Existential isolation and the struggle for belief validation.

People exhibit a strong need for belief validation, which they meet by sharing reality with others. Here, we examine the hypothesis that existential isolation - feeling alone in one's experiences - interferes with people's ability to share reality and thus achieve validation for their beliefs. In Studies 1 and 2, participants read a scenario that presented a choice, rated the percent of their peers whom they thought would select each of the two options, and then reported their own choice and their certainty of it. Existential isolation was a significant negative predictor of expected agreement and certainty in both studies. Interpersonal isolation (i.e., loneliness) did not relate to either of these variables. Moreover, mediational analyses from Study 2 show that expected agreement mediated the relationship between existential isolation and certainty in the hypothesized manner: existential isolation predicted high levels of uncertainty because people high in existential isolation tended not to believe that others would make the same choice. In Study 3, existential isolation correlated negatively with expected agreement even after controlling for interpersonal isolation, self-esteem, and depression. The findings attest to the epistemic implications of existential isolation and provide insight for future research.

More About When I's Meet: The Intergroup Ramifications of I-Sharing, Part II.

Previous research on I-sharing (the belief that one has shared the same, in-the-moment subjective experience with another person) revealed its promise for improving intergroup relations. We expand on this research by (a) pursuing the mechanism underlying I-sharing's effects; (b) asking whether I-sharing promotes positive, behavioral intergroup outcomes; and (c) asking whether the effects of I-sharing generalize to the outgroup at large. Study 1 rules out the possibility that I-sharing promotes liking for an outgroup member via a process of subtyping. Study 2 shows that I-sharing promotes liking for an outgroup member because it promotes a general feeling of subjective connection to the I-sharer. Study 3 provides evidence that I-sharing promotes helping across intergroup lines, and Study 4 shows that I-sharing with one outgroup member reduces infrahumanization of the outgroup more generally. These four studies contribute to our growing understanding of the unique impact that I-sharing has on intergroup outcomes.

Human like me: Evidence that I-sharing humanizes the otherwise dehumanized.

People persistently undermine the humanness of outgroup members, leaving researchers perplexed as to how to address this problem of 'dehumanization' (Haslam & Loughnan, , Ann Rev of Psychol, 65, 399; Leyens, , Group Process Intergroup Relat, 12, 807). Here, we test whether I-sharing (i.e., sharing a subjective experience) counters this tendency by promoting the humanization of outgroup members. In Study 1, White participants had a face-to-face meeting with a White or Black confederate and either did or did not I-share with this confederate. The extent to which participants humanized the outgroup member depended on whether or not they I-shared with her. Study 2 tested the effect of I-sharing on the two distinct dimensions of dehumanization (Haslam, , Pers Soc Psychol Rev, 10, 252). Conceptually replicating the results of Study 1, participants who I-shared with a social class ingroup or outgroup member rated their partner as higher in human nature than those who did not I-share with their partner. These results add to the growing literature on I-sharing's implications for intergroup processes and suggest effective ways of tackling a persistent problem.

When shared group membership signifies shared subjective experience: I-sharing and the minimal group paradigm.

Ingroup favoritism is pervasive. It emerges even in the minimal group paradigm, where participants are assigned to novel groups based on seemingly insignificant characteristics. Yet many of the grouping schemes used in minimal group research may imply something significant: namely, that ingroup members will share in-the-moment subjective experience, or I-share. Two studies examine the role of inferred I-sharing in the minimal group paradigm. We found that (1) people inferred that they would I-share with ingroup members more than outgroup members; (2) inferred I-sharing increased ingroup favoritism; and (3) inferred I-sharing accounted for this ingroup favoritism. Moreover, expecting to I-share with the outgroup improved participants' attitudes toward the outgroup. These results converge with other research suggesting that people favor ingroup members, in part, because they expect to I-share with them.

In the Blink of an I: On Delayed but Identical Subjective Reactions and Their Effect on Self-Interested Behavior.

People believe that they have shared an identical subjective experience--that they have I-shared--when they react identically and simultaneously to the same stimulus. Despite growing evidence for I-sharing, researchers have yet to ask whether simultaneity really makes a difference. We test the importance of simultaneity for I-sharing effects. Participants played prisoner's dilemma with someone who shared their subjective self, their objective self, or neither. Some participants learned this information immediately; others, after a short delay. Time delay decreased cooperation in the subjective similarity condition, but not in the objective similarity or neither conditions. These findings underscore the importance of simultaneity for I-sharing effects and highlight the implications of I-sharing for cooperation and self-interested behavior.

When I's meet: sharing subjective experience with someone from the outgroup.

Believing one shares a subjective experience with another (i.e., I-sharing) fosters connections among strangers and alters perceptions of the ingroup and outgroup. In this article, the authors ask whether I-sharing also fosters liking for members of a salient outgroup. Study 1 establishes that I-sharing promotes liking for the other sex, even among people with salient social identities. Study 2 shows that I-sharing promotes liking for a member of the sexual orientation outgroup, whether it occurs before or after group memberships get revealed. Study 3 focuses on salient race categories and looks at the effects of I-sharing versus value-sharing as a function of shared group membership. For those high in existential isolation, I-sharing trumps value-sharing, regardless of the I-sharer's social identity. I-sharing may offer a way of improving attitudes toward outgroup members that still enables people to embrace their differing social identities.

We're warmer (they're more competent): I-sharing and African Americans' perceptions of the ingroup and outgroup.

Researchers currently know very little about how African Americans regard themselves and their salient outgroup (i.e., European Americans). The current study examines how experiences with individual ingroup and outgroup members affect these evaluations on two key dimensions in intergroup research: warmth and competence. In particular, the study asks what effect I-sharing (i.e., sharing a subjective experience) with an African American or a European American has on African Americans' perceptions of the warmth and competence of their ingroup and outgroup. Results revealed an ingroup preference on the dimension of warmth when participants had I-shared with a fellow African American but not when they had I-shared with a European American. No such ingroup preference emerged on the dimension of competence. Instead, participants exhibited an outgroup preference on this dimension after I-sharing with a European American. The discussion entertains possible explanations for these differential effects of I-sharing on judgments of the ingroup and outgroup.

Seeing I to I: a pathway to interpersonal connectedness.

The authors introduce the construct of I-sharing--the belief that one shares an identical subjective experience with another person--and the role it plays in liking. In Studies 1-3, participants indicated their liking for an objectively similar and an objectively dissimilar person, one of whom I-shared with them and the other of whom did not. Participants preferred the objectively similar person but only when that person I-shared with them. Studies 4 and 5 highlight the role that feelings of existential isolation and the need for closeness play in people's attraction to I-sharers. In Study 4, people with high needs for interpersonal closeness responded to I-sharers and non-I-sharers with great intensity. In Study 5, priming participants with feelings of existential isolation increased their liking for I-sharers over objectively similar others. The results highlight the importance of shared subjective experience and have implications for interpersonal and intergroup processes.