Identifying attacks in the Russia-Ukraine conflict using seismic array data.

Seismometers are generally used by the research community to study local or distant earthquakes, but seismograms also contain critical observations from regional1,2 and global explosions3, which can be used to better understand conflicts and identify potential breaches of international law. Although seismic, infrasound and hydroacoustic technology is used by the International Monitoring System4 to monitor nuclear explosions as part of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the detection and location of lower-yield military attacks requires a network of sensors much closer to the source of the explosions. Obtaining comprehensive and objective data that can be used to effectively monitor an active conflict zone therefore remains a substantial challenge. Here we show how seismic waves generated by explosions in northern Ukraine and recorded by a local network of seismometers can be used to automatically identify individual attacks in close to real time, providing an unprecedented view of an active conflict zone. Between February and November 2022, we observed more than 1,200 explosions from the Kyiv, Zhytomyr and Chernihiv provinces, providing accurate origin times, locations and magnitudes. We identify a range of seismoacoustic signals associated with various types of military attack, with the resulting catalogue of explosions far exceeding the number of publicly reported attacks. Our results demonstrate that seismic data can be an effective tool for objective monitoring of a continuing conflict, providing invaluable information about potential breaches of international law.

Estimating tropospheric and stratospheric winds using infrasound from explosions.

The receiver-to-source backazimuth of atmospheric infrasound signals is biased when cross-winds are present along the propagation path. Infrasound from 598 surface explosions from over 30 years in northern Finland is measured with high spatial resolution on an array 178 km almost due North. The array is situated in the classical shadow-zone distance from the explosions. However, strong infrasound is almost always observed, which is most plausibly due to partial reflections from stratospheric altitudes. The most probable propagation paths are subject to both tropospheric and stratospheric cross-winds, and the wave-propagation modelling in this study yields good correspondence between the observed backazimuth deviation and cross-winds from the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts Reanalysis (ERA)-Interim reanalysis product. This study demonstrates that atmospheric cross-winds can be estimated directly from infrasound data using propagation time and backazimuth deviation observations. This study finds these cross-wind estimates to be in good agreement with the ERA-Interim reanalysis.

Joint seismic-infrasonic processing of recordings from a repeating source of atmospheric explosions.

A database has been established of seismic and infrasonic recordings from more than 100 well-constrained surface explosions, conducted by the Finnish military to destroy old ammunition. The recorded seismic signals are essentially identical and indicate that the variation in source location and magnitude is negligible. In contrast, the infrasonic arrivals on both seismic and infrasound sensors exhibit significant variation both with regard to the number of detected phases, phase travel times, and phase amplitudes, which would be attributable to atmospheric factors. This data set provides an excellent database for studies in sound propagation, infrasound array detection, and direction estimation.