Cling together, swing together? Assessing indirect retrieval of stimulus-response bindings for associated stimuli.

When a stimulus is paired with a response, a stimulus-response (SR) binding (or event file) is formed. Subsequent stimulus repetition retrieves the SR binding from memory, which facilitates (impedes) performance when the same (a different) response is required. We aimed to explore whether indirect retrieval of SR bindings by a newly learnt associated stimulus is possible. Participants first went through a learning task to acquire novel stimulus-stimulus associations. The same stimulus pairs were then presented in a prime-probe task to assess direct and indirect retrieval effects. Participants responded by classifying word color in prime and probe trials. Probe words were either identical to prime words (test for direct retrieval) or corresponded to the associated stimulus (test for indirect retrieval) or were unrelated words (baseline). Independently of word relation, response relation (repetition vs. change) across prime and probe trials was manipulated. In two highly powered preregistered studies (total N = 260) using different types of stimulus associations, we obtained evidence for direct retrieval due to identical word repetition in the probe. Crucially, evidence for indirect retrieval upon presentation of an associated probe word was absent. Controlling for memory of each stimulus-stimulus association did not alter the findings. Our results show that indirect retrieval through newly acquired associations does not occur at the level of SR bindings, at least not for recently acquired stimulus-stimulus associations. Our study illustrates the scope of binding principles and highlights boundary conditions for the stimulus properties that can elicit automatic response retrieval.

Context-specific adaptation for head fakes in basketball: a study on player-specific fake-frequency schedules.

In basketball, an attacking player often plays a pass to one side while looking to the other side. This head fake provokes a conflict in the observing opponent, as the processing of the head orientation interferes with the processing of the pass direction. Accordingly, responses to passes with head fakes are slower and result in more errors than responses to passes without head fakes (head-fake effect). The head-fake effect and structurally similar interference effects (e.g., Stroop effect) are modulated by the frequency of conflicting trials. Previous studies mostly applied a block-wise manipulation of proportion congruency. However, in basketball (and also in other team sports), where different individual opponents can be encountered, it might be important to take the individual frequency (e.g., 20% vs. 80%) of these opponents into account. Therefore, the present study investigates the possibility to quickly (i.e., on a trial-by-trial basis) reconfigure the response behavior to different proportions of incongruent trials, which are contingent on different basketball players. Results point out that participants indeed adapted to the fake-frequency of different basketball players, which could be the result of strategic adaptation processes. Multi-level analyses, however, indicate that a substantial portion of the player-specific adaptation to fake frequencies is accounted by episodic retrieval processes, suggesting that item-specific proportion congruency effects can be explained in terms of stimulus-response binding and retrieval: The head orientation (e.g., to the right) of a current stimulus retrieves the last episode with the same head orientation including the response that was part of this last episode. Thus, from a theoretical perspective, an attacking player would provoke the strongest detrimental effect on an opponent if s/he repeats the same head movement but changes the direction of the pass. Whether it is at all possible to strategically apply this recommendation in practice needs still to be answered.

An attentional approach to geometrical illusions.

It is known for a long time that some drawings composed of points, lines, and areas are systematically misperceived. The origin of these geometrical illusions is still unknown. Here we outline how a recent progress in attentional research contributes to a better understanding of such perceptual distortions. The basic idea behind this approach is that crucial elements of a drawing are differently attended. These changes in the allocation of spatial attention go along with systematic changes in low-level spatial coding. As a result, changes in the perception of spatial extent, angles, positions, and shapes can arise. How this approach can be applied to individual illusions is discussed.

Where scrollbars are clicked, and why.

Scrolling is a widely used mean to interact with visual displays, usually to move content to a certain target location on the display. Understanding how user scroll might identify potentially suboptimal use and allows to infer users' intentions. In the present study, we examined where users click on a scrollbar depending on the intended scrolling action. In two online experiments, click positions were systematically adapted to the intended scrolling action. Click position selection could not be explained as strict optimization of the distance traveled with the cursor, memory load, or motor-cognitive factors. By contrast, for identical scrolling actions click positions strongly depended on the context and on previous scrolls. The behavior of our participants closely resembled behavior observed for manipulation of other physical devices and suggested a simple heuristic of movement planning. The results have implications for modeling human-computer interaction and may contribute to predicting user behavior.

Switching between different cognitive strategies induces switch costs as evidenced by switches between manual and mental object rotation.

Switching between tasks entails costs when compared to repeating the same task. It is unclear whether switch costs also occur when repeating the same task but switching the underlying cognitive strategy (CS). Here, we investigated whether CS switch costs exist despite overlap in mental processing between CSs and a lack of abstract goal (always "solve task X") or answer key binding switches. Specifically, we asked participants to judge the identity of two misaligned objects by either mental or manual computer-mediated object rotation. In each trial of Block 1, to measure switch costs without choice-related cognitive processes, a cue indicated which CS (mental/manual) to use. In Block 2, the CS was freely chosen. Participants exhibited considerable CS switch costs for both cued and freely chosen switches. Moreover, Block 1 switch costs moderately predicted Block 2 switch frequency, while an overall tendency for CS repetition was observed. In sum, we found that switch costs are not confined to situations in which tasks are switched but generalize to situations in which the task stays identical and the CS is switched instead. The results have implications for modern computerized cognitive environments in which a multitude of cognitive strategies is available for the same task.

On the origin of the Ponzo illusion: An attentional account.

The Ponzo illusion is a famous optical illusion that is not well understood so far. Here we suggest that its origin is closely linked to distribution of spatial attention. In essence, it arises because the size of the attentional field varies between different parts of the stimulus layout, which comes with different spatial resolution and, as a consequence, different apparent sizes of the objects in the stimulus display. We report four experiments (conducted in 2022 and 2023), which support this approach. The illusion substantially decreases when the stimulus layout is modified so that the size of the supposed attentional field is equalized for the crucial parts (Experiment 1). Moreover, we induce a Ponzo-like illusion by means of attentional cues only (Experiment 2). The perceived spatial frequency differs for different parts of the stimulus layout consistent with predicted changes in spatial resolution (Experiment 3). Attentional cuing exerts an analogous influence on the apparent spatial frequency (Experiment 4). The presented approach provides a novel look at the origin of the Ponzo illusion and related phenomena. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Ideonamic: An integrative computational dynamic model of ideomotor learning and effect-based action control.

According to ideomotor theory, actions are represented, controlled, and retrieved in terms of the perceptual effects that these actions experientially engender. When agents perform a motor action, they observe its subsequent perceptual effects and establish action-effect associations. When they want to achieve this effect at a later time, they use the action-effect associations to preactivate the action by internally activating the effect representation. Ideomotor theory has received extensive support in recent years. To capture this particular effect-based view on action control and goal-directed behavior, we developed IDEONAMIC, an integrative computational model based on dynamic field theory that represents the specific components of the action control process as dynamic neural fields. We show that IDEONAMIC applies conveniently to different types of experimental ideomotor settings, simulates key findings, generates novel predictions from the dynamics of data, and allows reapproaching the underlying cognitive mechanisms from a computational point of view. We encourage the application of IDEONAMIC to more types of ideomotor settings to gain insights into effect-based action control. The model is available at https://osf.io/hbc6n. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Dynamics of task preparation processes revealed by effect course analysis on response times and error rates.

Cuing or executing a task impacts processing pathways for task-relevant information. While there is ample evidence that processing associated with task execution changes with practice, such evidence regarding cue-induced task preparation is scarce. Here we explored practice-related changes of processing pathways by task cuing in order to assess the plasticity of task preparation. We first developed and validated a new method for the study of practice-related changes, the effect course analysis. The effect course analysis is a model-free, non-parametric method designed to reveal effect changes within an experimental session on a continuous time scale. Then we applied this method to a new study in which cued task sets were supposed to remain activated during assessment of task-relevant pathways, as potential task execution was postponed at the end of the trial. The results showed that, with little practice, task cuing amplified task-relevant pathways, whereas this effect vanished with practice, suggesting that practice prompts fundamental changes of how task cues are used for task preparation. Hence, if one cannot be certain that cognitive processing is stationary, investigating the time course of experimental effects appears to be crucial to determine how cognitive processing is influenced by practice.

How to overcome biases against creativity: The role of familiarity with and confidence in original solutions.

Despite the societal relevance of creative ideas, humans favor traditional over more original solutions, conceivably because of the increased uncertainty that comes with trying novel approaches. Here, we tested whether this anti-creativity bias can be counteracted by increasing familiarity with, and confidence in, creative solutions. Participants chose between creative and traditional uses for given objects. In study 1 (N = 67 international adults), these objects repeated either identically or conceptually during the experiment; and in study 2 (N = 68 international adults), choice options were either self-generated or externally provided. Spatial and temporal measures of response selection indicated an implicit bias towards the traditional approach, independent of repetition type (study 1). This attraction towards the norm was also found for self-generated creative ideas, but it was considerably reduced compared to other-generated ideas (study 2). Instead of increasing familiarity, building confidence in creative solutions might thus be the key to reduce corresponding uncertainty and promote successful creative ideation.

Task-relevance and change detection in action-effect binding.

Features of actions are bound to coincidentally occurring stimuli so that re-encountering a stimulus retrieves a previous action episode. One hallmark of the purported mechanism in binding/retrieval tasks is a reliable reaction time advantage for repeating a previous response if tone stimuli repeat rather than alternate across trials. Other measures than reaction times yielded surprisingly mixed results, however. This is particularly true for continuous response features like force or response duration. We therefore conducted two experiments to resolve this disconnect between different measures. Experiment 1 tested for a potentially inflated effect in reaction time data, whereas Experiment 2 took the converse approach of studying conditions that would elicit similarly strong effects on alternative measures. Our results show that confounds in terms of auditory change detection do not inflate reaction time differences, reinforcing an interpretation of these effects as reflecting binding and retrieval. Moreover, strong effects on alternative measures appeared if these features were rendered task-relevant and came with sufficient variability. These observations provide critical evidence for binding and retrieval accounts, especially by showing that these accounts extend from binary decisions to continuous features of an actual motor response.

You do you: susceptibility of temporal binding to self-relevance.

The self-prioritization effect suggests that self-relevant information has a processing advantage over information that is not directly associated with the self. In consequence, reaction times are faster and accuracy rates higher when reacting to self-associated stimuli rather than to other-related stimuli (Sui et al., Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 38:1105-1117, 2012). This spurs the assumption that self-associated action-effects should also be perceived earlier than other-related outcomes. One way to measure this is temporal binding. Previous research indeed showed that the perceived temporal interval between actions and self-associated outcomes was reduced compared to friend- and other-associated outcomes. However, the employed method (interval estimations) and several experimental design choices make it impossible to discern whether the perceived shortening of the interval between a keypress and a self-relevant outcome is due to a perceptual shift of the action or of the action-effect or both. Thus, we conducted four experiments to assess whether temporal binding can indeed be modulated by self-relevance and if so where this perceptual bias is located. The results did not support stronger temporal binding for self- vs other-related action-effects. We discuss these results against the backdrop of the attentional basis of self-prioritization and propose directions for future research.

Perseveration on cognitive strategies.

To acquire and process information, performers can frequently rely on both internal and extended cognitive strategies. However, after becoming acquainted with two strategies, performers in previous studies exhibited a pronounced behavioral preference for just one strategy, which we refer to as perseveration. What is the origin of such perseveration? Previous research suggests that a prime reason for cognitive strategy choice is performance: Perseveration could reflect the preference for a superior strategy as determined by accurately monitoring each strategy's performance. However, following our preregistered hypotheses, we conjectured that perseveration persisted even if the available strategies featured similar performances. Such persisting perseveration could be reasonable if costs related to decision making, performance monitoring, and strategy switching would be additionally taken into account on top of isolated strategy performances. Here, we used a calibration procedure to equalize performances of strategies as far as possible and tested whether perseveration persisted. In Experiment 1, performance adjustment of strategies succeeded in equating accuracy but not speed. Many participants perseverated on the faster strategy. In Experiment 2, calibration succeeded regarding both accuracy and speed. No substantial perseveration was detected, and residual perseveration was conceivably related to metacognitive performance evaluations. We conclude that perseveration on cognitive strategies is frequently rooted in performance: Performers willingly use multiple strategies for the same task if performance differences appear sufficiently small. Surprisingly, other possible reasons for perseveration like effort or switch cost avoidance, mental challenge seeking, satisficing, or episodic retrieval of previous stimulus-strategy-bindings, were less relevant in the present study.

Sticky tradition impedes selection of creative ideas.

Creativity is a driving force for human development and has fascinated scholars for centuries. Surprisingly little is known about the cognitive underpinnings of putting creative ideas into action, however. To shed light on this part of the creative process, we tracked how hand movements unfolded when choosing between either a traditional or a creative use of a given object. Participants could freely decide between both options (Experiment 1, N = 51 adults) or were prompted to select a specific use (Experiment 2, N = 51 adults). Temporal as well as spatial measures of action unfolding revealed behavior to be strongly biased toward traditional options when choosing an available, more creative option eventually. Creative behavior thus comprises two obstacles: not only coming up with new ideas, but also overcoming a lasting bias toward using old ones. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Creative thinking does not promote dishonesty.

We assessed the relation of creativity and unethical behaviour by manipulating the thinking style of participants (N = 450 adults) and measuring the impact of this manipulation on the prevalence of dishonest behaviour. Participants performed one of three inducer tasks: the alternative uses task to promote divergent thinking, the remote associates task to promote convergent thinking, or a simple classification task for rule-based thinking. Before and after this manipulation, participants conducted the mind game as a straightforward measure of dishonesty. Dishonest behaviour increased from before to after the intervention, but we found no credible evidence that this increase differed between induced mindsets. Exploratory analyses did not support any relation of trait creativity and dishonesty either. We conclude that the influence of creative thinking on unethical behaviour seems to be more ambiguous than assumed in earlier research or might be restricted to specific populations or contexts.

Overreliance on inefficient computer-mediated information retrieval is countermanded by strategy advice that promotes memory-mediated retrieval.

With ubiquitous computing, problems can be solved using more strategies than ever, though many strategies feature subpar performance. Here, we explored whether and how simple advice regarding when to use which strategy can improve performance. Specifically, we presented unfamiliar alphanumeric equations (e.g., A + 5 = F) and asked whether counting up the alphabet from the left letter by the indicated number resulted in the right letter. In an initial choice block, participants could engage in one of three cognitive strategies: (a) internal counting, (b) internal retrieval of previously generated solutions, or (c) computer-mediated external retrieval of solutions. Participants belonged to one of two groups: they were either instructed to first try internal retrieval before using external retrieval, or received no specific use instructions. In a subsequent internal block with identical instructions for both groups, external retrieval was made unavailable. The 'try internal retrieval first' instruction in the choice block led to pronounced benefits (d = .76) in the internal block. Benefits were due to facilitated creation and retrieval of internal memory traces and possibly also due to improved strategy choice. These results showcase how simple strategy advice can greatly help users navigate cognitive environments. More generally, our results also imply that uninformed use of external tools (i.e., technology) can bear the risk of not developing and using even more superior internal processing strategies.

Following Affirmative and Negated Rules.

Rules are often stated in a negated manner ("no trespassing") rather than in an affirmative manner ("stay in your lane"). Here, we build on classic research on negation processing and, using a finger-tracking design on a touchscreen, we show that following negated rather than affirmative rules is harder as indicated by multiple performance measures. Moreover, our results indicate that practice has a surprisingly limited effect on negated rules, which are implemented more quickly with training, but this effect comes at the expense of reduced efficiency. Only affirmative rules are thus put into action efficiently, highlighting the importance of tailoring how rules are communicated to the peculiarities of the human mind.

Human perception of spatial frequency varies with stimulus orientation and location in the visual field.

Neuroanatomical variations across the visual field of human observers go along with corresponding variations of the perceived coarseness of visual stimuli. Here we show that horizontal gratings are perceived as having lower spatial frequency than vertical gratings when occurring along the horizontal meridian of the visual field, whereas gratings occurring along the vertical meridian show the exact opposite effect. This finding indicates a new peculiarity of processes operating along the cardinal axes of the visual field.

Sequential adaptation to modality incompatibility.

Modality-compatible stimulus-response mappings (e.g., responding vocally to an auditory stimulus and manually to a visual stimulus) are often easier to perform than modality-incompatible sets (reversed modality mappings). Here, we investigate sequential, trial-to-trial, modulations of modality compatibility effects. By reanalyzing a previous experiment and conducting two specifically tailored, new experiments, we demonstrate robust within-task sequential modulations. Furthermore, we test for between-task adaptations by intermixing the modality switching task with a Simon task. Results show reliable sequential adaptations within the modality switching task, but no transfer of adaptation between tasks in either direction. We discuss how a combination of prominent theoretical accounts such as conflict adaptation and episodic binding can serve as the cognitive underpinnings of the observed sequential adaptations. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Primacy Effects in Extended Cognitive Strategy Choice: Initial Speed Benefits Outweigh Later Speed Benefits.

BACKGROUND: Human performers often recruit environment-based assistance to acquire or process information, such as relying on a smartphone app, a search engine, or a conversational agent. To make informed choices between several of such extended cognitive strategies, performers need to monitor the performance of these options. OBJECTIVE: In the present study, we investigated whether participants monitor an extended cognitive strategy's performance-here, speed-more closely during initial as compared to later encounters. METHODS: In three experiments, 737 participants were asked to first observe speed differences between two competing cognitive strategies-here, two competing algorithms that can obtain answers to trivia questions-and eventually choose between both strategies based on the observations. RESULTS: Participants were sensitive to subtle speed differences and selected strategies accordingly. Most remarkably, even when participants performed identically with both strategies across all encounters, the strategy with superior speed in the initial encounters was preferred. Worded differently, participants exhibited a technology-use primacy effect. Contrarily, evidence for a recency effect was weak at best. CONCLUSION: These results suggest that great care is required when performers are first acquainted with novel ways to acquire or process information. Superior initial performance has the potential to desensitize the performer for inferior later performance and thus prohibit optimal choice. APPLICATION: Awareness of primacy enables users and designers of extended cognitive strategies to actively remediate suboptimal behavior originating in early monitoring episodes.

Headlines win elections: Mere exposure to fictitious news media alters voting behavior.

Repeatedly encountering a stimulus biases the observer's affective response and evaluation of the stimuli. Here we provide evidence for a causal link between mere exposure to fictitious news reports and subsequent voting behavior. In four pre-registered online experiments, participants browsed through newspaper webpages and were tacitly exposed to names of fictitious politicians. Exposure predicted voting behavior in a subsequent mock election, with a consistent preference for frequent over infrequent names, except when news items were decidedly negative. Follow-up analyses indicated that mere media presence fuels implicit personality theories regarding a candidate's vigor in political contexts. News outlets should therefore be mindful to cover political candidates as evenly as possible.