Are ethical explanations explanatory? Meta-ethical beliefs shape judgments about explanations for social change.

Why were women given the right to vote? "Because it is morally wrong to deny women the right to vote." This explanation does not seem to fit the typical pattern for explaining an event: rather than citing a cause, it appeals to an ethical claim. Do people judge ethical claims to be genuinely explanatory? And if so, why? In Studies 1 (N = 220) and 2 (N = 293), we find that many participants accept ethical explanations for social change and that this is predicted by their meta-ethical beliefs in moral progress and moral principles, suggesting that these participants treat morality as a directional feature of the world, somewhat akin to a causal force. In Studies 3 (N = 513) and 4 (N = 328), we find that participants recognize this relationship between ethical explanations and meta-ethical commitments, using the former to make inferences about individuals' beliefs in moral progress and moral principles. Together these studies demonstrate that our beliefs about the nature of morality shape our judgments of explanations and that explanations shape our inferences about others' moral commitments.

The moral consequences of teleological beliefs about the human species.

Adults in prior work often endorse explanations appealing to purposes (e.g., "pencils exist so people can write with them"), even when these "teleological" explanations are scientifically unwarranted (e.g., "water exists so life can survive on Earth"). We explore teleological endorsement in a novel domain-human purpose-and its relationship to moral judgments. Across studies conducted online with a sample of U.S.-recruited adults, we ask: (a) Do participants believe the human species exists for a purpose? (b) Do these beliefs predict moral condemnation of individuals who fail to fulfill this purpose? And (c) what explains the link between teleological beliefs and moral condemnation? Study 1 found that participants frequently endorsed teleological claims about humans existence (e.g., humans exist to procreate), and these beliefs correlated with moral condemnation of purpose violations (e.g., condemning those who do not procreate). Study 2 found evidence of a bidirectional causal relationship: Stipulating a species' purpose results in moral condemnation of purpose violations, and stipulating that an action is immoral increases endorsement that the species exists for that purpose. Study 3 found evidence that when participants believe a species exists to perform some action, they infer this action is good for the species, and this in turn supports moral condemnation of individuals who choose not to perform the action. Study 4 found evidence that believing an action is good for the species partially mediates the relationship between human purpose beliefs and moral condemnation. These findings shed light on how our descriptive understanding can shape our prescriptive judgments. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Minimally counterintuitive stimuli trigger greater curiosity than merely improbable stimuli.

Curiosity plays a key role in directing learning throughout the lifespan. Prior work finds that violations of expectations can be powerful triggers of curiosity in both children and adults, but it is unclear which expectation-violating events induce the greatest curiosity and how this might vary over development. Some theories have suggested a U-shaped function such that stimuli of moderate extremity pique the greatest curiosity. However, expectation-violations vary not only in degree, but in kind: for example, some things violate an intuitive theory (e.g., an alligator that can talk) and others are merely unlikely (e.g., an alligator hiding under your bed). Combining research on curiosity with distinctions posited in the cognitive science of religion, we test whether minimally counterintuitive (MCI) stimuli, which involve one violation of an intuitive theory, are especially effective at triggering curiosity. We presented adults (N = 77) and 4- and 5-year-olds (N = 36) in the United States with stimuli that were ordinary, unlikely, MCI, and very counterintuitive (VCI) and asked which one they would like to learn more about. Adults and 5-year-olds chose Unlikely over Ordinary and MCI over Unlikely, but not VCI over MCI, more often than chance. Our results suggest that (i) minimally counterintuitive stimuli trigger greater curiosity than merely unlikely stimuli, (ii) surprisingness has diminishing returns, and (iii) sensitivity to surprisingness increases with age, appearing in our task by age 5.

Intuitions about magic track the development of intuitive physics.

Many successful magic tricks violate our assumptions about how physical objects behave, but some magic tricks are better than others. We examined whether the interest adults express in a magic trick is predicted by the age at which infants first respond to violation of the corresponding physical principle. In Experiment 1, adults (N = 319) rated their interest in magic tricks mimicking stimuli from violation-of-expectation experiments with infants. We found a clear correlation between how interesting a trick is and the age at which infants demonstrate a sensitivity to its underlying principle. In a second experiment (N = 350), we replicated this finding and also used three additional tricks for which there is no established age of acquisition to predict the age at which those physical principles might be acquired. A third experiment (N = 368) replicated these findings measuring adults' surprise at physical violations rather than their interest in magic tricks. Our results suggest that adults' intuitions reflect the development of physical knowledge and show how magic can reveal our expectations about the physical world.