Teaching medical students to apply deliberate reflection.

PURPOSE: Deliberate reflection on initial diagnosis has been found to repair diagnostic errors. We investigated the effectiveness of teaching students to use deliberate reflection on future cases and whether their usage would depend on their perception of case difficulty. METHOD: One-hundred-nineteen medical students solved cases either with deliberate-reflection or without instructions to reflect. One week later, all participants solved six cases, each with two equally likely diagnoses, but some symptoms in the case were associated with only one of the diagnoses (discriminating features). Participants provided one diagnosis and subsequently wrote down everything they remembered from it. After the first three cases, they were told that the next three would be difficult cases. Reflection was measured by the proportion of discriminating features recalled (overall; related to their provided diagnosis; related to alternative diagnosis). RESULTS: The deliberate-reflection condition recalled more features for the alternative diagnosis than the control condition (p = .013) regardless of described difficulty. They also recalled more features related to their provided diagnosis on the first three cases (p = .004), but on the last three cases (described as difficult), there was no difference. CONCLUSION: Learning deliberate reflection helped students engage in more reflective reasoning when solving future cases.

Learning deliberate reflection in medical diagnosis: does learning-by-teaching help?

Deliberate reflection has been found to foster diagnostic accuracy on complex cases or under circumstances that tend to induce cognitive bias. However, it is unclear whether the procedure can also be learned and thereby autonomously applied when diagnosing future cases without instructions to reflect. We investigated whether general practice residents would learn the deliberate reflection procedure through 'learning-by-teaching' and apply it to diagnose new cases. The study was a two-phase experiment. In the learning phase, 56 general-practice residents were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. They either (1) studied examples of deliberate reflection and then explained the procedure to a fictitious peer on video; or (2) solved cases without reflection (control). In the test phase, one to three weeks later, all participants diagnosed new cases while thinking aloud. The analysis of the test phase showed no significant differences between the conditions on any of the outcome measures (diagnostic accuracy, p = .263; time to diagnose, p = .598; mental effort ratings, p = .544; confidence ratings, p = .710; proportion of contradiction units (i.e. measure of deliberate reflection), p = .544). In contrast to findings on learning-by-teaching from other domains, teaching deliberate reflection to a fictitious peer, did not increase reflective reasoning when diagnosing future cases. Potential explanations that future research might address are that either residents in the experimental condition did not apply the learned deliberate reflection procedure in the test phase, or residents in the control condition also engaged in reflection.

Improving medical residents' self-assessment of their diagnostic accuracy: does feedback help?

When physicians do not estimate their diagnostic accuracy correctly, i.e. show inaccurate diagnostic calibration, diagnostic errors or overtesting can occur. A previous study showed that physicians' diagnostic calibration for easy cases improved, after they received feedback on their previous diagnoses. We investigated whether diagnostic calibration would also improve from this feedback when cases were more difficult. Sixty-nine general-practice residents were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. In the feedback condition, they diagnosed a case, rated their confidence in their diagnosis, their invested mental effort, and case complexity, and then were shown the correct diagnosis (feedback). This was repeated for 12 cases. Participants in the control condition did the same without receiving feedback. We analysed calibration in terms of (1) absolute accuracy (absolute difference between diagnostic accuracy and confidence), and (2) bias (confidence minus diagnostic calibration). There was no difference between the conditions in the measurements of calibration (absolute accuracy, p = .204; bias, p = .176). Post-hoc analyses showed that on correctly diagnosed cases (on which participants are either accurate or underconfident), calibration in the feedback condition was less accurate than in the control condition, p = .013. This study shows that feedback on diagnostic performance did not improve physicians' calibration for more difficult cases. One explanation could be that participants were confronted with their mistakes and thereafter lowered their confidence ratings even if cases were diagnosed correctly. This shows how difficult it is to improve diagnostic calibration, which is important to prevent diagnostic errors or maltreatment.