A Systems Approach to Analyzing and Preventing Hospital Adverse Events.

OBJECTIVE: This study aimed to demonstrate the use of a systems theory-based accident analysis technique in health care applications as a more powerful alternative to the chain-of-event accident models currently underpinning root cause analysis methods. METHOD: A new accident analysis technique, CAST [Causal Analysis based on Systems Theory], is described and illustrated on a set of adverse cardiovascular surgery events at a large medical center. The lessons that can be learned from the analysis are compared with those that can be derived from the typical root cause analysis techniques used today. RESULTS: The analysis of the 30 cardiovascular surgery adverse events using CAST revealed the reasons behind unsafe individual behavior, which were related to the design of the system involved and not negligence or incompetence on the part of individuals. With the use of the system-theoretic analysis results, recommendations can be generated to change the context in which decisions are made and thus improve decision making and reduce the risk of an accident. CONCLUSIONS: The use of a systems-theoretic accident analysis technique can assist in identifying causal factors at all levels of the system without simply assigning blame to either the frontline clinicians or technicians involved. Identification of these causal factors in accidents will help health care systems learn from mistakes and design system-level changes to prevent them in the future.

Rasmussen's legacy: A paradigm change in engineering for safety.

This paper describes three applications of Rasmussen's idea to systems engineering practice. The first is the application of the abstraction hierarchy to engineering specifications, particularly requirements specification. The second is the use of Rasmussen's ideas in safety modeling and analysis to create a new, more powerful type of accident causation model that extends traditional models to better handle human-operated, software-intensive, sociotechnical systems. Because this new model has a formal, mathematical foundation built on systems theory (as was Rasmussen's original model), new modeling and analysis tools become possible. The third application is to engineering hazard analysis. Engineers have traditionally either omitted human from consideration in system hazard analysis or have treated them rather superficially, for example, that they behave randomly. Applying Rasmussen's model of human error to a powerful new hazard analysis technique allows human behavior to be included in engineering hazard analysis.

When a checklist is not enough: How to improve them and what else is needed.

OBJECTIVES: Checklists are being introduced to enhance patient safety, but the results have been mixed. The goal of this research is to understand why time-outs and checklists are sometimes not effective in preventing surgical adverse events and to identify additional measures needed to reduce these events. METHODS: A total of 380 consecutive patients underwent complex cardiac surgery over a 24-month period between November 2011 and November 2013 at an academic medical center, out of a total of 529 cardiac cases. Elective isolated aortic valve replacements, mitral valve repairs, and coronary artery bypass graft surgical procedures (N = 149) were excluded. A time-out was conducted in a standard fashion in all patients in accordance with the World Health Organization surgical checklist protocol. Adverse events were classified as anything that resulted in an operative delay, nonavailability of equipment, failure of drug administration, or unexpected adverse clinical outcome. These events and their details were collected every week and analyzed using a systemic causal analysis technique using a technique called CAST (causal analysis based on systems theory). This analytic technique evaluated the sociotechnical system to identify the set of causal factors involved in the adverse events and the causal factors explored to identify reasons. Recommendations were made for the improvement of checklists and the use of system design changes that could prevent such events in the future. RESULTS: Thirty events were identified. The causal analysis of these 30 adverse events was carried out and actionable events classified. There were important limitations in the use of standard checklists as a stand-alone patient safety measure in the operating room setting, because of multiple factors. Major categories included miscommunication between staff, medication errors, missing instrumentation, missing implants, and improper handling of equipment or instruments. An average of 3.9 recommendations were generated for each adverse event scenario. CONCLUSIONS: Time-outs and checklists can prevent some types of adverse events, but they need to be carefully designed. Additional interventions aimed at improving safety controls in the system design are needed to augment the use of checklists. Customization of checklists for specialized surgical procedures may reduce adverse events.

Adverse Events in Robotic Surgery: A Retrospective Study of 14 Years of FDA Data.

BACKGROUND: Use of robotic systems for minimally invasive surgery has rapidly increased during the last decade. Understanding the causes of adverse events and their impact on patients in robot-assisted surgery will help improve systems and operational practices to avoid incidents in the future. METHODS: By developing an automated natural language processing tool, we performed a comprehensive analysis of the adverse events reported to the publicly available MAUDE database (maintained by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration) from 2000 to 2013. We determined the number of events reported per procedure and per surgical specialty, the most common types of device malfunctions and their impact on patients, and the potential causes for catastrophic events such as patient injuries and deaths. RESULTS: During the study period, 144 deaths (1.4% of the 10,624 reports), 1,391 patient injuries (13.1%), and 8,061 device malfunctions (75.9%) were reported. The numbers of injury and death events per procedure have stayed relatively constant (mean = 83.4, 95% confidence interval (CI), 74.2-92.7 per 100,000 procedures) over the years. Surgical specialties for which robots are extensively used, such as gynecology and urology, had lower numbers of injuries, deaths, and conversions per procedure than more complex surgeries, such as cardiothoracic and head and neck (106.3 vs. 232.9 per 100,000 procedures, Risk Ratio = 2.2, 95% CI, 1.9-2.6). Device and instrument malfunctions, such as falling of burnt/broken pieces of instruments into the patient (14.7%), electrical arcing of instruments (10.5%), unintended operation of instruments (8.6%), system errors (5%), and video/imaging problems (2.6%), constituted a major part of the reports. Device malfunctions impacted patients in terms of injuries or procedure interruptions. In 1,104 (10.4%) of all the events, the procedure was interrupted to restart the system (3.1%), to convert the procedure to non-robotic techniques (7.3%), or to reschedule it (2.5%). CONCLUSIONS: Despite widespread adoption of robotic systems for minimally invasive surgery in the U.S., a non-negligible number of technical difficulties and complications are still being experienced during procedures. Adoption of advanced techniques in design and operation of robotic surgical systems and enhanced mechanisms for adverse event reporting may reduce these preventable incidents in the future.

Application of systems and control theory-based hazard analysis to radiation oncology.

PURPOSE: Both humans and software are notoriously challenging to account for in traditional hazard analysis models. The purpose of this work is to investigate and demonstrate the application of a new, extended accident causality model, called systems theoretic accident model and processes (STAMP), to radiation oncology. Specifically, a hazard analysis technique based on STAMP, system-theoretic process analysis (STPA), is used to perform a hazard analysis. METHODS: The STPA procedure starts with the definition of high-level accidents for radiation oncology at the medical center and the hazards leading to those accidents. From there, the hierarchical safety control structure of the radiation oncology clinic is modeled, i.e., the controls that are used to prevent accidents and provide effective treatment. Using STPA, unsafe control actions (behaviors) are identified that can lead to the hazards as well as causal scenarios that can lead to the identified unsafe control. This information can be used to eliminate or mitigate potential hazards. The STPA procedure is demonstrated on a new online adaptive cranial radiosurgery procedure that omits the CT simulation step and uses CBCT for localization, planning, and surface imaging system during treatment. RESULTS: The STPA procedure generated a comprehensive set of causal scenarios that are traced back to system hazards and accidents. Ten control loops were created for the new SRS procedure, which covered the areas of hospital and department management, treatment design and delivery, and vendor service. Eighty three unsafe control actions were identified as well as 472 causal scenarios that could lead to those unsafe control actions. CONCLUSIONS: STPA provides a method for understanding the role of management decisions and hospital operations on system safety and generating process design requirements to prevent hazards and accidents. The interaction of people, hardware, and software is highlighted. The method of STPA produces results that can be used to improve safety and prevent accidents and warrants further investigation.

Advancing a sociotechnical systems approach to workplace safety--developing the conceptual framework.

Traditional efforts to deal with the enormous problem of workplace safety have proved insufficient, as they have tended to neglect the broader sociotechnical environment that surrounds workers. Here, we advocate a sociotechnical systems approach that describes the complex multi-level system factors that contribute to workplace safety. From the literature on sociotechnical systems, complex systems and safety, we develop a sociotechnical model of workplace safety with concentric layers of the work system, socio-organisational context and the external environment. The future challenges that are identified through the model are highlighted. PRACTITIONER SUMMARY: Understanding the environmental, organisational and work system factors that contribute to workplace safety will help to develop more effective and integrated solutions to deal with persistent workplace safety problems. Solutions to improve workplace safety need to recognise the broad sociotechnical system and the respective interactions between the system elements and levels.

Editorial: emerging issues in sociotechnical systems thinking and workplace safety.

The burden of on-the-job accidents and fatalities and the harm of associated human suffering continue to present an important challenge for safety researchers and practitioners. While significant improvements have been achieved in recent decades, the workplace accident rate remains unacceptably high. This has spurred interest in the development of novel research approaches, with particular interest in the systemic influences of social/organisational and technological factors. In response, the Hopkinton Conference on Sociotechnical Systems and Safety was organised to assess the current state of knowledge in the area and to identify research priorities. Over the course of several months prior to the conference, leading international experts drafted collaborative, state-of-the-art reviews covering various aspects of sociotechnical systems and safety. These papers, presented in this special issue, cover topics ranging from the identification of key concepts and definitions to sociotechnical characteristics of safe and unsafe organisations. This paper provides an overview of the conference and introduces key themes and topics. PRACTITIONER SUMMARY: Sociotechnical approaches to workplace safety are intended to draw practitioners' attention to the critical influence that systemic social/organisational and technological factors exert on safety-relevant outcomes. This paper introduces major themes addressed in the Hopkinton Conference within the context of current workplace safety research and practice challenges.

Sociotechnical approaches to workplace safety: Research needs and opportunities.

The sociotechnical systems perspective offers intriguing and potentially valuable insights into problems associated with workplace safety. While formal sociotechnical systems thinking originated in the 1950s, its application to the analysis and design of sustainable, safe working environments has not been fully developed. To that end, a Hopkinton Conference was organised to review and summarise the state of knowledge in the area and to identify research priorities. A group of 26 international experts produced collaborative articles for this special issue of Ergonomics, and each focused on examining a key conceptual, methodological and/or theoretical issue associated with sociotechnical systems and safety. In this concluding paper, we describe the major conference themes and recommendations. These are organised into six topic areas: (1) Concepts, definitions and frameworks, (2) defining research methodologies, (3) modelling and simulation, (4) communications and decision-making, (5) sociotechnical attributes of safe and unsafe systems and (6) potential future research directions for sociotechnical systems research. PRACTITIONER SUMMARY: Sociotechnical complexity, a characteristic of many contemporary work environments, presents potential safety risks that traditional approaches to workplace safety may not adequately address. In this paper, we summarise the investigations of a group of international researchers into questions associated with the application of sociotechnical systems thinking to improve worker safety.

The systems approach to medicine: controversy and misconceptions.

The 'systems approach' to patient safety in healthcare has recently led to questions about its ethics and practical utility. In this viewpoint, we clarify the systems approach by examining two popular misunderstandings of it: (1) the systematisation and standardisation of practice, which reduces actor autonomy; (2) an approach that seeks explanations for success and failure outside of individual people. We argue that both giving people a procedure to follow and blaming the system when things go wrong misconstrue the systems approach.

EHR safety: the way forward to safe and effective systems.

Diverse stakeholders--clinicians, researchers, business leaders, policy makers, and the public--have good reason to believe that the effective use of electronic health care records (EHRs) is essential to meaningful advances in health care quality and patient safety. However, several reports have documented the potential of EHRs to contribute to health care system flaws and patient harm. As organizations (including small hospitals and physician practices) with limited resources for care-process transformation, human-factors engineering, software safety, and project management begin to use EHRs, the chance of EHR-associated harm may increase. The authors propose a coordinated set of steps to advance the practice and theory of safe EHR design, implementation, and continuous improvement. These include setting EHR implementation in the context of health care process improvement, building safety into the specification and design of EHRs, safety testing and reporting, and rapid communication of EHR-related safety flaws and incidents.