Correcting the past: failures to replicate ψ.

Across 7 experiments (N = 3,289), we replicate the procedure of Experiments 8 and 9 from Bem (2011), which had originally demonstrated retroactive facilitation of recall. We failed to replicate that finding. We further conduct a meta-analysis of all replication attempts of these experiments and find that the average effect size (d = 0.04) is no different from 0. We discuss some reasons for differences between the results in this article and those presented in Bem (2011).

The effect of accuracy motivation on anchoring and adjustment: do people adjust from provided anchors?

Increasing accuracy motivation (e.g., by providing monetary incentives for accuracy) often fails to increase adjustment away from provided anchors, a result that has led researchers to conclude that people do not effortfully adjust away from such anchors. We challenge this conclusion. First, we show that people are typically uncertain about which way to adjust from provided anchors and that this uncertainty often causes people to believe that they have initially adjusted too far away from such anchors (Studies 1a and 1b). Then, we show that although accuracy motivation fails to increase the gap between anchors and final estimates when people are uncertain about the direction of adjustment, accuracy motivation does increase anchor-estimate gaps when people are certain about the direction of adjustment, and that this is true regardless of whether the anchors are provided or self-generated (Studies 2, 3a, 3b, and 5). These results suggest that people do effortfully adjust away from provided anchors but that uncertainty about the direction of adjustment makes that adjustment harder to detect than previously assumed. This conclusion has important theoretical implications, suggesting that currently emphasized distinctions between anchor types (self-generated vs. provided) are not fundamental and that ostensibly competing theories of anchoring (selective accessibility and anchoring-and-adjustment) are complementary.

Anchoring on the "here" and "now" in time and distance judgments.

Time and distance estimates were elicited with either unit-based (e.g., "How many days until...") or end-based (e.g., "On what date...") questions. For intervals of uncertain extent, unit-based estimates were consistently lower than were the corresponding end-based estimates. The observed patterns are consistent with an anchoring and adjustment process: When people generate unit-based estimates of uncertain dates or distances, they may anchor on the "here" or "now" and adjust incrementally by the unit; such adjustment, however, is often insufficient and yields systematic underestimation. Although this anchoring and adjustment cannot be directly observed, consistent with the hypothesized process, reliance on larger units yielded higher estimates and warning about insufficient adjustment reduced the effect. Implications for research on anchoring, the planning fallacy, and everyday judgment are discussed.

Anchors aweigh: a demonstration of cross-modality anchoring and magnitude priming.

Research has shown that judgments tend to assimilate to irrelevant "anchors." We extend anchoring effects to show that anchors can even operate across modalities by, apparently, priming a general sense of magnitude that is not moored to any unit or scale. An initial study showed that participants drawing long "anchor" lines made higher numerical estimates of target lengths than did those drawing shorter lines. We then replicated this finding, showing that a similar pattern was obtained even when the target estimates were not in the dimension of length. A third study showed that an anchor's length relative to its context, and not its absolute length, is the key to predicting the anchor's impact on judgments. A final study demonstrated that magnitude priming (priming a sense of largeness or smallness) is a plausible mechanism underlying the reported effects. We conclude that the boundary conditions of anchoring effects may be much looser than previously thought, with anchors operating across modalities and dimensions to bias judgment.

Rationality.

This chapter reviews selected findings in research on reasoning, judgment, and choice and considers the systematic ways in which people violate basic requirements of the corresponding normative analyses. Recent objections to the empirical findings are then considered; these objections question the findings' relevance to assumptions about rationality. These objections address the adequacy of the tasks used in the aforementioned research and the appropriateness of the critical interpretation of participants' responses, as well as the justifiability of some of the theoretical assumptions made by experimenters. The objections are each found not to seriously impinge on the general conclusion that people often violate tenets of rationality in inadvisable ways. In the process, relevant psychological constructs, ranging from cognitive ability and need for cognition, to dual process theories and the role of incentives, are discussed. It is proposed that the rationality critique is compelling and rightfully gaining influence in the social sciences in general.