Social attributions in patients with ventromedial prefrontal hypoperfusion.

Neuroimaging studies have demonstrated that the medial prefrontal cortex is involved in attributions on enduring and abstract trait characteristics of persons, but not in causal attributions of temporary here-and-now events. Moreover, the neural representation of trait information is thought to be located in the ventral part of the medial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC). In order to verify this latter finding, this study compared the performance of 8 patients with hypoperfusion of the vmPFC, 10 with hypoperfusion excluding the vmPFC and 15 healthy controls on trait and causal attribution questionnaires consisting of several events presented in brief written scenarios. We also investigated whether vmPFC hypoperfusion influenced the experienced intensity of the negative or positive valence of the events. Our results showed that patients with ventral hypoperfusion performed significantly worse on trait attributions in comparison with the non-vmPFC group and healthy controls. All groups performed equally well on causal attributions. These findings support previous research suggesting that the vmPFC is critically involved in enduring trait attribution, but not in temporary causal attribution. Considering the emotional experience of valence, the findings showed more intense valence ratings for negative events and persons. This confirms the role of the vmPFC in the modulation and regulation of negative emotions.

Causal attribution in individuals with subclinical and clinical autism spectrum disorder: An fMRI study.

This neuroimaging study compares brain activation during causal attribution to three different attribution loci (i.e., self, another person, and situation) across a typical population without (N = 20) or with subclinical autism spectrum symptoms (N = 18) and a clinical population with autism spectrum disorder (ASD; N = 11). While they underwent fMRI, all participants read short sentences describing positive and negative behaviors and thoughts of another person directed toward the participant (i.e., "you"). Participants were then asked to attribute these behaviors to themselves, the other person, or the situation. Behavioral measures revealed self-serving attributions (i.e., attributing positive events to the self, while attributing negative events externally from the self) in all three participant groups. Neural measures revealed a great deal of shared activation across the three attribution loci and across the three participant groups in the temporo-parietal junction, the posterior superior sulcus, and the precuneus. Comparison between groups revealed more widespread activation in both subclinical and clinical ASD participants, which may be indicative of the extraneural resources these participants invest to compensate their impairments.

Neural correlates of attributing causes to the self, another person and the situation.

This study compares brain activation during causal attribution to three different loci, the self, another person and the situation; and further explores correlations with clinical scales (i.e. depression, anxiety and autism) in a typical population. While they underwent functional magnetic resonance imaging, 20 participants read short sentences about another person ('someone') who engaged in behaviors with the participant or made comments about the participant. The participants then attributed these behaviors to three attribution loci: themselves, the other person or the situation. The results revealed common activation across the three attribution loci in the bilateral temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), left posterior superior temporal sulcus, precuneus and right temporal pole (TP). Comparisons between the attribution loci revealed very little differences, except for increased activation of the right TP while making attributions to the situation compared with the self. In addition, when making attributions to the situation or other persons for negative events, there were reliable correlations between low activity in the left TPJ and high levels of anxiety and problematic social interaction in autism. The results indicate that attributions to different loci are based on the same underlying brain process, which might be atypical among persons with anxiety or autism symptoms.

False belief and counterfactual reasoning in a social environment.

Behavioral studies indicate that theory of mind and counterfactual reasoning are strongly related cognitive processes. In a neuroimaging study, we explored the common and distinct regions underlying these inference processes. We directly compared false belief reasoning (inferring an agent's false belief about an object's location or content) and counterfactual reasoning (inferring what the object's location or content would be if an agent had acted differently), both in contrast with a baseline condition of conditional reasoning (inferring what the true location or content of an object is). Results indicate that these three types of reasoning about social scenarios are supported by activations in the mentalizing network (left temporo-parietal junction and precuneus) and the executive control network (bilateral prefrontal cortex [PFC] and right inferior parietal lobule). In addition, representing a false belief or counterfactual state (both not directly observable in the external world) recruits additional activity in the executive control network (left dorsolateral PFC and parietal lobe). The results further suggest that counterfactual reasoning is a more complex cognitive process than false belief reasoning, showing stronger activation of the dorsomedial, left dorsolateral PFC, cerebellum and left temporal cortex.

Traits are represented in the medial prefrontal cortex: an fMRI adaptation study.

Neuroimaging studies on trait inference about the self and others have found a network of brain areas, the critical part of which appears to be medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC). We investigated whether the mPFC plays an essential role in the neural representation of a trait code. To localize the trait code, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) adaptation, which is a rapid suppression of neuronal responses upon repeated presentation of the same underlying stimulus, in this case, the implied trait. Participants had to infer an agent's (social) trait from brief trait-implying behavioral descriptions. In each trial, the critical (target) sentence was preceded by a sentence (prime) that implied the same trait, the opposite trait, or no trait at all. The results revealed robust adaptation from prime to target in the ventral mPFC only during trait conditions, as expected. Adaptation was strongest after being primed with a similar trait, moderately strong after an opposite trait and much weaker after a trait-irrelevant prime. This adaptation pattern was found nowhere else in the brain. In line with previous research on fMRI adaptation, we interpret these findings as indicating that a trait code is represented in the ventral mPFC.

Situation and person attributions under spontaneous and intentional instructions: an fMRI study.

This functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) research explores how observers make causal beliefs about an event in terms of the person or situation. Thirty-four participants read various short descriptions of social events that implied either the person or the situation as the cause. Half of them were explicitly instructed to judge whether the event was caused by something about the person or the situation (intentional inferences), whereas the other half was instructed simply to read the material carefully (spontaneous inferences). The results showed common activation in areas related to mentalizing, across all types of causes or instructions (posterior superior temporal sulcus, temporo-parietal junction, precuneus). However, the medial prefrontal cortex was activated only under spontaneous instructions, but not under intentional instruction. This suggests a bias toward person attributions (e.g. fundamental attribution bias). Complementary to this, intentional situation attributions activated a stronger and more extended network compared to intentional person attributions, suggesting that situation attributions require more controlled, extended and broader processing of the information.

Experiential versus analytical emotion regulation and sleep: breaking the link between negative events and sleep disturbance.

Despite a long history of interest in emotion regulation as well as in the mechanisms that regulate sleep, the relationship between emotion regulation and sleep is not yet well understood. The present study investigated whether "an experiential approach"-defined by coping through affectively acknowledging, understanding, and expressing actual emotional experience and affective feeling about a situation-compared with a "cognitive analytical approach"-defined by the cognitive analysis of the causes, meanings and implications of the situation for the own self-would buffer the impact of an emotional failure experience on (1) emotional experience and (2) sleep structure assessed by EEG polysomnography. Twenty-eight healthy volunteers participated in this study. A direct comparison of the two emotion regulation strategies revealed that participants who were instructed to apply an experiential approach showed less fragmentation of sleep than participants who were instructed to apply an analytical approach. The use of an experiential approach resulted in a longer sleep time, higher sleep efficiency, fewer awakenings, less % time awake, and fewer minutes wake after sleep onset. Implications of the differential effects of these two forms of emotion regulation on sleep are discussed.