"We're tolerant and they're prejudiced": Same-sex marriage supporters' and opponents' perceptions of supportive and oppositional claims.

The current research examined the proposition that debates over same-sex marriage are characterized, at least in part, by conflicting understandings about what is and is not prejudiced, normative and true. Toward this end, Australians' (N = 415) prejudice judgements of supportive and oppositional statements toward same-sex marriage were measured and analysed with analyses of variance. Unsurprisingly, same-sex marriage supporters perceived a supportive statement as unprejudiced, tolerant, truthful, in pursuit of individual liberty, and normative; oppositional statements were seen in precisely the opposite manner. Same-sex marriage opponents, however, disagreed, instead judging an oppositional statement as unprejudiced, tolerant, truthful, in pursuit of individual liberty, and normative; it was a supportive statement that was seen as relatively prejudiced. These effects remained even after controlling for independent expressions of in-group favouritism. The current data align with a collective naïve realism perspective, in which group members see their own views as veridical and those of disagreeing others as biased. We argue that prejudice-reduction efforts must be instantiated to facilitate a common in-group identity between supporters and opponents to enable consensus over facts and, ultimately, what is and is not prejudice. Without this consensus, each side of the political debate may simply hurl the pejorative label of "prejudice" against the other, with likely little opportunity for social influence and social change.

Gender-based in-group social influence can lead women to view a hostile sexist attitude as less prejudiced and more true.

Social influence processes by which women come to judge a hostile sexist attitude as relatively true and unprejudiced were examined. Based upon status characteristics theory, women's judgments were expected to be more strongly influenced by a man's than a woman's interpretation of the sexist attitude as true or prejudiced. Based upon self-categorization theory, women's judgments were expected to be more strongly influenced by a woman's than a man's interpretation. Support was primarily observed for the self-categorization theory prediction. This effect, however, was initially suppressed by participants' acceptance of the legitimacy of gender status differences. A post-hoc mediational analysis revealed two pathways by which in-group social influence affected women's acceptance the relative veracity of negative claims about their own group: a direct path from shared in-group membership with the influencing agent, and an indirect path through their acceptance of the legitimacy of gender status differences. The research highlights how women's endorsement of sexist views can have the capacity to minimize other women's challenges of these views as prejudice.

Moral Vitalism: Seeing Good and Evil as Real, Agentic Forces.

Moral vitalism refers to a tendency to view good and evil as actual forces that can influence people and events. We introduce a scale designed to assess the belief in moral vitalism. High scorers on the scale endorse items such as "There are underlying forces of good and evil in this world." After establishing the reliability and criterion validity of the scale (Studies 1, 2a, and 2b), we examined the predictive validity of the moral vitalism scale, showing that "moral vitalists" worry about being possessed by evil (Study 3), being contaminated through contact with evil people (Study 4), and forfeiting their own mental purity (Study 5). We discuss the nature of moral vitalism and the implications of the construct for understanding the role of metaphysical lay theories about the nature of good and evil in moral reasoning.