School-age children are more skeptical of inaccurate robots than adults.

We expect children to learn new words, skills, and ideas from various technologies. When learning from humans, children prefer people who are reliable and trustworthy, yet children also forgive people's occasional mistakes. Are the dynamics of children learning from technologies, which can also be unreliable, similar to learning from humans? We tackle this question by focusing on early childhood, an age at which children are expected to master foundational academic skills. In this project, 168 4-7-year-old children (Study 1) and 168 adults (Study 2) played a word-guessing game with either a human or robot. The partner first gave a sequence of correct answers, but then followed this with a sequence of wrong answers, with a reaction following each one. Reactions varied by condition, either expressing an accident, an accident marked with an apology, or an unhelpful intention. We found that older children were less trusting than both younger children and adults and were even more skeptical after errors. Trust decreased most rapidly when errors were intentional, but only children (and especially older children) outright rejected help from intentionally unhelpful partners. As an exception to this general trend, older children maintained their trust for longer when a robot (but not a human) apologized for its mistake. Our work suggests that educational technology design cannot be one size fits all but rather must account for developmental changes in children's learning goals.

Is it personal or is it social? The interaction of knowledge domain and statistical evidence in U.S. and Chinese preschoolers' social generalizations.

Children make inferences about the social world by observing human actions. However, human actions can be ambiguous: They can be sources of information about personal, idiosyncratic characteristics of individuals or socially shared knowledge. In two cross-cultural studies (N = 420; Mage = 4.05 years, SD = 0.77, 47% female), we ask if U.S. and Chinese children's inferences about whether an action is personal or social vary by domain, statistical evidence, and culture. We did this with a generalization method: Preschoolers learn about one agent's actions and then are asked what they think a new agent will do. Low rates of generalization suggest children inferred something unique to an individual, while high rates suggest that children inferred that the action represented socially shared knowledge. In a mixed between- and within-participant design, children observed agents demonstrate sequences of statistically random (or nonrandom, between participants) actions that were verbally framed as relevant to a particular domain (agent's personal preferences, labels, object functions, or game rules). We found that children's social generalizations about actions were on a continuum: with linguistic conventions (e.g., labels) being the most social, preferences being the most personal, and nonlinguistic conventions (i.e., object functions, game rules) falling somewhere in between. Furthermore, the influence of statistical evidence and cultural variation varied for each domain. These findings highlight how children combine knowledge and evidence to infer social meaning from actions and have implications for rational constructivist accounts of cultural learning. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

The development and diversity of religious cognition and behavior: Protocol for Wave 1 data collection with children and parents by the Developing Belief Network.

The Developing Belief Network is a consortium of researchers studying human development in diverse social-cultural settings, with a focus on the interplay between general cognitive development and culturally specific processes of socialization and cultural transmission in early and middle childhood. The current manuscript describes the study protocol for the network's first wave of data collection, which aims to explore the development and diversity of religious cognition and behavior. This work is guided by three key research questions: (1) How do children represent and reason about religious and supernatural agents? (2) How do children represent and reason about religion as an aspect of social identity? (3) How are religious and supernatural beliefs transmitted within and between generations? The protocol is designed to address these questions via a set of nine tasks for children between the ages of 4 and 10 years, a comprehensive survey completed by their parents/caregivers, and a task designed to elicit conversations between children and caregivers. This study is being conducted in 39 distinct cultural-religious groups (to date), spanning 17 countries and 13 languages. In this manuscript, we provide detailed descriptions of all elements of this study protocol, give a brief overview of the ways in which this protocol has been adapted for use in diverse religious communities, and present the final, English-language study materials for 6 of the 39 cultural-religious groups who are currently being recruited for this study: Protestant Americans, Catholic Americans, American members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Jewish Americans, Muslim Americans, and religiously unaffiliated Americans.

Testimony and observation of statistical evidence interact in adults' and children's category-based induction.

Hearing generic or other kind-relevant claims can influence the use of information from direct observations in category learning. In the current study, we ask how both adults and children integrate their observations with testimony when learning about the causal property of a novel category. Participants were randomly assigned to hear one of four types of testimony: generic, quantified "all", specific, or only labels. In Study 1, adults (N = 1249) then observed that some proportion of objects (10%-100%) possessed a causal property. In Study 2, children (N = 123, Mage = 5.06 years, SD = 0.61 years, range 4.01-5.99 years) observed a sample where 30% of the objects had the causal property. Generic and quantified "all" claims led both adults and children to generalize the causal property beyond what was observed. Adults and children diverged, however, in their overall trust in testimony that could be verified by observations: adults were more skeptical of inaccurate quantified claims, whereas children were more accepting. Additional memory probes suggest that children's trust in unverified claims may have been due to misremembering what they saw in favor of what they heard. The current findings demonstrate that both child and adult learners integrate information from both sources, offering insights into the mechanisms by which language frames first-hand experience.

The minds of machines: Children's beliefs about the experiences, thoughts, and morals of familiar interactive technologies.

Children are developing alongside interactive technologies that can move, talk, and act like agents, but it is unclear if children's beliefs about the agency of these household technologies are similar to their beliefs about advanced, humanoid robots used in lab research. This study investigated 4-11-year-old children's (N = 127, Mage = 7.50, SDage = 2.27, 53% females, 75% White; from the Northeastern United States) beliefs about the mental, physical, emotional, and moral features of two familiar technologies (Amazon Alexa and Roomba) in comparison to their beliefs about a humanoid robot (Nao). Children's beliefs about the agency of these technologies were organized into three distinct clusters-having experiences, having minds, and deserving moral treatment. Children endorsed some agent-like features for each technology type, but the extent to which they did so declined with age. Furthermore, children's judgment of the technologies' freedom to "act otherwise" in moral scenarios changed with age, suggesting a development shift in children's understanding of technologies' limitations. Importantly, there were systematic differences between Alexa, Roomba, and Nao, that correspond to the unique characteristics of each. Together these findings suggest that children's intuitive theories of agency are informed by an increasingly technological world. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Building representations of the social world: Children extract patterns from social choices to reason about multi-group hierarchies.

How do children learn about the structure of the social world? We tested whether children would extract patterns from an agent's social choices to make inferences about multiple groups' relative social standing. In Experiment 1, 4- to 6-year-old children (N = 36; tested in Central New York) saw an agent and three groups (Group-A, Group-B, and Group-C) and observed the agent choose between pairs of individuals from different groups. Across pairwise selections, a pattern emerged: The agent chose individuals from Group-A > Group-B > Group-C. Children tracked the agent's choices to predict that Group-A was "most-preferred" and the "leader" and that Group-C was "least-preferred" and the "helper." In Experiments 2 and 3, we examined children's reasoning about a more complex pattern involving four groups and tested a wider age range. In Experiment 2, 5- to 10-year-old children (N = 98; tested in Central New York) used the agent's pattern of pairwise choices to infer that the agent liked Group-A > Group-B > Group-C > Group-D and to make predictions about which groups were likely to be "leaders" and "helpers." In Experiment 3, we found evidence for social specificity in children's reasoning: 5- to 10-year-old children (N = 96; from 26 US States) made inferences about groups' relative social but not physical power from the agent's pattern of affiliative choices across the four groups. These findings showcase a mechanism through which children may learn about societal-level hierarchies through the patterns they observe over time in people's group-based social choices. RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS: Children in our sample extracted patterns from an agent's positive social choices between multiple groups to reason about groups' relative social standing. Children used the pattern of an agent's positive social choices to guide their reasoning about which groups were likely to be "leaders" and "helpers" in a fictional town. The pattern that emerged in an agent's choices of friends shaped children's thinking about groups' relative social but not physical power. Children tracked social choices to reason about group-based hierarchies at the individual level (which groups an agent prefers) and societal level (which groups are privileged).

Rational learners and parochial norms.

Parochial norms are narrow in social scope, meaning they apply to certain groups but not to others. Accounts of norm acquisition typically invoke tribal biases: from an early age, people assume a group's behavioral regularities are prescribed and bounded by mere group membership. However, another possibility is rational learning: given the available evidence, people infer the social scope of norms in statistically appropriate ways. With this paper, we introduce a rational learning account of parochial norm acquisition and test a unique prediction that it makes. In one study with adults (N = 480) and one study with children ages 5- to 8-years-old (N = 120), participants viewed violations of a novel rule sampled from one of two unfamiliar social groups. We found that adults judgments of social scope - whether the rule applied only to the sampled group (parochial scope), or other groups (inclusive scope) - were appropriately sensitive to the relevant features of their statistical evidence (Study 1). In children (Study 2) we found an age difference: 7- to 8-year-olds used statistical evidence to infer that norms were parochial or inclusive, whereas 5- to 6-year olds were overall inclusive regardless of statistical evidence. A Bayesian analysis shows a possible inclusivity bias: adults and children inferred inclusive rules more frequently than predicted by a naïve Bayesian model with unbiased priors. This work highlights that tribalist biases in social cognition are not necessary to explain the acquisition of parochial norms.

When it's not easy to do the right thing: Developmental changes in understanding cost drive evaluations of moral praiseworthiness.

Recent work identified a shift in judgments of moral praiseworthiness that occurs late in development: adults recognize the virtue of moral actions that involve resolving an inner conflict between moral desires and selfish desires. Children, in contrast, praise agents who do the right thing in the absence of inner conflict. This finding stands in contrast with other work showing that children incorporate notions of cost and effort into their social reasoning. Using a modified version of Starmans and Bloom's (2016) vignettes, we show that understanding the virtue of costly moral action precedes understanding the virtue of resolving inner conflict. In two studies (N = 192 children, range = 4.00-9.95 years; and N = 193 adults), we contrasted a character who paid a personal cost (psychological in Study 1, physical in Study 2) to perform a moral action with another who acted morally without paying a cost. We found a developmental progression; 8- and 9-year-old children and adults recognized the praiseworthiness of moral actions that are psychologically or physically costly. Six- and 7-year-old children only recognized the praiseworthiness of moral actions that are physically costly, but not actions that are psychologically costly. Moreover, neither adults nor children inferred that paying a cost to act morally required having a moral desire or resolving inner conflict. These results suggest that both adults and children conceptualize obligation as a direct motivational force on actions. They further suggest that costly choice-a hallmark of moral agency-is implicated in judgments of praiseworthiness early in development.

Walking in Her Shoes: Pretending to Be a Female Role Model Increases Young Girls' Persistence in Science.

Pretend play is a ubiquitous learning tool in early childhood, enabling children to explore possibilities outside of their current reality. Here, we demonstrate how pretend play can be leveraged to empower girls in scientific domains. American children ages 4 to 7 years (N = 240) played a challenging science activity in one of three conditions. Children in the exposure condition heard about a successful gender-matched scientist, children in the roleplay condition pretended to be that scientist, and children in the baseline condition did not receive information about the scientist. Girls in the roleplay condition, but not in the exposure condition, persisted longer in the science activity than girls in the baseline condition. Pretending to be the scientist equated girls' persistence to that of boys. These findings suggest that pretend play of role models motivates young girls in science and may help reduce gender gaps from their roots.

Imagination and social cognition in childhood.

Imagination is a cognitive process used to generate new ideas from old, not just in the service of creativity and fantasy, but also in our ordinary thoughts about alternatives to current reality. In this article, I argue for the central function of imagination in the development of social cognition in infancy and childhood. In Section 1, I review a work showing that even in the first year of life, social cognition can be viewed through a nascent ability to imagine the physical possibilities and physical limits on action. In Section 2, I discuss how imagination of what should happen is appropriately constrained by what can happen, and how this influences children's moral evaluations. In the final section, I suggest developmental changes in imagination-especially the ability to imagine improbable events-may have implications for social inference, leading children to learn that inner motives can conflict. These examples point to a flexible and domain-general process that operates on knowledge to make social meaning. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Development and Aging Cognitive Biology > Cognitive Development Philosophy > Knowledge and Belief.

Face-to-face learning enhances the social transmission of information.

Learning from others provides the foundation for culture and the advancement of knowledge. Learning a new visuospatial skill from others represents a specific challenge-overcoming differences in perspective so that we understand what someone is doing and why they are doing it. The "what" of visuospatial learning is thought to be easiest from a shared 0° first-person perspective and most difficult from a 180° third-person perspective. However, the visual disparity at 180° promotes face-to-face interaction, which may enhance learning by scaffolding social perspective taking, the "why" of visuospatial learning. We tested these potentially conflicting hypotheses in child and young adult learners. Thirty-six children (4-6 years) and 57 young adults (18-27 years) observed a live model open a puzzle box from a first-person (0°) or third-person (90° or 180°) perspective. The puzzle box had multiple solutions, only one of which was modelled, which allowed for the assessment of imitation and goal emulation. Participants had three attempts to open the puzzle box from the model's perspective. While first-person (0°) observation increased imitation relative to a 180° third-person perspective, the 180° observers opened the puzzle box most readily (i.e., fastest). Although both age groups were excellent imitators and able to take the model's perspective, adults were more faithful imitators, and children were more likely to innovate a new solution. A shared visual perspective increased imitation, but a shared mental perspective promoted goal achievement and the social transmission of innovation. "Perfection of means and confusion of goals-in my opinion-seem to characterize our age" Einstein (1973) pg 337, Ideas and Opinions.

The Community-Engaged Lab: A Case-Study Introduction for Developmental Science.

Due to the closing of campuses, museums, and other public spaces during the pandemic, the typical avenues for recruitment, partnership, and dissemination are now unavailable to developmental labs. In this paper, we show how a shift in perspective has impacted our lab's ability to successfully transition to virtual work during the COVID-19 shut-down. This begins by recognizing that any lab that relies on local communities to engage in human research is itself a community organization. From this, we introduce a community-engaged lab model, and explain how it works using our own activities during the pandemic as an example. To begin, we introduce the vocabulary of mission-driven community organizations and show how we applied the key ideas of mission, vision, and culture to discussions of our own lab's identity. We contrast the community-engaged lab model with a traditional bi-directional model of recruitment from and dissemination to communities and describe how the community-engaged model can be used to reframe these and other ordinary lab activities. Our activities during the pandemic serve as a case study: we formed new community partnerships, engaged with child "citizen-scientists" in online research, and opened new avenues of virtual programming. One year later, we see modest but quantifiable impact of this approach: a return to pre-pandemic diversity in our samples, new engagement opportunities for trainees, and new sustainable partnerships. We end by discussing the promise and limitations of the community-engaged lab model for the future of developmental research.

Culture moderates the relationship between self-control ability and free will beliefs in childhood.

We investigate individual, developmental, and cultural differences in self-control in relation to children's changing belief in "free will" - the possibility of acting against and inhibiting strong desires. In three studies, 4- to 8-year-olds in the U.S., China, Singapore, and Peru (N = 441) answered questions to gauge their belief in free will and completed a series of self-control and inhibitory control tasks. Children across all four cultures showed predictable age-related improvements in self-control, as well as changes in their free will beliefs. Cultural context played a role in the timing of these emerging free will beliefs: Singaporean and Peruvian children's beliefs changed at later ages than Chinese and U.S. children. Critically, culture moderated the link between self-control abilities and free will beliefs: Individual differences in self-control behaviors were linked to individual differences in free will beliefs in U.S. children, but not in children from China, Singapore or Peru. There was also evidence of a causal influence of self-control performance on free will beliefs in our U.S. sample. In Study 2, a randomly assigned group of U.S. 4- and 5-year-olds who failed at two self-control tasks showed reduced belief in free will, but a group of children who completed free will questions first did not show changes to self-control. Together these results suggest that culturally-acquired causal-explanatory frameworks for action, along with observations of one's own abilities, might influence children's emerging understanding of free will.

Social sampling: Children track social choices to reason about status hierarchies.

We tested whether preschool-aged children (N = 280) track an agents' choices of individuals from novel social groups (i.e., social choices) to infer an agent's social preferences and the social status of the groups. Across experiments, children saw a box containing 2 groups (red and blue toy cats). In Experiment 1, children were randomly assigned to Social Selection in which items were described as "friends," or to Object Selection in which items were described as "toys." Within each selection type, the agent selected 5 items from either a numerically common group (82% of box; selections appearing random) or a numerically rare group (18% of box; selections violating random sampling). After watching these selections, children were asked who the agent would play with among 3 individuals: 1 from the selected group, 1 from the unselected group, or 1 from a novel group. Only participants who viewed Social Selection of a numerically rare group predicted that the agent would select an individual from that group in the future. These participants also said an individual from the selected group was the "leader." Subsequent experiments further probed the Social Selection findings. Children's reasoning depended on the agent actively selecting the friends (Experiment 2), and children thought a member of the rare selected group was the leader, but not the "helper" (Experiment 3). These results illustrate that children track an agent's positive social choices to reason about that agent's social preferences and to infer the status (likelihood of being a leader) of novel social groups. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Leaving a Choice for Others: Children's Evaluations of Considerate, Socially-Mindful Actions.

People value those who act with others in mind even as they pursue their own goals. Across three studies (N = 566; 4- to 6-year-olds), we investigated children's developing understanding of such considerate, socially-mindful actions. By age 6, both U.S. and Chinese children positively evaluate a character who takes a snack for herself in a way that leaves a snack choice for others over a character who leaves no choice (Study 1), but only when the actors had alternative possible actions (Study 2) and when a clear beneficiary was present (Study 3). These results suggest an emerging ability to infer underlying social intentions from self-oriented actions, providing insights into the role of social-cognitive capacities versus culture-specific norms in children's moral evaluations.

The ontogeny of cumulative culture: Individual toddlers vary in faithful imitation and goal emulation.

The success of human culture depends on early emerging mechanisms of social learning, which include the ability to acquire opaque cultural knowledge through faithful imitation, as well as the ability to advance culture through flexible discovery of new means to goal attainment. This study explores whether this mixture of faithful imitation and goal emulation is based in part on individual differences which emerge early in ontogeny. Experimental measurements and parental reports were collected for a group of 2-year-old children (N = 48, age = 23-32 months) on their imitative behavior as well as other aspects of cognitive and social development. Results revealed individual differences in children's imitative behavior across trials and tasks which were best characterized by a model that included two behavioral routines; one corresponding to faithful imitation, and one to goal emulation. Moreover, individual differences in faithful imitation and goal emulation were correlated with individual differences in theory of mind, prosocial behavior, and temperament. These findings were discussed in terms of their implications for understanding the mechanisms of social learning, ontogeny of cumulative culture, and the benefit of analyzing individual differences for developmental experiments.

The cultural roots of free will beliefs: How Singaporean and U.S. Children judge and explain possibilities for action in interpersonal contexts.

Making sense of human actions involves thinking about both endogenous influences (the internal mental states of agents) and exogenous influences (social, moral, and interpersonal constraints). Culture impacts how we weight the relative causal influence of these two influences. To examine these cultural influences in depth, we asked 147 4-11-year-olds in 3 cultural groups (Singaporean Chinese, Singaporean Malay, and U.S. Americans) about the possibility of acting on desires that go against social, moral, and interpersonal norms (i.e., "free will," defined as the ability to do otherwise). By age 4, U.S. children were more likely to endorse the freedom to act against norms than Singaporean children, and these cultural differences were more prevalent at older ages. Children's explanations mirrored between- and within-culture differences in causal beliefs about action: Both groups of Singaporean children referenced interdependent causes/consequences in their explanations than U.S. children, and Singaporean Malay children referenced more interdependent causes/consequences than Singaporean Chinese children. Singaporean children were more likely to elaborate on lack of free will by referencing punishment and/or having to seek permission from authorities, revealing a local cultural influence of growing up in an authoritarian society. These results underscore the critical role of culture in shaping how children understand mind, self, and action. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Young children consider individual authority and collective agreement when deciding who can change rules.

Young children demonstrate awareness of normativity in various domains of social learning. It is unclear, however, whether children recognize that rules can be changed in certain contexts and by certain people or groups. Across three studies, we provided empirical evidence that children consider individual authority and collective agreement when reasoning about who can change rules. In Study 1, children aged 4-7years watched videos of children playing simply sorting and stacking games in groups or alone. Across conditions, the group game was initiated (a) by one child, (b) by collaborative agreement, or (c) by an adult authority figure. In the group games with a rule initiated by one child, children attributed ability to change rules only to that individual and not his or her friends, and they mentioned ownership and authority in their explanations. When the rule was initiated collaboratively, older children said that no individual could change the rule, whereas younger children said that either individual could do so. When an adult initiated the rule, children stated that only the adult could change it. In contrast, children always endorsed a child's decision to change his or her own solitary rule and never endorsed any child's ability to change moral and conventional rules in daily life. Age differences corresponded to beliefs about friendship and agreement in peer play (Study 2) and disappeared when the decision process behind and normative force of collaboratively initiated rules were clarified (Study 3). These results show important connections between normativity and considerations of authority and collaboration during early childhood.

The influence of understanding and having choice on children's prosocial behavior.

Humans are remarkable moral evaluators. However, between infancy and the preschool-age, children move from merely evaluating the world in terms of moral ("good"/"bad") terms to acting upon it in meaningful (prosocial and antisocial) ways. We argue that children's developing understanding and experience of choice and agency has profound behavioral consequences for this development in prosocial behavior. During the preschool age, children begin to explicitly reflect on their own actions and alternative actions (i.e., actions not taken), which then in turn help them make sense of the extent to which their prosocial behavior is costly, freely chosen, and internally motivated. We review the progression and developmental antecedents of children's beliefs about choice and agency as well as recent evidence for how children's social contexts may imbue them with a sense of choice and agency over their moral actions. We argue that the preschool period may be a particularly sensitive developmental time window during which children are sensitive to input regarding their own agency.

The choice is yours: Infants' expectations about an agent's future behavior based on taking and receiving actions.

Our social world is rich with information about other people's choices, which subsequently inform our inferences about their future behavior. For individuals socialized within the American cultural context, which places a high value on autonomy and independence, outcomes that are the result of an agent's own choices may hold more predictive value than similar outcomes that are the result of another person's choices. Across two experiments we test the ontogeny of this phenomenon; that is, whether infants are sensitive to the causal history associated with an agent's acquisition of an object. We demonstrate that on average, 12.5-month-old American infants view taking actions as a better indication of an agent's future behavior than are receiving actions. Furthermore, there were significant individual differences in the extent to which infants perceived object receipt to be indicative of future behavior. Specifically, the less autonomous infants were perceived to be (by their parents), socialized to be, and behaved, the more they viewed object receipt as indicative of future behavior. The results are discussed in terms of the role of individual and cultural experience in early understanding of intentional action. (PsycINFO Database Record