Purity is not a distinct moral domain.

Purity violations overlap with other moral domains. They are not uniquely characterized by hypothesized markers of purity - the witness's emotion of disgust, taint to perpetrator's soul, or the diminished role of intention in moral judgment. Thus, Fitouchi et al.'s proposition that puritanical morality (a subset of violations in the purity domain) is part of cooperation-based morality is an important advance.

On the set of emotions with facial signals.

Which, if any, emotions have a facial signal? Studies from AI to Zoology sometimes presuppose an answer to this question. According to one important and influential research program, the basic (fundamental and discrete) emotions can be identified by their possession of a biologically based unique and universally recognized facial signal. To the classic set of six such emotions, researchers recently advanced 12 new candidates, which were examined in the present study with a standard free-labeling procedure in three samples: English-speaking Americans (n = 200), Mandarin-speaking Chinese (n = 101), and Malayalam-speaking Indians (n = 200). In the three samples, respectively, a majority of respondents chose the predicted label for only one, one, and none of the 12 faces. That is, a majority of respondents failed to choose the predicted label for 11 of the 12 faces in the English-speaking (proportion of respondents range for the 11: .04 to .45) and Mandarin-speaking (proportion of respondents range for the 11: .00 to .44) samples; a majority of respondents failed to choose the predicted label for any of the 12 faces in the Malayalam-speaking sample (proportion of respondents range: .00 to .42). The modal choice in the three samples was the predicted label for five, six, and one, respectively, of the 12 faces. "Recognition" of the predicted emotion was negligible (< 15% of respondents) for five, eight (two of which were modal), and 10, respectively, of the 12 faces. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Is purity a distinct and homogeneous domain in moral psychology?

"No" is our answer to the question in our title. In moral psychology, a purity violation (defined as an immoral act committed against one's own body or soul) was theorized to be a homogeneous moral domain qualitatively distinct from other moral domains. In contrast, we hypothesized heterogeneity rather than homogeneity, overlapping rather than distinct domains, and quantitative rather than qualitative differences from other hypothesized domains (specifically, autonomy, which is harm to others). Purity has been said to consist of norms violations of which elicit disgust and taint the soul. Here we empirically examined homogeneity: whether violations of body (e.g., eating putrid food) belong in the same moral domain as violations of the soul unrelated to bodily health (e.g., selling one's soul, desecrating sacred books). We examined distinctness: whether reactions to purity violations differ in predicted ways from those to violations of autonomy. In four studies (the last preregistered), American Internet users (in Studies 2 and 4, classified as politically conservative or liberal; Ns = 80, 96, 1,312, 376) were given stories about violations based on prior studies. Nonhealth purity violations were rated as relatively more disgusting, but less gross (the lay term for the reaction to putrid things) and more likely to taint the soul than were health-related ones. Surprisingly, both health and nonhealth purity violations were typically judged as only slightly immoral if at all. Autonomy violations were rated as more disgusting and tainting of the soul than were purity violations. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Deconstructing disgust as the emotion of violations of body and soul.

Through the evolutionary process of preadaptation, disgust was coopted to serve as the guardian not just of one's body but also of one's soul-or so it has been theorized. On this theory, elicitors include health-related threats and nonhealth-related degrading acts, which together form a pancultural domain of morality. A prediction from this theory was examined here in four samples: 96 English-speaking Americans, 96 Malayalam-speaking Indians, 136 Japanese-speaking Japanese, and 194 Arabic-speaking Egyptians. Participants read health and nonhealth threat stories (derived from prior studies) and were asked to judge how immoral the action was, what word describes the emotion elicited by the story, and what facial expression conveys that emotion. Even though health threats elicited disgust, they were seen as barely immoral if at all. In contrast, nonhealth events were immoral but elicited anger more than disgust. Emotional reactions to heath and nonhealth threats did not indicate that they are the same emotion. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

On evidence for a dozen new basic emotions: A methodological critique.

Much theory, research, and application regarding emotion is based on a set of basic emotions. But the question remains: which emotions are in that set? One proposal is to expand the classic set of six with 12 new ones, each indicated by a facial expression purported to convey that one specific emotion universally. A series of studies offered as support for this proposal relied on presenting participants with the emotion label embedded in a story and then asking them to choose among four facial expressions or none. Here we critique that response procedure (used in various studies) as confounding emotion with story. Our Study 1 (N = 1,230 residents of the United States) found that the same response procedure could "show" that the facial expressions used in that previous research convey emotions other than the ones that had been proposed. Our Study 2 (N = 64 in India and N = 56 in China) found similar results with participants who speak non-Indo-European languages (Malayalam and Mandarin). Altogether, our results question whether the proposed set of new basic emotions is warranted, given problems in the response procedure in which an emotion is embedded in a story. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Disgust and the sacred: Do people react to violations of the sacred with the same emotion they react to something putrid?

Disgust has been hypothesized to be uniquely linked to violations of a distinct moral domain (called divinity, purity, or sacred) aimed at preserving one's body from contamination with pathogens and preserving one's soul from violations of what is sacred. Here we examined whether the same emotion-core disgust-occurs when witnessing both types of violation, and we proposed a specific method for doing so. In two studies (N = 160; 240), American and Indian participants indicated their emotional reaction to (stories depicting) sacred or nonsacred violations, each either with or without pathogens. Both Americans and Indians felt "grossed out" (a term for core disgust) by events with pathogens (whether violations of the sacred or not). They felt disgusted and angered, but not grossed out, by violations of the sacred. For both Americans and Indians, grossed out was never the modal emotion when a sacred violation did not involve pathogens. Results were inconsistent with a focus on any single emotion: sacred violations were associated with several different negative emotions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Do community and autonomy moral violations elicit different emotions?

According to one important set of theories, different domains of immorality are linked to different discrete emotions-panculturally. Violations against the community elicit contempt, whereas violations against an individual elicit anger. To test this theory, American, Indian and Japanese participants (N = 480) indicated contempt and anger reactions (with verbal rating and face selection) to both the types of immorality. To remedy method problems in previous research, community and autonomy violations were created for the same story-frame, by varying the target to be either the community or an individual. Community and autonomy violations did not differ significantly in the emotion elicited: overall, both types of violations elicited more anger than contempt (and more negative emotion of any kind than positive emotion). By verbal rating, Americans and Indians reported more anger than contempt for both types of violation, whereas Japanese reported more contempt than anger for both types. By face selection, the three cultural groups selected anger more than contempt for both types of violation. The results speak against defining distinct domains of morality by their association with distinct emotions.

Even unpleasant reminders that you are an animal need not disgust you.

Three studies (Ns = 200, 400, 400) tested the hypothesis that we humans feel disgust when reminded of our animal nature. Participants verbally rated their disgust reaction to pictures of humans engaged in various unpleasant actions. For pictures of events that present danger or suffering, accompanied by an explicit and vivid reminder that animals face the same situation, participants reported fear and sadness rather than disgust. For pictures of events that present a norm violation, an explicit animal reminder (relative to a human picture alone) did not lead to a consequent increment in disgust. For pictures of events that present a physically disgusting contamination, an explicit animal reminder (relative to a human picture alone) led to a decrement in disgust. Thus, not all unpleasant animal reminders are disgusting. Some disgusting things may remind us of our animal nature, but they are not disgusting because they do so. (PsycINFO Database Record

The English word disgust has no exact translation in Hindi or Malayalam.

Do different languages have a translation for the English word disgust that labels the same underlying concept? If not, the English word might label a culture-specific concept. Four studies (Ns = 93, 90, 180, 960) compared disgust to its common translation in Hindi (an Indo-European language) and in Malayalam (a Dravidian language) by examining two components of the concept thought of as a script: causal antecedent and facial expression. The English word was used to refer to reactions to both unclean substances and moral violations; Hindi and Malayalam translations referred mainly to moral violations. Speakers of all three languages associated different facial expressions to unclean substances and moral violations. Words for disgust in the three languages failed a test of translation equivalence (a correlation of .80 or above across emotional facial expressions).

Is it disgusting to be reminded that you are an animal?

Six studies (Ns = 65, 96, 120, 129, 40, 200) tested the hypothesis that being reminded of our animal nature makes us feel disgust. Participants from three cultural groups indicated the intensity of their disgust reactions to pleasant and unpleasant animal reminder stories and pictures as well as to a statement directly reminding them of their animal nature. Findings did not support the hypothesis: Pleasant animal reminders reminded respondents of their animal nature (even more powerfully than did unpleasant ones), but were not disgusting. The direct reminder of our animal nature was not disgusting. There was no significant correlation between disgust and being reminded of animal nature for disgusting (unpleasant) animal reminders. Thus, some disgusting events remind us of our animal nature, but they are not disgusting because they remind us of our animal nature. Animal reminders per se are not disgusting.