That "vision thing": the state of theory in social and personality psychology at the edge of the new millennium.

Social psychololgy's status as a theoretical discipline is assessed. Whereas it has excelled as an experimental science, the field has generally eschewed broad theorizing and tended to limit its conceptualizations to relatively narrow, "mid-range" notions closely linked to the operational level of analysis. Such "theory shyness" may have spawned several negative consequences, including the tendency to invent new names for old concepts, fragmentation of the field, and isolation from the general cultural dialogue. Recently, steps have been taken to encourage greater theoretical activity by social psychologists, and there are now several major outlets for theoretical contributions. Further initiatives are needed, however, to instigate theoretical creativity, including ways of overcoming disciplinary risk aversion and the training of young social psychologists in ways and means of theory construction.

To "do the right thing" or to "just do it": locomotion and assessment as distinct self-regulatory imperatives.

An integrated series of studies investigated 2 functional dimensions of self-regulation referred to as assessment and locomotion (E. T. Higgins and A. W. Kruglanski, 1995). Assessment constitutes the comparative aspect of self-regulation that critically evaluates alternative goals or means to decide which are best to pursue and appraises performance. Locomotion constitutes the aspect of self-regulation concerned with movement from state to state, including commitment of psychological resources to initiate and maintain such movement. Two separate scales were developed to measure individual differences in these tendencies. Psychometric work attested to the scales' unidimensionality, internal consistency, and temporal stability. The authors found that (a) locomotion and assessment are relatively independent of each other, (b) both are needed for self-regulatory success, and (c) each relates to distinct task orientations and motivational emphases.

Membership has its (epistemic) rewards: need for closure effects on in-group bias.

Three studies examined the impact of the need for cognitive closure on manifestations of in-group bias. All 3 studies found that high (vs. low) need for closure increased in-group favoritism and outgroup derogation. Specifically, Study 1 found a positive relation between need for cognitive closure and both participants' ethnic group identification and their collective self-esteem. Studies 2 and 3 found a positive relation between need for closure and participants' identification with an in-group member and their acceptance of an in-group member's beliefs and attitudes. Studies 2 and 3 also found a negative relation between need for closure and participants' identification with an out-group member and their acceptance of an out-group member's beliefs and attitudes. The implications of these findings for the epistemic function of in-groups are discussed.

Social metacognition: an expansionist review.

In this article we review recent socialpsychological contributions to the metacognitive movement. It is argued that social psychologists have long contributed to the study of "thinking about thinking," even though their work has not yet been recognized as metacognitive. The present "expansionist" survey suggests that the domain of social metacognition should include (a) beliefs about one's own mental states and processes as well as beliefs about those of other people, (b) momentary sensations as well as enduring folk theories, and (c) descriptive beliefs about how the mind works and nonnative beliefs about how it ought to work. The contents and origins of metacognition are inherently social; at the same time, metacognitions are comprised of cognitive elements and are governed by the principles and laws applicable to human thinking in general. Accordingly, whereas metacognitions about self-knowledge may be derived from different informational sources than metacognitions about other people, the processes whereby different types of metacognitions are formed, activated, and applied are essentially the same. Focusing on the social nature of metacognition and the profound relevance of cultural expectations on cognitive performance makes clear the benefits of systematically exploring the cognitive-social interface in reference to metacognitive phenomena.

Psychological theory testing versus psychometric nay-saying: comment on Neuberg et al.'s (1997) critique of the need for closure scale.

S. L. Neuberg, T. N. Judice, and S. G. West (1997) faulted our work with the Need for Closure Scale (NFCS) on grounds that the NFCS lacks discriminant validity relative to S. L. Neuberg's and J. T. Newsom's (1993) Personal Need for Structure (PNS) Scale and is multidimensional, which, so they claim, renders the use of its total score inadmissible. By contrast, the present authors show that neither of the above assertions is incompatible with the underlying need for closure theory. Relations between NFCS and the PNS are to be expected, as these were designed to operationalize the very same construct (of need for closure). Furthermore, no unidimensionality of the NFCS has been claimed, and none is required to use its total score for testing various theoretically derived predictions. An instrument's ultimate utility hinges on theoretical considerations and empirical evidence rather than on questionable psychometric dogma unrelated to the substantive matters at hand.

Brief encounters ending in estrangement: motivated language use and interpersonal rapport in the question-answer paradigm.

Three experiments explored need-for-for-closure effects in the question-answer paradigm. In experiment 1, participants under high (vs. low) need for closure selected more abstract interview questions. In Experiments 2 and 3, such questions elicited more abstract answers--answers that casually implicated the object (vs. the subject) of the sentence and that prompted a less positive perceived rapport between the interviewer and the interviewee. These findings are discussed in reference to the role of motivation in language and the possible interpersonal consequences of motivated language use.

Motivated language use in intergroup contexts: need-for-closure effects on the linguistic intergroup bias.

Two experiments examined the impact of the motivation for cognitive closure on the abstractness of linguistic communications in intergroup contexts. Participants described positive and negative behaviors attributed to either an in-group or an out-group member. Individuals high (vs. low) in need for closure exhibited greater linguistic abstraction when describing positive behaviors of in-group members and negative behaviors of out-group members. These differences disappeared for descriptions of negative behaviors of out-group members. The discussion relates these results to the interface of motivation, language, and social cognition.

Motivated closing of the mind: "seizing" and "freezing".

A theoretical framework is outlined in which the key construct is the need for (nonspecific) cognitive closure. The need for closure is a desire for definite knowledge on some issue. It represents a dimension of stable individual differences as well as a situationally evocable state. The need for closure has widely ramifying consequences for social-cognitive phenomena at the intrapersonal, interpersonal, and group levels of analysis. Those consequences derive from 2 general tendencies, those of urgency and performance. The urgency tendency represents an individual's inclination to attain closure as soon as possible, and the permanence tendency represents an individual's inclination to maintain it for as long as possible. Empirical evidence for present theory attests to diverse need for closure effects on fundamental social psychological phenomena, including impression formation, stereotyping, attribution, persuasion, group decision making, and language use in intergroup contexts.

Individual differences in need for cognitive closure.

This article introduces an individual-difference measure of the need for cognitive closure. As a dispositional construct, the need for cognitive closure is presently treated as a latent variable manifested through several different aspects, namely, desire for predictability, preference for order and structure, discomfort with ambiguity, decisiveness, and close-mindedness. This article presents psychometric work on the measure as well as several validation studies including (a) a "known-groups" discrimination between populations assumed to differ in their need for closure, (b) discriminant and convergent validation with respect to related personality measures, and (c) replication of effects obtained with situational inductions of the need for closure. The present findings suggest that the Need for Closure Scale is a reliable and valid instrument of considerable potential utility in future "motivated social cognition" research.

Motivated resistance and openness to persuasion in the presence or absence of prior information.

Three experiments investigated the relation between need for cognitive closure and persuasion. In the 1st study, Ss high on an individual-differences measure of need for closure were more resistant to persuasion by their low need-for-closure counterparts than vice versa. In the 2nd study, Ss in a noisy environment, assumed to instill a relatively high need for closure, were more resistant to persuasion than Ss in a quiet environment, but only in presence of an initial informational base for an opinion. In its absence, Ss in the noisy (vs. quiet) environment were less resistant to persuasion. The interaction between need for closure and informational base was replicated in the 3rd experiment reverting to the individual-differences measure of need for closure. The discussion considered implications of these findings for further persuasion phenomena.

Group members' reactions to opinion deviates and conformists at varying degrees of proximity to decision deadline and of environmental noise.

Four experiments examined freely interacting groups to investigate the determinants of group members' reactions to opinion deviates and conformists. In the 1st experiment, the deviate was rejected more when he or she articulated the dissenting opinion in close proximity to the group-decision deadline versus at an earlier point in the group discussion. In the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th experiment, the deviate was rejected more when the group discussion was carried out in a noisy versus a quiet environment. Furthermore, when the conformist's contributions to the group's attempts to reach consensus were made salient (in Experiment 4), he or she was evaluated more positively in a noisy versus a quiet environment. The results were discussed in terms of the notion that group members' tendency to denigrate a deviate or extol a conformist may be stronger when their need for collective cognitive closure is heightened.

Motivational effects in the social comparison of opinions.

Four experiments were executed to test the effects of different epistemic motivations on subjects' tendency to compare with agreeing or disagreeing others. We found that under high (vs. low) fear of invalidity, subjects tend more to compare with disagreeing (vs. agreeing) others. By contrast, under high (vs. low) need for self-confirmation or a high (vs. low) need for cognitive structure, subjects tended more to compare with agreeing others. These results are discussed in reference to social comparison formulations (Festinger, 1954; Goethals & Darley, 1977) and the theory of lay epistemology (Kruglanski & Ajzen, 1983; Kruglanski & Freund, 1983).