Defending subjective inflation: an inference to the best explanation.

In a recent opinion piece, Abid (2019) criticizes the hypothesis that subjective inflation may partly account for apparent phenomenological richness across the visual field and outside the focus of attention. In response, we address three main issues. First, we maintain that inflation should be interpreted as an intraperceptual-and not post-perceptual-phenomenon. Second, we describe how inflation may differ from filling-in. Finally, we contend that, in general, there is sufficient evidence to tip the scales toward intraperceptual interpretations of visibility and confidence judgments.

New measures of agency from an adaptive sensorimotor task.

Self-agency, the sense that one is the author or owner of one's behaviors, is impaired in multiple psychological and neurological disorders, including functional movement disorders, Parkinson's Disease, alien hand syndrome, schizophrenia, and dystonia. Existing assessments of self-agency, many of which focus on agency of movement, can be prohibitively time-consuming and often yield ambiguous results. Here, we introduce a short online motion tracking task that quantifies movement agency through both first-order perceptual and second-order metacognitive judgments. The task assesses the degree to which a participant can distinguish between a motion stimulus whose trajectory is influenced by the participant's cursor movements and a motion stimulus whose trajectory is random. We demonstrate the task's reliability in healthy participants and discuss how its efficiency, reliability, and ease of online implementation make it a promising new tool for both diagnosing and understanding disorders of agency.

Subjective inflation: phenomenology's get-rich-quick scheme.

How do we explain the seemingly rich nature of visual phenomenology while accounting for impoverished perception in the periphery? This apparent mismatch has led some to posit that rich phenomenological content overflows cognitive access, whereas others hold that phenomenology is in fact sparse and constrained by cognitive access. Here, we review the Rich versus Sparse debate as it relates to a phenomenon called subjective inflation, wherein minimally attended or peripheral visual perception tends to be subjectively evaluated as more reliable than attended or foveal perception when objective performance is matched. We argue that subjective inflation can account for rich phenomenology without invoking phenomenological overflow. On this view, visual phenomenology is constrained by cognitive access, but seemingly inflated above what would be predicted based on sparse sensory content.

Continuous flash suppression and monocular pattern masking impact subjective awareness similarly.

Peters and Lau (eLife, 4, e09651, 2015) found that when criterion bias is controlled for, there is no evidence for unconscious visual perception in normal observers, in the sense that they cannot directly discriminate a target above chance without knowing it. One criticism of that study is that the visual suppression method used, forward and backward masking (FBM), may be too blunt in the way it interferes with visual processing to allow for unconscious forced-choice discrimination. To investigate this question, we compared FBM directly to continuous flash suppression (CFS) in a two-interval forced-choice task. Although CFS is popular, and may be thought of as a more powerful visual suppression technique, we found no difference in the degree of perceptual impairment between the two suppression types. To the extent that CFS impairs perception, both objective discrimination and subjective awareness are impaired to similar degrees under FBM. This pattern was consistently observed across three experiments in which various experimental parameters were varied. These findings provide evidence for an ongoing debate about unconscious perception: normal observers cannot perform forced-choice discrimination tasks unconsciously.

Correction to: Continuous flash suppression and monocular pattern masking impact subjective awareness similarly.

There is an error in Fig. 4, part A. In the "continuous flash suppression" box, the labels "non-dominant eye" and "dominant eye" need to be switched with each other. The corrected Fig. 4 appears below.

Neuroscience: The Key to Consciousness May Not Be under the Streetlight.

Key theories of consciousness predict that the prefrontal cortex (PFC) plays important roles, but there has been relatively little causal evidence showing that manipulation of activity in the region can broadly affect conscious experiences. A new study provides crucial findings to help resolve this issue, showing that direct pharmacological stimulation of PFC restores wakefulness in anesthetized rats.

Towards an unconscious neural reinforcement intervention for common fears.

Can "hardwired" physiological fear responses (e.g., for spiders and snakes) be reprogramed unconsciously in the human brain? Currently, exposure therapy is among the most effective treatments for anxiety disorders, but this intervention is subjectively aversive to patients, causing many to drop out of treatment prematurely. Here we introduce a method to bypass the subjective unpleasantness in conscious exposure, by directly pairing monetary reward with unconscious occurrences of decoded representations of naturally feared animals in the brain. To decode physiological fear representations without triggering excessively aversive reactions, we capitalize on recent advancements in functional magnetic resonance imaging decoding techniques, and use a method called hyperalignment to infer the relevant representations of feared animals for a designated participant based on data from other "surrogate" participants. In this way, the procedure completely bypasses the need for a conscious encounter with feared animals. We demonstrate that our method can lead to reliable reductions in physiological fear responses, as measured by skin conductance as well as amygdala hemodynamic activity. Not only do these results raise the intriguing possibility that naturally occurring fear responses can be "reprogrammed" outside of conscious awareness, importantly, they also create the rare opportunity to rigorously test a psychological intervention of this nature in a double-blind, placebo-controlled fashion. This may pave the way for a new approach combining the appealing rationale and proven efficacy of conventional psychotherapy with the rigor and leverage of clinical neuroscience.

Clarifying signal detection theoretic interpretations of the Müller-Lyer and sound-induced flash illusions.

In a recent article, Witt, Taylor, Sugovic, and Wixted (2015) made several claims about the way the Müller-Lyer and sound-induced flash illusions should influence the signal detection theory criterion and sensitivity measures, c and d'. Here, we address some crucial conceptual inconsistencies in their simulation of the Müller-Lyer illusion and clarify a previous analysis of the sound-induced flash illusion from the literature that is misinterpreted in their discussion. Alternative signal detection theoretic interpretations of both illusions are offered.