Pre-exposing Canada Geese (Branta canadensis) to a low-pathogenic H1N1 avian influenza virus protects them against H5N1 HPAI virus challenge.

In previous studies we examined the role of Canada Geese (Branta canadensis) in the epidemiology of Eurasian highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1. To expand on this and better understand how pre-exposure to heterosubtypic low-pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) viruses might influence the outcome of H5N1 HPAI infection, we pre-exposed naïve juvenile Canada Geese to different North American wild-bird-origin LPAI viruses. We selected H1, H2, and H6 hemagglutinin subtype viruses based on their higher-order evolutionary relatedness to the H5 hemagglutinin. Pre-exposing Canada Geese to either H2N3 or H6N5 viruses did not protect them against a lethal H5N1 HPAI virus challenge. In addition, H5N1 was transmitted to naïve control birds that were placed among both groups resulting in death by 5 days postcontact. In contrast, Canada Geese that were pre-exposed to H1N1 were protected against a lethal H5N1 challenge, shed minimal amounts of the virus into the environment, and did not transmit the infection to naïve contact birds. None of the H1N1, H2N3, or H6N5 pre-exposure sera neutralized H5N1 in vitro; however, sera from H1N1-infected birds reduced virus plaque size but not number when compared with H2N3, H6N5, or negative sera, suggesting that antibodies directed against the neuraminidase may have had a role in the protective effects observed.

Molecular and antigenic characterization of reassortant H3N2 viruses from turkeys with a unique constellation of pandemic H1N1 internal genes.

Triple reassortant (TR) H3N2 influenza viruses cause varying degrees of loss in egg production in breeder turkeys. In this study we characterized TR H3N2 viruses isolated from three breeder turkey farms diagnosed with a drop in egg production. The eight gene segments of the virus isolated from the first case submission (FAV-003) were all of TR H3N2 lineage. However, viruses from the two subsequent case submissions (FAV-009 and FAV-010) were unique reassortants with PB2, PA, nucleoprotein (NP) and matrix (M) gene segments from 2009 pandemic H1N1 and the remaining gene segments from TR H3N2. Phylogenetic analysis of the HA and NA genes placed the 3 virus isolates in 2 separate clades within cluster IV of TR H3N2 viruses. Birds from the latter two affected farms had been vaccinated with a H3N4 oil emulsion vaccine prior to the outbreak. The HAl subunit of the H3N4 vaccine strain had only a predicted amino acid identity of 79% with the isolate from FAV-003 and 80% for the isolates from FAV-009 and FAV-0010. By comparison, the predicted amino acid sequence identity between a prototype TR H3N2 cluster IV virus A/Sw/ON/33853/2005 and the three turkey isolates from this study was 95% while the identity between FAV-003 and FAV-009/10 isolates was 91%. When the previously identified antigenic sites A, B, C, D and E of HA1 were examined, isolates from FAV-003 and FAV-009/10 had a total of 19 and 16 amino acid substitutions respectively when compared with the H3N4 vaccine strain. These changes corresponded with the failure of the sera collected from turkeys that received this vaccine to neutralize any of the above three isolates in vitro.

Characterization of H1N1 swine influenza viruses circulating in Canadian pigs in 2009.

The 2009 pandemic H1N1 (pH1N1), of apparent swine origin, may have evolved in pigs unnoticed because of insufficient surveillance. Consequently, the need for surveillance of influenza viruses circulating in pigs has received added attention. In this study we characterized H1N1 viruses isolated from Canadian pigs in 2009. Isolates from May 2009 were comprised of hemagglutinin and neuraminidase (NA) genes of classical SIV origin in combination with the North American triple-reassortant internal gene (TRIG) cassette, here termed contemporary SIV (conSIV) H1N1. These conSIV H1N1 viruses were contiguous with the North American αH1 cluster, which was distinct from the pH1N1 isolates that were antigenically more related to the γH1 cluster. After the initial isolation of pH1N1 from an Alberta pig farm in early May 2009, pH1N1 was found several times in Canadian pigs. These pH1N1 isolates were genetically and antigenically homogeneous. In addition, H1N1 viruses bearing seasonal human H1 and N1 genes together with the TRIG cassette and an NA encoding an oseltamivir-resistance marker were isolated from pigs. The NS gene of one of these seasonal human-like SIV (shSIV) H1N1 isolates was homologous to pH1N1 NS, implicating reassortment between the two strains. Antigenic cross-reactivity was observed between pH1N1 and conSIV but not with shSIV H1N1. In summary, although there was cocirculation of pH1N1 with conSIV and shSIV H1N1 in Canadian pigs after May 2009, there was no evidence supporting the presence of pH1N1 in pigs prior to May 2009. The possibility for further reassortants being generated exists and should be closely monitored.

Molecular characterization of pandemic H1N1 influenza viruses isolated from turkeys and pathogenicity of a human pH1N1 isolate in turkeys.

Suspected human-to-animal transmission of the 2009 pandemic H1N1 (pH1N1) virus has been reported in several animal species, including pigs, dogs, cats, ferrets, and turkeys. In this study we describe the genetic characterization of pH1N1 viruses isolated from breeder turkeys that was associated with a progressive drop in egg production. Sequence analysis of all eight gene segments from three viruses isolated from this outbreak demonstrated homology with other human and swine pH1N1 isolates. The susceptibility of turkeys to a human pH1N1 isolate was further evaluated experimentally. The 50% turkey infectious dose (TID50) for the human isolate A/Mexico/LnDRE/4487/2009 was determined by inoculating groups of 8-10-week-old turkeys with serial 10-fold dilutions of virus by oronasal and cloacal routes. We estimated the TID50 to be between 1 x 10(5) and 1 x 10(6) TCID50. The pathogenesis of pH1N1 in oronasally or cloacally inoculated juvenile turkeys was also examined. None of the turkeys exhibited clinical signs, and no significant difference in virus shedding or seroconversion was observed between the two inoculation groups. More than 50% of the turkeys in both oronasal and cloacal groups shed virus beginning at 2 days postinoculation (dpi). All birds that actively shed virus seroconverted by 14 dpi. Virus antigen was demonstrated by immunohistochemistry in the cecal tonsils and bursa of Fabricius in two of the birds that were infected by the cloacal route. Virus transmission to naive contact turkeys was at best doubtful. This report provides additional evidence that pH1N1 can cross the species barrier and cause disease outbreaks in domestic turkeys. However, it appears that the reproductive status of the host as well as environmental factors such as concurrent infections, stress, the presence or absence of litter, and stocking density may also contribute to efficient infection and transmission of this agent.

Genetic and pathobiologic characterization of pandemic H1N1 2009 influenza viruses from a naturally infected swine herd.

Since its initial identification in Mexico and the United States, concerns have been raised that the novel H1N1 influenza virus might cause a pandemic of severity comparable to that of the 1918 pandemic. In late April 2009, viruses phylogenetically related to pandemic H1N1 influenza virus were isolated from an outbreak on a Canadian pig farm. This outbreak also had epidemiological links to a suspected human case. Experimental infections carried out in pigs using one of the swine isolates from this outbreak and the human isolate A/Mexico/InDRE4487/2009 showed differences in virus recovery from the lower respiratory tract. Virus was consistently isolated from the lungs of pigs infected with A/Mexico/InDRE4487/2009, while only one pig infected with A/swine/Alberta/OTH-33-8/2008 yielded live virus from the lung, despite comparable amounts of viral RNA and antigen in both groups of pigs. Clinical disease resembled other influenza virus infections in swine, albeit with somewhat prolonged virus antigen detection and delayed viral-RNA clearance from the lungs. There was also a noteworthy amount of genotypic variability among the viruses isolated from the pigs on the farm. This, along with the somewhat irregular pathobiological characteristics observed in experimentally infected animals, suggests that although the virus may be of swine origin, significant viral evolution may still be ongoing.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza virus A (H7N3) in domestic poultry, Saskatchewan, Canada, 2007.

Epidemiologic, serologic, and molecular phylogenetic methods were used to investigate an outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza on a broiler breeding farm in Saskatchewan, Canada. Results, coupled with data from influenza A virus surveillance of migratory waterfowl in Canada, implicated wild birds as the most probable source of the low pathogenicity precursor virus.

The roles of national and provincial diagnostic laboratories in the eradication of highly pathogenic H7N3 avian influenza virus from the Fraser Valley of British Columbia, Canada.

In February 2004 a highly pathogenic avian influenza outbreak erupted in the Fraser Valley of British Columbia, Canada. The index farm was a chicken broiler breeder operation comprising two flocks, 24 and 52 wk of age. Birds in the older flock presented with a mild drop in egg production and a small increase in mortality. Pathological specimens taken from the older flock were submitted to the provincial veterinary diagnostic laboratory from which an influenza A virus was isolated. While still under investigation by the provincial veterinary authorities, a spike in mortality was observed in birds belonging to the younger flock. Diagnostic material from both flocks was forwarded to the Canadian Food Inspection Agency's National Centre for Foreign Animal Disease. A low-pathogenicity H7N3 virus was detected in the older flock and a novel highly pathogenic H7N3 virus was found in specimens collected from the younger flock. Despite destruction and disposal of birds on the index farm, the virus spread to adjacent farms. Given the high density of poultry operations in the Fraser Valley and the high level of integration amongst industry support services, a total of approximately 17 million chickens, turkeys, ducks, geese, and speciality birds were put at immediate risk. Despite movement controls the virus spread and established itself in three distinct clusters. To prevent further spread, healthy, marketable birds outside of the surveillance areas were pre-emptively slaughtered. Although highly pathogenic avian influenza is a federal responsibility, the successful control and eradication of this outbreak would not have been possible without the cooperative involvement of federal and provincial diagnostic laboratories. The success of this collaboration was partly responsible for the formation of a national avian influenza laboratory network.

Relationship between H5N2 avian influenza viruses isolated from wild and domestic ducks in British Columbia, Canada.

In the summer of 2005 a Canadian national surveillance program for influenza A viruses in wild aquatic birds was initiated. The program involved collaboration between federal and provincial levels of government and was coordinated by the Canadian Cooperative Wildlife Health Centre. The surveillance plan targeted young-of-the-year Mallards along with other duck species at six sampling locations along the major migratory flyways across Canada. Beginning in early August, cloacal swabs were taken from 704 ducks on two lakes adjacent to one another near Kamloops, British Columbia. The swabs were screened for the presence of influenza A RNA using a real-time reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction (RRT-PCR) assay that targets the M1 gene. Swab samples that gave positive results underwent further testing using H5- and H7-specific RRT-PCR assays. One hundred and seventy-four cloacal swab specimens gave positive or suspicious results for the presence of an H5 virus. A portion of these (28/35) were confirmed using an H5-specific conventional reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction assay and an H5 virus was eventually isolated from 24/127 swab specimens. Neuraminidase typing revealed the presence of H5N2 and H5N9 viruses. In mid-November of 2005 an H5N2 virus was detected in a commercial duck operation in the lower mainland of British Columbia, approximately 120 km from where the H5N2-positive wild ducks were sampled. Molecular genetic analysis of the H5N2 viruses isolated from wild and domestic ducks was carried out to determine their kinship.

Susceptibility of Canada Geese (Branta canadensis) to highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (H5N1).

Migratory birds have been implicated in the long-range spread of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A virus (H5N1) from Asia to Europe and Africa. Although sampling of healthy wild birds representing a large number of species has not identified possible carriers of influenza virus (H5N1) into Europe, surveillance of dead and sick birds has demonstrated mute (Cygnus olor) and whooper (C. cygnus) swans as potential sentinels. Because of concerns that migratory birds could spread H5N1 subtype to the Western Hemisphere and lead to its establishment within free-living avian populations, experimental studies have addressed the susceptibility of several indigenous North American duck and gull species. We examined the susceptibility of Canada geese (Branta canadensis) to HPAI virus (H5N1). Large populations of this species can be found in periagricultural and periurban settings and thus may be of potential epidemiologic importance if H5N1 subtype were to establish itself in North American wild bird populations.

Intersegmental recombination between the haemagglutinin and matrix genes was responsible for the emergence of a highly pathogenic H7N3 avian influenza virus in British Columbia.

In February 2004 a highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) outbreak erupted in British Columbia. Investigations indicated that the responsible HPAI H7N3 virus emerged suddenly from a low pathogenic precursor. Analysis of the haemagglutinin (HA) genes of the low and high pathogenic viruses isolated from the index farm revealed the only difference to be a 21 nt insert at the HA cleavage site of the highly pathogenic avian influenza virus. It was deduced that this insert most probably arose as a result of non-homologous recombination between the HA and matrix genes of the same virus. Over the course of the outbreak, a total of 37 isolates with, and 3 isolates without inserts were characterized. The events described here appear very similar to those which occurred in Chile in 2002 where the virulence shift of another H7N3 virus was attributed to non-homologous recombination between the HA and nucleoprotein genes.

Comparison of reverse transcriptase-polymerase chain reaction, virus isolation, and immunoperoxidase assays for detecting pigs infected with low, moderate, and high virulent strains of classical swine fever virus.

Pigs were experimentally inoculated with Glentorf, Lelystad/97, and Alfort/187: representative low, moderate, and high virulent strains of classical swine fever virus (CSFV). Animals were tested for viremia using virus isolation and reverse transcriptase-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) assays run under routine diagnostic conditions. The virus was detected in the peripheral blood by virus isolation and RT-PCR assays of all Glentorf- and Lelystad/97-infected pigs beginning at 3 days postinoculation (dpi) and in all Alfort/187-infected pigs beginning at 2 dpi. Viremia, as determined by virus isolation, remained detectable in Lelystad/97- and Alfort/187-infected pigs until the last animal within each cohort was euthanized on days 12 and 7 postinoculation, respectively. In contrast, the virus could be isolated from the blood of all Glentorf-infected pigs between 3 and 7 dpi but not from 10 to 21 dpi when the experiment was concluded. Viremia, as determined by RT-PCR, became apparent in Alfort/187-infected pigs at 2 dpi and in Glentorf- and Lelystad/97-infected pigs at 3 dpi. All pigs, regardless of the CSFV strain used, remained RT-PCR positive until they were euthanized. Tonsils were harvested from all the pigs and frozen sections tested for the presence of the CSFV antigen using polyclonal pestivirus and monoclonal CSFV horseradish peroxidase (HRPO) conjugates. Immunostaining reactions were positive for all the Alfort/187- and Lelystad/97-infected pigs. By contrast, tonsils from the Glentorf-infected pigs gave negative to equivocal results. These data suggest that an RT-PCR assay performed on blood may be the best test when dealing with pigs infected with low virulent strains of CSFV.