The role of visuomotor synchrony on virtual full-body illusions in children and adults.

The present study explored the effects of visuomotor synchrony in virtual reality during the embodiment of a full human avatar in children (aged 5-6 years) and adults. Participants viewed their virtual bodies from a first-person perspective while they moved the body during self-generated and structured movement. Embodiment was measured via questions and psychophysiological responses (skin conductance) to a virtual body-threat and during both movement conditions. Both children and adults had increased feelings of ownership and agency over a virtual body during synchronous visuomotor feedback (compared to asynchronous visuomotor feedback). Children had greater ownership compared to adults during synchronous movement but did not differ from adults on agency. There were no differences in SCRs (frequency or magnitude) between children and adults, between conditions (i.e., baseline or movement conditions) or visuomotor feedback. Collectively, the study highlights the importance of visuomotor synchrony for children's ratings of embodiment for a virtual avatar from at least 5 years old, and suggests adults and children are comparable in terms of psychophysiological arousal when moving (or receiving a threat to) a virtual body. This has important implications for our understanding of the development of embodied cognition and highlights the considerable promise of exploring visuomotor VR experiences in children.

Alice in Wonderland: The effects of body size and movement on children's size perception and body representation in virtual reality.

Previous work shows that in adults, illusory embodiment of a virtual avatar can be induced using congruent visuomotor cues. Furthermore, embodying different-sized avatars influences adults' perception of their environment's size. This study (N = 92) investigated whether children are also susceptible to such embodiment and size illusions. Adults and 5-year-old children viewed a first-person perspective of different-sized avatars moving either congruently or incongruently with their own body. Participants rated their feelings of embodiment over the avatar and also estimated the sizes of their body and objects in the environment. Unlike adults, children embodied the avatar regardless of visuomotor congruency. Both adults and children freely embodied different-sized avatars, and this affected their size perception in the surrounding virtual environment; they felt that objects were larger in a small body and vice versa in a large body. In addition, children felt that their body had grown in the large body condition. These findings have important implications for both our theoretical understanding of own-body representation, and our knowledge of perception in virtual environments.

Emotion lateralization in a graduated emotional chimeric face task: An online study.

OBJECTIVE: To resolve inconsistencies in the literature regarding the dominance of the right cerebral hemisphere (RH) in emotional face perception, specifically investigating the role of the intensity of emotional expressions, different emotions, and conscious perception. METHOD: The study used an online version of the well-established emotional chimeric face task (ECFT) in which participants judged which side of a chimeric face stimulus was more emotional. We tested the laterality bias in the ECFT across six basic emotions and experimentally modified the intensity of the emotional facial expression from neutral to fully emotional expressions, in incremental steps of 20%. RESULTS: The results showed an overall left hemiface bias across all emotions, supporting the RH hypothesis of emotional lateralization. However, the left hemiface bias decreased with decreasing intensity of the emotional facial expression. CONCLUSIONS: The results provide further support for the RH hypothesis and suggest that the RH dominance in emotional face perception may be affected by task difficulty and visual perception strategy. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Laterality and (in)visibility in emotional face perception: Manipulations in spatial frequency content.

It is widely agreed that hemispheric asymmetries in emotional face perception exist. However, the mechanisms underlying this lateralization are not fully understood. In the present study, we tested whether (a) these asymmetries are driven by the low spatial frequency content of images depicting facial expressions, and (b) whether the effects differed depending on whether the emotional facial expressions were clearly visible or hidden (i.e., embedded in low spatial frequencies). The manipulation sheds light on the contribution of cortical and subcortical routes to emotional processing mechanisms. We prepared both unfiltered (broadband) and hybrid faces. Within the latter, different bands of spatial frequency content from images of 2 different expressions were combined (i.e., low frequencies from an emotional image combined with high frequencies from a neutral image). We presented these broadband and hybrid images using the free-viewing emotional chimeric faces task (ECFT) in which 2 images are presented above and below fixation and asked participants to report which of the 2 mirror reversed images appeared more emotional. As predicted, the results showed that only broadband expressions produced the well-known left visual field/right hemisphere (LVF/RH) bias across all basic emotions. For hybrid images, only happiness revealed a significant LVF/RH bias. These results suggest that low spatial frequency content of emotional facial expressions, which activates the magnocellular pathway in subcortical structures and bypassing cortical visual processing, is not generally sufficient to induce an LVF bias under free-viewing conditions where participants deny explicitly seeing the emotion, suggesting that the LVF bias in ECFT is primarily cortically mediated. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

My body until proven otherwise: Exploring the time course of the full body illusion.

Evidence from the Full Body Illusion (FBI) has shown that adults can embody full bodies which are not their own when they move synchronously with their own body or are viewed from a first-person perspective. However, there is currently no consensus regarding the time course of the illusion. Here, for the first time, we examined the effect of visuomotor synchrony (synchronous/asynchronous/no movement) on the FBI over time. Surprisingly, we found evidence of embodiment over a virtual body after five seconds in all conditions. Embodiment decreased with increased exposure to asynchronous movement, but remained high in synchronous and no movement conditions. We suggest that embodiment of a body seen from a first-person perspective is felt by default, and that embodiment can then be lost in the face of contradictory cues. These results have significant implications for our understanding of how multisensory cues contribute to embodiment.

Plasticity versus chronicity: Stable performance on category fluency 40 years post-onset.

What is the long-term trajectory of semantic memory deficits in patients who have suffered structural brain damage? Memory is, per definition, a changing faculty. The traditional view is that after an initial recovery period, the mature human brain has little capacity to repair or reorganize. More recently, it has been suggested that the central nervous system may be more plastic with the ability to change in neural structure, connectivity, and function. The latter observations are, however, largely based on normal learning in healthy subjects. Here, we report a patient who suffered bilateral ventro-medial damage after presumed herpes encephalitis in 1971. He was seen regularly in the eighties, and we recently had the opportunity to re-assess his semantic memory deficits. On semantic category fluency, he showed a very clear category-specific deficit performing better that control data on non-living categories and significantly worse on living items. Recent testing showed that his impairments have remained unchanged for more than 40 years. We suggest cautiousness when extrapolating the concept of brain plasticity, as observed during normal learning, to plasticity in the context of structural brain damage.

Beyond scattering and absorption: Perceptual unmixing of translucent liquids.

Is perception of translucence based on estimations of scattering and absorption of light or on statistical pseudocues associated with familiar materials? We compared perceptual performance with real and computer-generated stimuli. Real stimuli were glasses of milky tea. Milk predominantly scatters light and tea absorbs it, but since the tea absorbs less as the milk concentration increases, the effects of milkiness and strength on scattering and absorption are not independent. Conversely, computer-generated stimuli were glasses of "milky tea" in which absorption and scattering were independently manipulated. Observers judged tea concentrations regardless of milk concentrations, or vice versa. Maximum-likelihood conjoint measurement was used to estimate the contributions of each physical component-concentrations of milk and tea, or amounts of scattering and absorption-to perceived milkiness or tea strength. Separability of the two physical dimensions was better for real than for computer-generated teas, suggesting that interactions between scattering and absorption were correctly accounted for in perceptual unmixing, but unmixing was always imperfect. Since the real and rendered stimuli represent different physical processes and therefore differ in their image statistics, perceptual judgments with these stimuli allowed us to identify particular pseudocues (presumably learned with real stimuli) that explain judgments with both stimulus sets.

Vision: Non-illusory Evidence for Distinct Visual Pathways for Perception and Action.

When visual information about an object's distance is obscured, but its retinal size visible, the object's physical size is ambiguous to vision; however, additional proprioceptive distance information permits physical size to be estimated when grasping the object, but perceptual size estimates remain inaccurate, adding to that evidence for distinct visual pathways for perception and action.

Coding of attention across the human intraparietal sulcus.

There has been concentrated debate over four decades as to whether or not the nonhuman primate parietal cortex codes for intention or attention. In nonhuman primates, certain studies report results consistent with an intentional role, whereas others provide support for coding of visual-spatial attention. Until now, no one has yet directly contrasted an established motor "intention" paradigm with a verified "attention" paradigm within the same protocol. This debate has continued in both the nonhuman primate and healthy human brain and is subsequently timely. We incorporated both paradigms across two distinct temporal epochs within a whole-parietal slow event-related human functional magnetic resonance imaging experiment. This enabled us to examine whether or not one paradigm proves more effective at driving the neural response across three intraparietal areas. As participants performed saccadic eye and/or pointing tasks, discrete event-related components with dissociable responses were elicited in distinct sub-regions of human parietal cortex. Critically, the posterior intraparietal area showed robust activity consistent with attention (no intention planning). The most contentious area in the literature, the middle intraparietal area produced activation patterns that further reinforce attention coding in human parietal cortex. Finally, the anterior intraparietal area showed the same pattern. Therefore, distributed coding of attention is relatively more pronounced across the two computations within human parietal cortex.

Direct encoding of orientation variance in the visual system.

Our perception of regional irregularity, an example of which is orientation variance, seems effortless when we view two patches of texture that differ in this attribute. Little is understood, however, of how the visual system encodes a regional statistic like orientation variance, but there is some evidence to suggest that it is directly encoded by populations of neurons tuned broadly to high or low levels. The present study shows that selective adaptation to low or high levels of variance results in a perceptual aftereffect that shifts the perceived level of variance of a subsequently viewed texture in the direction away from that of the adapting stimulus (Experiments 1 and 2). Importantly, the effect is durable across changes in mean orientation, suggesting that the encoding of orientation variance is independent of global first moment orientation statistics (i.e., mean orientation). In Experiment 3 it was shown that the variance-specific aftereffect did not show signs of being encoded in a spatiotopic reference frame, similar to the equivalent aftereffect of adaptation to the first moment orientation statistic (the tilt aftereffect), which is represented in the primary visual cortex and exists only in retinotopic coordinates. Experiment 4 shows that a neuropsychological patient with damage to ventral areas of the cortex but spared intact early areas retains sensitivity to orientation variance. Together these results suggest that orientation variance is encoded directly by the visual system and possibly at an early cortical stage.

Exogenous attention to unseen objects?

Attention and awareness are closely related phenomena, but recent evidence has shown that not all attended stimuli give rise to awareness. Controversy still remains over whether, and the extent to which, a dissociation between attention and awareness encompasses all forms of attention. For example, it has been suggested that attention without awareness is more readily demonstrated for voluntary, endogenous attention than its reflexive, exogenous counterpart. Here we examine whether exogenous attentional cueing can have selective behavioural effects on stimuli that nevertheless remain unseen. Using a task in which object-based attention has been shown in the absence of awareness, we remove all possible contingencies between cues and target stimuli to ensure that any cueing effects must be under purely exogenous control, and find evidence of exogenous object-based attention without awareness. In a second experiment we address whether this dissociation crucially depends on the method used to establish that the objects indeed remain unseen. Specifically, to confirm that objects are unseen we adopt appropriate signal detection task procedures, including those that retain parity with the primary attentional task (by requiring participants to discriminate the two types of trial that are used to measure an effect of attention). We show a significant object-based attention effect is apparent under conditions where the selected object indeed remains undetectable.

What is it like to have type-2 blindsight? Drawing inferences from residual function in type-1 blindsight.

Controversy surrounds the question of whether the experience sometimes elicited by visual stimuli in blindsight (type-2 blindsight) is visual in nature or whether it is some sort of non-visual experience. The suggestion that the experience is visual seems, at face value, to make sense. I argue here, however, that the residual abilities found in type-1 blindsight (blindsight in which stimuli elicit no conscious experience) are not aspects of normal vision with consciousness deleted, but are based fragments of visual processes that, in themselves, would not be intelligible as visual experiences. If type-2 blindsight is a conscious manifestation of this residual function then it is not obvious that type-2 blindsight would be phenomenally like vision.

Color constancy for an unseen surface.

The illumination of a scene strongly affects our perception of objects in that scene, e.g., the pages of a book illuminated by candlelight will appear quite yellow relative to other types of artificial illuminants. Yet at the same time, the reader still judges the pages as white, their surface color unaffected by the interplay of paper and illuminant. It has been shown empirically that we can indeed report two quite different interpretations of "color": one is dependent on the constant surface spectral reflectance of an object (surface color) and the other on the power of light of different wavelengths reflected from that object (reflected color). How then are these two representations related? The common view, dating from Aristotle, is that our experience of surface color is derived from reflected color or, in more familiar terms, that color perception follows from color sensation. By definition, color constancy requires that vision "discounts the illuminant"; thus, it seems reasonable that vision begins with the color of objects as they naively appear and that we infer from their appearances their surface color. Here, we question this classic view. We use metacontrast-masked priming and, by presenting the unseen prime and the visible mask under different illuminants, dissociate two ways in which the prime matched the mask: in surface color or in reflected color. We find that priming of the mask occurs when it matches the prime in surface color, not reflected color. It follows that color perception can arise without prior color sensation.

Object perception: where do we see the weight?

A new study of the response of the human brain as subjects view objects of different weights they are about to lift shows that the weight of objects, which influences the way we act upon them, is represented in the ventral stream of the visual cortex.

Auditory-visual localization in hemianopia.

OBJECTIVE: Beyond visual field defects, patients with hemianopia have been suggested to perceive horizontal visual space in a distorted manner. However, the pattern of these distortions remained debatable. The aim of this study was to estimate the geometry of the visual representation of space in hemianopia using an auditory marker. METHOD: Patients with pure left or right hemianopia (without neglect) were tested in tasks requiring them to bring a visual stimulus into spatial alignment with a target sound (Experiment 1) or vice versa (Experiment 2). RESULTS: In Experiment 1, patients adjusted the location of a light such that it was displaced toward the anopic side with reference to the physical sound position. In Experiment 2, patients adjusted the location of a sound such that it was displaced opposite to the anopic side with reference to the actual position of the visual target. Both experiments consistently indicated that hemianopic patients perceived a sound and a light to be in spatial alignment when the physical position of the light deviated by several degrees from the sound toward the side of the anopic hemifield, that is, to the contralesional side. CONCLUSIONS: Given that auditory localization in patients with hemianopia has been previously shown to be only slightly biased toward the anopic side, the observed distortion of visual space with reference to auditory space can be explained by assuming that visual positions were, in absolute terms, perceived as shifted toward the intact side. As a result, HA patients may perceive visual space as compressed on their ipsilesional (intact), in comparison with their contralesional (anopic) side.

Object-based attention without awareness.

Attention and awareness are often considered to be related. Some forms of attention can, however, facilitate the processing of stimuli that remain unseen. It is unclear whether this dissociation extends beyond selection on the basis of primitive properties, such as spatial location, to situations in which there are more complex bases for attentional selection. The experiment described here shows that attentional selection at the level of objects can take place without giving rise to awareness of those objects. Pairs of objects were continually masked, which rendered them invisible to participants performing a cued-target-discrimination task. When the cue and target appeared within the same object, discrimination was faster than when they appeared in different objects at the same spatial separation. Participants reported no awareness of the objects and were unable to detect them in a signal-detection task. Object-based attention, therefore, is not sufficient for object awareness.