Hand movement trajectories illustrate the mechanism underlying Kurt Lewin's distinction between approach-approach and avoidance-avoidance motivational conflicts.

Classic motivational conflicts theory (Lewin, 1931) distinguishes between approach-approach, and avoidance-avoidance conflicts. Previous research has focused solely on testing the theory's prediction that avoidance-avoidance conflicts are more difficult to resolve than approach-approach ones, using outcome measures (decision time and self-reports). The theory, however, specifies a force-fields mechanism to account for this difference in conflict resolution difficulty, whereby avoidance-avoidance conflicts (compared to approach-approach ones) elicit more (a) oscillations and (b) return to the middle point between options. However, this force-fields mechanism has never been empirically tested, arguably due to a lack of the tools to do so. In five studies (N = 534 U.K. residents), we use mouse-tracking measures to provide insight into the force-fields mechanism. We show that the force-fields' mechanistic properties-oscillations and returns to the middle point-distinguish the two types of conflict and uniquely account for conflict resolution difficulty beyond standard conflict-strength measures. Moreover, we test a novel, theory-driven prediction and robustly show a differential pattern of increased oscillations as a function of the decision-maker's proximity to the decision options. Finally, we test a boundary condition moderating the influence of conflict type on both the force-fields' mechanistic properties and conflict resolution difficulty. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

The relative difficulty of resolving motivational conflicts is affective context-dependent.

According to Lewin's seminal motivational theory, conflicts between undesirable alternatives (avoidance-avoidance conflicts) are more difficult to resolve than conflicts between desirable alternatives (approach-approach conflicts). This difference in the difficulty of resolving approach-approach and avoidance-avoidance conflicts was suggested as a general law for human behavior, and subsequent research provided robust evidence to support it. Here we challenge this assertion. We argue that the difference in conflict resolution difficulty depends on the compatibility between the type of conflict (approach-approach vs. avoidance-avoidance) and the affective context (positive vs. negative) in which the conflict is being resolved. We report five studies. Data were collected from 2019 to 2021. In Studies 1-4, we presented participants with both conflict types, embedded in either a positive or a negative affective context. Across different designs and stimuli, and for both experienced difficulty and decision time, we found that in a positive affective context, avoidance-avoidance conflicts were more difficult to resolve than approach-approach conflicts; however, in a negative affective context, no difference between the conflict types was found. In Study 5, we added a neutral control condition to relate our findings to previous research, which did not manipulate the affective context. Taken together, our findings challenge a seminal motivational theory and show that choosing the lesser of two evils is not always more difficult than choosing the greater of two goods. Instead, the difference in conflict resolution difficulty depends on the affective context in which the choice is being made. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Midfrontal theta as an index of conflict strength in approach-approach vs avoidance-avoidance conflicts.

The seminal theory of motivational conflicts distinguishes between approach-approach (AP-AP) conflicts, in which a decision is made between desirable alternatives, and avoidance-avoidance (AV-AV) conflicts, in which a decision is made between undesirable alternatives. The behavioral differences between AP-AP and AV-AV conflicts are well documented: abundant research showed that AV-AV conflicts are more difficult to resolve than AP-AP ones. However, there is little to no research looking into the neural underpinnings of the differences between the two conflict types. Here, we show that midfrontal theta, an established neural marker of conflict, distinguished between the two conflict types such that midfrontal theta power was higher in AV-AV conflicts than in AP-AP conflicts. We further demonstrate that higher midfrontal theta power was associated with shorter decision times on a single-trial basis, indicating that midfrontal theta played a role in promoting successful controlled behavior. Taken together, our results show that AP-AP and AV-AV conflicts are distinguishable on the neural level. The implications of these results go beyond motivational conflicts, as they establish midfrontal theta as a measure of the continuous degree of conflict in subjective decisions.

Perspectives, they might be a-changin': A proactive-control take on the cognitive cost of maintaining one's own perspective.

The world abounds with different perspectives, which necessitates balancing between maintaining the currently relevant perspective and flexibly switching between perspectives, if needed. Employing the distinction between reactive and proactive control (Braver, 2012), we argue that previous research on perspective-taking has mainly looked at the cost of activating reactive control to deal with what is happening now. Here we examine the cost of activating proactive control in order to be prepared for what might happen in the future. In three experiments, we embed a perspective-taking task (Samson et al., 2010) into a task-switching design and calculate perspective-mixing costs to capture proactive control. We show that a context in which perspective shifts might occur unpredictably (compared to a context in which such shifts are not expected) results in a poorer ability to maintain any perspective, but especially one's own. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Choice changes preferences, not merely reflects them: A meta-analysis of the artifact-free free-choice paradigm.

One of the prominent, by now seminal, paradigms in the research tradition of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) is the free-choice paradigm developed by Brehm (1956) to measure choice-induced preference change. Some 50 years after Brehm introduced the paradigm, Chen and Risen (2010) published an influential critique arguing that what the paradigm measures is not necessarily a choice-induced preference change, but possibly an artifact of the choice revealing existing preferences. They showed that once the artifact is experimentally controlled for, there is either no or very little evidence for choice-induced preference change. Given the prominence of the paradigm, this critique meant that much of what we thought we knew about the psychological process of cognitive dissonance might not be true. Following the critique, research using the paradigm applied various corrections to overcome the artifact. The present research examined whether choice truly changes preferences, or rather merely reflects them. We conducted a meta-analysis on 43 studies (N = 2,191), all using an artifact-free free-choice paradigm. Using different meta-analytical methods, and conceptually different analyses, including a Bayesian one, we found an overall effect size of Cohen's d = 0.40, 95% confidence interval (CI) [0.32, 0.49]. Furthermore, we found no evidence for publication bias as an alternative explanation for the choice-induced preference change effect. These results support the existence of true preference change created by choice. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

The contrast diversity effect: Increasing the diversity of contrast examples increases generalization from a single item.

In five experiments, we established and explored the contrast diversity effect-the effect of diversity of negative evidence on inductive inferences drawn from a single observation of a target exemplar. In Experiments 1 through 3, we show that increasing the diversity of negative evidence in a contrasting category led people to infer that a target exemplar corresponded to a higher level category and led to greater generalization of a novel property associated with the target. Further, we demonstrated two boundary conditions in which the effect only occurred when the negative evidence was consistent with a higher level category that both united the contrast exemplars and distinguished them from the target (Experiment 4) and when the negative evidence and the target shared an obvious parent category (Experiment 5). Taken together, these findings demonstrate that increasing the diversity of negative evidence alone increases generalization from a target so long as the negative evidence is drawn from a single contrast category that excludes, but shares a common parent with, the target. Implications for general theories of induction are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Cognitive control modulates attention to food cues: Support for the control readiness model of self-control.

Self-control in one's food choices often depends on the regulation of attention toward healthy choices and away from temptations. We tested whether selective attention to food cues can be modulated by a newly developed proactive self-control mechanism-control readiness-whereby control activated in one domain can facilitate control in another domain. In two studies, we elicited the activation of control using a color-naming Stroop task and tested its effect on attention to food cues in a subsequent, unrelated task. We found that control readiness modulates both overt attention, which involves shifts in eye gaze (Study 1), and covert attention, which involves shift in mental attention without shifting in eye gaze (Study 2). We further demonstrated that individuals for whom tempting food cues signal a self-control problem (operationalized by relatively higher BMI) were especially likely to benefit from control readiness. We discuss the theoretical contributions of the control readiness model and the implications of our findings for enhancing proactive self-control to overcome temptation in food choices.

When the Spatial and Ideological Collide: Metaphorical Conflict Shapes Social Perception.

In the present article, we introduce the concept of metaphorical conflict-a conflict between the concrete and abstract aspects of a metaphor. We used the association between the concrete (spatial) and abstract (ideological) components of the political left-right metaphor to demonstrate that metaphorical conflict has marked implications for cognitive processing and social perception. Specifically, we showed that creating conflict between a spatial location and a metaphorically linked concept reduces perceived differences between the attitudes of partisans who are generally viewed as possessing fundamentally different worldviews (Democrats and Republicans). We further demonstrated that metaphorical conflict reduces perceived attitude differences by creating a mind-set in which categories are represented as possessing broader boundaries than when concepts are metaphorically compatible. These results suggest that metaphorical conflict shapes social perception by making members of distinct groups appear more similar than they are generally thought to be. These findings have important implications for research on conflict, embodied cognition, and social perception.

Social learning across psychological distance.

While those we learn from are often close to us, more and more our learning environments are shifting to include more distant and dissimilar others. The question we examine in 5 studies is how whom we learn from influences what we learn and how what we learn influences from whom we choose to learn it. In Study 1, we show that social learning, in and of itself, promotes higher level (more abstract) learning than does learning based on one's own direct experience. In Studies 2 and 3, we show that when people learn from and emulate others, they tend to do so at a higher level when learning from a distant model than from a near model. Studies 4 and 5 show that thinking about learning at a higher (compared to a lower) level leads individuals to expand the range of others that they will consider learning from. Study 6 shows that when given an actual choice, people prefer to learn low-level information from near sources and high-level information from distant sources. These results demonstrate a basic link between level of learning and psychological distance in social learning processes.

Neural mechanisms of proactive and reactive cognitive control in social anxiety.

Social anxiety--the fear of social embarrassment and negative evaluation by others--ranks among people's worst fears, and it is often thought to impair task performance. We investigated the neurocognitive processes through which trait social anxiety relates to task performance, proposing a model of the joint contributions of reactive control, theoretically associated with conflict monitoring and activity of the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC), and proactive control, theoretically associated with top-down regulation and activity of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC). Participants varying in their degree of trait social anxiety completed the Eriksen flanker task while electroencephalography (EEG) was recorded. Task-related left dlPFC activity was indexed by relative left prefrontal EEG (inverse alpha), and conflict-related dACC activity was indexed by the N2r component of the event-related potential. Stronger activity in both regions predicted better response control, and greater social anxiety was associated with worse response control. Furthermore, for all participants, greater left prefrontal EEG activity predicted better behavioral control, but for high social anxiety participants only, greater N2r responses also predicted behavioral control. This pattern suggests that low social anxiety individuals engaged a proactive control process, driven by dlPFC activity, whereas high social anxiety individuals relied additionally on a reactive control process, driven by conflict-related dACC activity. These findings support a model of control that involves different patterns of interplay between proactive and reactive strategies and may help to explain self-regulatory impairments in social anxiety.

Accessibility is a matter of trust: Dispositional and contextual distrust blocks accessibility effects.

Distrust poses a challenge to human cognition because it signals that information from the environment should not be taken at face value. Accordingly, in the present research, we argue and show that distrust, both as a chronic disposition and as a contextual factor, blocks accessibility effects. We report five studies in which distrust is either measured (Studies 2 and 3) or manipulated (Studies 1, 4 and 5), and test the "distrust-blocks-accessibility hypothesis" on both verbal and non-verbal accessibility effects. We first elucidate the nature of the distrust mindset and show that distrust inherently entails the activation of alternatives to the original accessible concept thus undermining the preeminence of the prime (Study 1). We then show that distrust blocks accessibility using the "Donald" task (Study 2), the "Halo Effect" task (Study 3), an embodiment paradigm (Study 4), and an applied context of web advertising (Study 5). We conclude that the human mind is sensitive and flexible enough to block any influence from the environment if it seems unreliable. We discuss the novel implications of this perspective for both distrust and accessibility research.

Power effects on cognitive control: Turning conflict into action.

Power is known to promote effective goal pursuit, especially when it requires one to overcome distractions or bias. We proposed that this effect involves the ability to engage and implement cognitive control. In Study 1, we demonstrated that power enhances behavioral performance on a response conflict task and that it does so by enhancing controlled processing rather than by reducing automatic processing. In Study 2, we used an event-related potential index of anterior cingulate activity to test whether power effects on control were due to enhanced conflict sensitivity or action implementation. Power did not significantly affect neural sensitivity to conflict; rather, high power was associated with a stronger link between conflict processing and intended action, relative to low power. These findings suggest a new perspective on how social factors can affect controlled processing and offer new evidence regarding the transition between conflict detection and the implementation of action control.

Positive consequences of conflict on decision making: when a conflict mindset facilitates choice.

Much research has shown that conflict is aversive and leads to increased choice deferral. In contrast, we have proposed that conflict can be beneficial. Specifically, exposure to nonconscious goal conflict can activate a mindset (a set of cognitive procedures) that facilitates the systematic processing of information without triggering the associated costs, such as negative affect and stress. In a conflict mindset, people should be better able to make tradeoffs and resolve choice conflict. We tested this proposition in 4 experiments, and demonstrated that priming conflicting goals before a decision increases choice in domains unrelated to the primed conflict. We further demonstrated that increased choice occurs because people in a conflict mindset process choice information more systematically, and we rule out several alternative explanations for the results.

The control-freak mind: stereotypical biases are eliminated following conflict-activated cognitive control.

Numerous daily situations require control for successful goal attainment. An important question is whether control can adjust across situations, to create control readiness from one situation to the next. Using trial to trial control adjustment paradigms, previous research generally suggested that control adjustments are domain specific. However, this research typically used neutral stimuli (e.g., single letters) devoid of personally and socially relevant goals. We propose that personal relevance may be an important modulator of control adjustment and, hence, that personally relevant control tasks can benefit from control readiness, even if it is produced by a different task. In 2 experiments we test whether control over the expression of stereotypes, a highly meaningful and desirable goal for many, can benefit from control readiness evoked by a neutral unrelated Flanker task. Results suggest that stereotype-driven behavior is modulated by independently activated control and that personal relevance may facilitate control adjustments across domains.

When conflicts are good: nonconscious goal conflicts reduce confirmatory thinking.

In this article, we argue that nonconscious goal conflicts are accompanied by a mindset that has wide-ranging implications for reasoning and thinking in content areas that are not part of the conflict itself. Specifically, we propose that nonconscious goal conflicts induce a mode of processing information that increases the likelihood of approaching an issue from opposing perspectives. This hypothesis is examined by investigating the effects of nonconscious goal conflicts on confirmatory thinking, that is, a way of thinking that narrowly focuses on confirmation rather than on broader examination of information. In 5 experiments, we show that nonconscious goal conflicts significantly reduce confirmatory hypothesis testing (Experiments 1 through 3) and anchoring (Experiments 4 and 5). We further show that these effects result from a goal conflict by rejecting explanations based on priming of semantic opposites, and priming of multiple goals that do not conflict (Experiments 2 and 3), and by examining decision times as a conflict process variable (Experiment 5). Using various probes, we show that these changes in confirmatory judgments are not accompanied by changes in conflict phenomenology. Together, these results suggest that nonconscious goal conflicts attenuate the robust confirmatory thinking strategy that characterizes human thinking in numerous domains.