterized by their impersonal, normative dimension.

Children's allocation of resources in social dominance situations.

Two experiments with preschoolers (36 to 78 months) and 8-year-old children (Experiment 1, N = 173; Experiment 2, N = 132) investigated the development of children's resource distribution in dominance contexts. On the basis of the distributive justice literature, 2 opposite predictions were tested. Children could match resource allocation with the unequal social setting they observe and thus favor a dominant individual over a subordinate 1. Alternatively, children could choose to compensate the subordinate if they consider that the dominance asymmetry should be counteracted. Two experiments using a giving task (Experiment 1) and a taking task (Experiment 2) led to the same results. In both experiments, children took dominance into account when allocating resources. Moreover, their distributive decisions were similarly affected by age: Although 3- and 4-year-old children favored the dominant individual, 5-year-old children showed no preference and 8-year-old children strongly favored the subordinate. Several mechanisms accounting for this developmental pattern are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record

The boss is always right: Preschoolers endorse the testimony of a dominant over that of a subordinate.

Recent research has shown that young children rely on social cues to evaluate testimony. For instance, they prefer to endorse testimony provided by a consensual group than by a single dissenter. Given that dominance is pervasive in children's social environment, it can be hypothesized that children also use dominance relations in their selection of testimony. To test this hypothesis, a dominance asymmetry was induced between two characters either by having one repeatedly win in physical contests (physical power; Experiment 1) or by having one repeatedly impose her goals on the other (decisional power; Experiment 2). In two subsequent testimony tasks, 3- to 5-year-old children significantly tended to endorse the testimony of the dominant over that of the subordinate. These results suggest that preschoolers take dominance into account when evaluating testimony. In conclusion, we discuss two potential explanations for these findings.

How the brain predicts people's behavior in relation to rules and desires. Evidence of a medio-prefrontal dissociation.

Forming and updating impressions about others is critical in everyday life and engages portions of the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dMPFC), the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) and the amygdala. Some of these activations are attributed to "mentalizing" functions necessary to represent people's mental states, such as beliefs or desires. Evolutionary psychology and developmental studies, however, suggest that interpersonal inferences can also be obtained through the aid of deontic heuristics, which dictate what must (or must not) be done in given circumstances. We used fMRI and asked 18 participants to predict whether unknown characters would follow their desires or obey external rules. Participants had no means, at the beginning, to make accurate predictions, but slowly learned (throughout the experiment) each character's behavioral profile. We isolated brain regions whose activity changed during the experiment, as a neural signature of impression updating: whereas dMPFC was progressively more involved in predicting characters' behavior in relation to their desires, the medial orbitofrontal cortex and the amygdala were progressively more recruited in predicting rule-based behavior. Our data provide evidence of a neural dissociation between deontic inference and theory-of-mind (ToM), and support a differentiation of orbital and dorsal prefrontal cortex in terms of low- and high-level social cognition.

Social cognition is not reducible to theory of mind: when children use deontic rules to predict the behaviour of others.

The objective of this paper is to discuss whether children have a capacity for deontic reasoning that is irreducible to mentalizing. The results of two experiments point to the existence of such non-mentalistic understanding and prediction of the behaviour of others. In Study 1, young children (3- and 4-year-olds) were told different versions of classic false-belief tasks, some of which were modified by the introduction of a rule or a regularity. When the task (a standard change of location task) included a rule, the performance of 3-year-olds, who fail traditional false-belief tasks, significantly improved. In Study 2, 3-year-olds proved to be able to infer a rule from a social situation and to use it in order to predict the behaviour of a character involved in a modified version of the false-belief task. These studies suggest that rules play a central role in the social cognition of young children and that deontic reasoning might not necessarily involve mind reading.