Developmental and evolutionary constraints on olfactory circuit selection.

SignificanceIn this work, we explore the hypothesis that biological neural networks optimize their architecture, through evolution, for learning. We study early olfactory circuits of mammals and insects, which have relatively similar structure but a huge diversity in size. We approximate these circuits as three-layer networks and estimate, analytically, the scaling of the optimal hidden-layer size with input-layer size. We find that both longevity and information in the genome constrain the hidden-layer size, so a range of allometric scalings is possible. However, the experimentally observed allometric scalings in mammals and insects are consistent with biologically plausible values. This analysis should pave the way for a deeper understanding of both biological and artificial networks.

Sparse connectivity for MAP inference in linear models using sister mitral cells.

Sensory processing is hard because the variables of interest are encoded in spike trains in a relatively complex way. A major goal in studies of sensory processing is to understand how the brain extracts those variables. Here we revisit a common encoding model in which variables are encoded linearly. Although there are typically more variables than neurons, this problem is still solvable because only a small number of variables appear at any one time (sparse prior). However, previous solutions require all-to-all connectivity, inconsistent with the sparse connectivity seen in the brain. Here we propose an algorithm that provably reaches the MAP (maximum a posteriori) inference solution, but does so using sparse connectivity. Our algorithm is inspired by the circuit of the mouse olfactory bulb, but our approach is general enough to apply to other modalities. In addition, it should be possible to extend it to nonlinear encoding models.

Synaptic plasticity as Bayesian inference.

Learning, especially rapid learning, is critical for survival. However, learning is hard; a large number of synaptic weights must be set based on noisy, often ambiguous, sensory information. In such a high-noise regime, keeping track of probability distributions over weights is the optimal strategy. Here we hypothesize that synapses take that strategy; in essence, when they estimate weights, they include error bars. They then use that uncertainty to adjust their learning rates, with more uncertain weights having higher learning rates. We also make a second, independent, hypothesis: synapses communicate their uncertainty by linking it to variability in postsynaptic potential size, with more uncertainty leading to more variability. These two hypotheses cast synaptic plasticity as a problem of Bayesian inference, and thus provide a normative view of learning. They generalize known learning rules, offer an explanation for the large variability in the size of postsynaptic potentials and make falsifiable experimental predictions.

Rapid Bayesian learning in the mammalian olfactory system.

Many experimental studies suggest that animals can rapidly learn to identify odors and predict the rewards associated with them. However, the underlying plasticity mechanism remains elusive. In particular, it is not clear how olfactory circuits achieve rapid, data efficient learning with local synaptic plasticity. Here, we formulate olfactory learning as a Bayesian optimization process, then map the learning rules into a computational model of the mammalian olfactory circuit. The model is capable of odor identification from a small number of observations, while reproducing cellular plasticity commonly observed during development. We extend the framework to reward-based learning, and show that the circuit is able to rapidly learn odor-reward association with a plausible neural architecture. These results deepen our theoretical understanding of unsupervised learning in the mammalian brain.

Noisy Synaptic Conductance: Bug or a Feature?

More often than not, action potentials fail to trigger neurotransmitter release. And even when neurotransmitter is released, the resulting change in synaptic conductance is highly variable. Given the energetic cost of generating and propagating action potentials, and the importance of information transmission across synapses, this seems both wasteful and inefficient. However, synaptic noise arising from variable transmission can improve, in certain restricted conditions, information transmission. Under broader conditions, it can improve information transmission per release, a quantity that is relevant given the energetic constraints on computing in the brain. Here we discuss the role, both positive and negative, synaptic noise plays in information transmission and computation in the brain.

Excitatory and Inhibitory Subnetworks Are Equally Selective during Decision-Making and Emerge Simultaneously during Learning.

Inhibitory neurons, which play a critical role in decision-making models, are often simplified as a single pool of non-selective neurons lacking connection specificity. This assumption is supported by observations in the primary visual cortex: inhibitory neurons are broadly tuned in vivo and show non-specific connectivity in slice. The selectivity of excitatory and inhibitory neurons within decision circuits and, hence, the validity of decision-making models are unknown. We simultaneously measured excitatory and inhibitory neurons in the posterior parietal cortex of mice judging multisensory stimuli. Surprisingly, excitatory and inhibitory neurons were equally selective for the animal's choice, both at the single-cell and population level. Further, both cell types exhibited similar changes in selectivity and temporal dynamics during learning, paralleling behavioral improvements. These observations, combined with modeling, argue against circuit architectures assuming non-selective inhibitory neurons. Instead, they argue for selective subnetworks of inhibitory and excitatory neurons that are shaped by experience to support expert decision-making.

The idiosyncratic nature of confidence.

Confidence is the 'feeling of knowing' that accompanies decision making. Bayesian theory proposes that confidence is a function solely of the perceived probability of being correct. Empirical research has suggested, however, that different individuals may perform different computations to estimate confidence from uncertain evidence. To test this hypothesis, we collected confidence reports in a task where subjects made categorical decisions about the mean of a sequence. We found that for most individuals, confidence did indeed reflect the perceived probability of being correct. However, in approximately half of them, confidence also reflected a different probabilistic quantity: the perceived uncertainty in the estimated variable. We found that the contribution of both quantities was stable over weeks. We also observed that the influence of the perceived probability of being correct was stable across two tasks, one perceptual and one cognitive. Overall, our findings provide a computational interpretation of individual differences in human confidence.

Robust information propagation through noisy neural circuits.

Sensory neurons give highly variable responses to stimulation, which can limit the amount of stimulus information available to downstream circuits. Much work has investigated the factors that affect the amount of information encoded in these population responses, leading to insights about the role of covariability among neurons, tuning curve shape, etc. However, the informativeness of neural responses is not the only relevant feature of population codes; of potentially equal importance is how robustly that information propagates to downstream structures. For instance, to quantify the retina's performance, one must consider not only the informativeness of the optic nerve responses, but also the amount of information that survives the spike-generating nonlinearity and noise corruption in the next stage of processing, the lateral geniculate nucleus. Our study identifies the set of covariance structures for the upstream cells that optimize the ability of information to propagate through noisy, nonlinear circuits. Within this optimal family are covariances with "differential correlations", which are known to reduce the information encoded in neural population activities. Thus, covariance structures that maximize information in neural population codes, and those that maximize the ability of this information to propagate, can be very different. Moreover, redundancy is neither necessary nor sufficient to make population codes robust against corruption by noise: redundant codes can be very fragile, and synergistic codes can-in some cases-optimize robustness against noise.

Cracking the Neural Code for Sensory Perception by Combining Statistics, Intervention, and Behavior.

The two basic processes underlying perceptual decisions-how neural responses encode stimuli, and how they inform behavioral choices-have mainly been studied separately. Thus, although many spatiotemporal features of neural population activity, or "neural codes," have been shown to carry sensory information, it is often unknown whether the brain uses these features for perception. To address this issue, we propose a new framework centered on redefining the neural code as the neural features that carry sensory information used by the animal to drive appropriate behavior; that is, the features that have an intersection between sensory and choice information. We show how this framework leads to a new statistical analysis of neural activity recorded during behavior that can identify such neural codes, and we discuss how to combine intersection-based analysis of neural recordings with intervention on neural activity to determine definitively whether specific neural activity features are involved in a task.

A probabilistic approach to demixing odors.

The olfactory system faces a hard problem: on the basis of noisy information from olfactory receptor neurons (the neurons that transduce chemicals to neural activity), it must figure out which odors are present in the world. Odors almost never occur in isolation, and different odors excite overlapping populations of olfactory receptor neurons, so the central challenge of the olfactory system is to demix its input. Because of noise and the large number of possible odors, demixing is fundamentally a probabilistic inference task. We propose that the early olfactory system uses approximate Bayesian inference to solve it. The computations involve a dynamical loop between the olfactory bulb and the piriform cortex, with cortex explaining incoming activity from the olfactory receptor neurons in terms of a mixture of odors. The model is compatible with known anatomy and physiology, including pattern decorrelation, and it performs better than other models at demixing odors.

Zipf's Law Arises Naturally When There Are Underlying, Unobserved Variables.

Zipf's law, which states that the probability of an observation is inversely proportional to its rank, has been observed in many domains. While there are models that explain Zipf's law in each of them, those explanations are typically domain specific. Recently, methods from statistical physics were used to show that a fairly broad class of models does provide a general explanation of Zipf's law. This explanation rests on the observation that real world data is often generated from underlying causes, known as latent variables. Those latent variables mix together multiple models that do not obey Zipf's law, giving a model that does. Here we extend that work both theoretically and empirically. Theoretically, we provide a far simpler and more intuitive explanation of Zipf's law, which at the same time considerably extends the class of models to which this explanation can apply. Furthermore, we also give methods for verifying whether this explanation applies to a particular dataset. Empirically, these advances allowed us extend this explanation to important classes of data, including word frequencies (the first domain in which Zipf's law was discovered), data with variable sequence length, and multi-neuron spiking activity.

Doubly Bayesian Analysis of Confidence in Perceptual Decision-Making.

Humans stand out from other animals in that they are able to explicitly report on the reliability of their internal operations. This ability, which is known as metacognition, is typically studied by asking people to report their confidence in the correctness of some decision. However, the computations underlying confidence reports remain unclear. In this paper, we present a fully Bayesian method for directly comparing models of confidence. Using a visual two-interval forced-choice task, we tested whether confidence reports reflect heuristic computations (e.g. the magnitude of sensory data) or Bayes optimal ones (i.e. how likely a decision is to be correct given the sensory data). In a standard design in which subjects were first asked to make a decision, and only then gave their confidence, subjects were mostly Bayes optimal. In contrast, in a less-commonly used design in which subjects indicated their confidence and decision simultaneously, they were roughly equally likely to use the Bayes optimal strategy or to use a heuristic but suboptimal strategy. Our results suggest that, while people's confidence reports can reflect Bayes optimal computations, even a small unusual twist or additional element of complexity can prevent optimality.

Does interaction matter? Testing whether a confidence heuristic can replace interaction in collective decision-making.

In a range of contexts, individuals arrive at collective decisions by sharing confidence in their judgements. This tendency to evaluate the reliability of information by the confidence with which it is expressed has been termed the 'confidence heuristic'. We tested two ways of implementing the confidence heuristic in the context of a collective perceptual decision-making task: either directly, by opting for the judgement made with higher confidence, or indirectly, by opting for the faster judgement, exploiting an inverse correlation between confidence and reaction time. We found that the success of these heuristics depends on how similar individuals are in terms of the reliability of their judgements and, more importantly, that for dissimilar individuals such heuristics are dramatically inferior to interaction. Interaction allows individuals to alleviate, but not fully resolve, differences in the reliability of their judgements. We discuss the implications of these findings for models of confidence and collective decision-making.

The perception of probability.

We present a computational model to explain the results from experiments in which subjects estimate the hidden probability parameter of a stepwise nonstationary Bernoulli process outcome by outcome. The model captures the following results qualitatively and quantitatively, with only 2 free parameters: (a) Subjects do not update their estimate after each outcome; they step from one estimate to another at irregular intervals. (b) The joint distribution of step widths and heights cannot be explained on the assumption that a threshold amount of change must be exceeded in order for them to indicate a change in their perception. (c) The mapping of observed probability to the median perceived probability is the identity function over the full range of probabilities. (d) Precision (how close estimates are to the best possible estimate) is good and constant over the full range. (e) Subjects quickly detect substantial changes in the hidden probability parameter. (f) The perceived probability sometimes changes dramatically from one observation to the next. (g) Subjects sometimes have second thoughts about a previous change perception, after observing further outcomes. (h) The frequency with which they perceive changes moves in the direction of the true frequency over sessions. (Explaining this finding requires 2 additional parametric assumptions.) The model treats the perception of the current probability as a by-product of the construction of a compact encoding of the experienced sequence in terms of its change points. It illustrates the why and the how of intermittent Bayesian belief updating and retrospective revision in simple perception. It suggests a reinterpretation of findings in the recent literature on the neurobiology of decision making.

How well do mean field theories of spiking quadratic-integrate-and-fire networks work in realistic parameter regimes?

We use mean field techniques to compute the distribution of excitatory and inhibitory firing rates in large networks of randomly connected spiking quadratic integrate and fire neurons. These techniques are based on the assumption that activity is asynchronous and Poisson. For most parameter settings these assumptions are strongly violated; nevertheless, so long as the networks are not too synchronous, we find good agreement between mean field prediction and network simulations. Thus, much of the intuition developed for randomly connected networks in the asynchronous regime applies to mildly synchronous networks.

Probabilistic brains: knowns and unknowns.

There is strong behavioral and physiological evidence that the brain both represents probability distributions and performs probabilistic inference. Computational neuroscientists have started to shed light on how these probabilistic representations and computations might be implemented in neural circuits. One particularly appealing aspect of these theories is their generality: they can be used to model a wide range of tasks, from sensory processing to high-level cognition. To date, however, these theories have only been applied to very simple tasks. Here we discuss the challenges that will emerge as researchers start focusing their efforts on real-life computations, with a focus on probabilistic learning, structural learning and approximate inference.

Randomly connected networks have short temporal memory.

The brain is easily able to process and categorize complex time-varying signals. For example, the two sentences, "It is cold in London this time of year" and "It is hot in London this time of year," have different meanings, even though the words hot and cold appear several seconds before the ends of the two sentences. Any network that can tell these sentences apart must therefore have a long temporal memory. In other words, the current state of the network must depend on events that happened several seconds ago. This is a difficult task, as neurons are dominated by relatively short time constants--tens to hundreds of milliseconds. Nevertheless, it was recently proposed that randomly connected networks could exhibit the long memories necessary for complex temporal processing. This is an attractive idea, both for its simplicity and because little tuning of recurrent synaptic weights is required. However, we show that when connectivity is high, as it is in the mammalian brain, randomly connected networks cannot exhibit temporal memory much longer than the time constants of their constituent neurons.

Not noisy, just wrong: the role of suboptimal inference in behavioral variability.

Behavior varies from trial to trial even when the stimulus is maintained as constant as possible. In many models, this variability is attributed to noise in the brain. Here, we propose that there is another major source of variability: suboptimal inference. Importantly, we argue that in most tasks of interest, and particularly complex ones, suboptimal inference is likely to be the dominant component of behavioral variability. This perspective explains a variety of intriguing observations, including why variability appears to be larger on the sensory than on the motor side, and why our sensors are sometimes surprisingly unreliable.