Early threat perception is independent of later cognitive and behavioral control. A virtual reality-EEG-ECG study.

Research on social threat has shown influences of various factors, such as agent characteristics, proximity, and social interaction on social threat perception. An important, yet understudied aspect of threat exposure concerns the ability to exert control over the threat and its implications for threat perception. In this study, we used a virtual reality (VR) environment showing an approaching avatar that was either angry (threatening body expression) or neutral (neutral body expression) and informed participants to stop avatars from coming closer under five levels of control success (0, 25, 50, 75, or 100%) when they felt uncomfortable. Behavioral results revealed that social threat triggered faster reactions at a greater virtual distance from the participant than the neutral avatar. Event-related potentials (ERPs) revealed that the angry avatar elicited a larger N170/vertex positive potential (VPP) and a smaller N3 than the neutral avatar. The 100% control condition elicited a larger late positive potential (LPP) than the 75% control condition. In addition, we observed enhanced theta power and accelerated heart rate for the angry avatar vs. neutral avatar, suggesting that these measures index threat perception. Our results indicate that perception of social threat takes place in early to middle cortical processing stages, and control ability is associated with cognitive evaluation in middle to late stages.

Three stages of perceiving consecutively moral behaviors: Neurophysiological effect of agent and valence on the moral judgments.

The present study investigates how agents and the moral valence of the acts affect moral judgments when two consecutively behaviors are perceived, with each describing morally salient behaviors done by the same or different agent(s). Participants had to rate the likableness/pleasantness of the agents/behaviors. Behavioral results indicated that rating the likableness of the agent was mainly depended on the morally diagnostic character of the agent while rating the pleasantness of the behaviors was mainly depended on the moral valence of the behaviors per se. ERP results showed: 1) larger N1 was found in response to the agent consistently acting immorally, indicating an early detection of social threatening information. 2) Compared with agents who consistently act morally which provided no norm- or expectation-violation information, other conditions induced larger N400, indicating greater cognitive effort was recruited when the present moral information violated the participants' prior knowledge to the agent. 3) Increased LPP was found in response to the agent consistently acting morally (vs. moral behaviors acted by different agents), representing that people may allocate more attention to positive information during this stage. We suggest that this three-stage scheme is a common model when people encounter consecutive moral events.

The Neural Mechanism of the Social Framing Effect: Evidence from fMRI and tDCS Studies.

As an important cognitive bias, the framing effect shows that our decision preferences are sensitive to the verbal description (i.e., frame) of options. This study focuses on the neural underpinnings of the social framing effect, which is based on decision-making regarding other people. A novel paradigm was used in which participants made a trade-off between economic benefits and the feelings of others. This decision was described as either a "harm" to, or "not helping," other persons in two conditions (Harm frame vs Help frame). Both human males and females were recruited. Participants behaved more prosocially for Harm frame compared with Help frame, resulting in a significant social framing effect. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, Experiment 1 showed that the social framing effect was associated with stronger activation in the temporoparietal junction (TPJ), especially its right part. The functional connectivity between the right TPJ (rTPJ) and medial prefrontal cortex predicted the social framing effect on the group level. In Experiment 2, we used transcranial direct current stimulation to modulate the activity of the rTPJ and found that the social framing effect became more prominent under anodal (excitatory) stimulation, while the nonsocial framing effect elicited by the economic gain/loss gambling frame remained unaffected. The rTPJ results might be associated with moral conflicts modulated by the social consequences of an action or different levels of mentalizing with others under different frame conditions, but alternative interpretations are also worth noting. These findings could help elucidate the psychological mechanisms of the social framing effect.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Previous studies have suggested that the framing effect is generated from an interaction between the amygdala and anterior cingulate cortex. This opinion, however, is based on findings from nonsocial framing tasks. Recent research has highlighted the importance of distinguishing between the social and nonsocial framing effects. The current study focuses on the social framing effect and finds out that the temporoparietal junction and its functional connectivity with the medial prefrontal cortex play a significant role. Additionally, modulating the activity of this region leads to changes in social (but not nonsocial) framing effect. Broadly speaking, these findings help understand the difference in neural mechanisms between social and nonsocial decision-making. Meanwhile, they might be illuminating to promote helping behavior in society.

Others' Pain Appraisals Modulate the Anticipation and Experience of Subsequent Pain.

The present study investigated how pain appraisals from other individuals modulated self-pain anticipation and perception. Appraisals of pain intensity from 10 other individuals were presented before the participants received identical electrical pain stimulation themselves. In reality, the presented other's pain appraisals, with either low or high in mean and variance, were generated by the experimenter, and were randomly paired with the subsequent electrical stimulation at either low or high intensity. Specifically, the mean and variance of others' pain appraisals were manipulated to induce participants' expectation and certainty to the upcoming pain. Subjective ratings of pain intensity and electroencephalographic (EEG) responses to the electrical stimulation, as well as anticipatory EEG activities measured prior to the onset of electrical stimulation, were compared. Results showed that the mean and variance of others' pain appraisal modulated the subjective pain ratings and the affective-motivational P2 responses elicited by the electrical stimulation, as well as anticipatory sensorimotor α-oscillation measured before the onset of pain stimulation. When the mean of others' pain appraisal was low, higher variance suppressed the sensorimotor α-oscillations and enhanced subsequent pain perception. In contrast, when the mean was high, the higher variance enhanced sensorimotor α-oscillations and suppressed subsequent pain perception. These results demonstrated that others' pain appraisals can modulate both of the anticipation and perception of first-hand pain. It also suggested that the top-down modulation of others' pain appraisals on pain perception could be partially driven by the different brain states during the anticipation stage, as captured by the prestimulus sensorimotor α-oscillations.

The stereotype of professional roles influences neural responses to moral transgressions: ERP evidence.

The person-centered account of moral judgments is important since immoral behaviors are diagnostic of an individual's character. The present study explored how the professional stereotypes associated with the agents shaped the way people perceiving moral/immoral behaviors. The behavioral ratings and neural responses (i.e., P200, N2, LPC event-related potentials (ERPs)) to moral/immoral behaviors done by agents with respectable or ordinary professional roles were recorded and compared. Behaviorally, we found that participants rated the agent with a respectable professional role behaving immorally as more dislikable comparing to the agent with an ordinary professional role. For ERPs, we found that: 1) the agents with respectable professional roles elicited larger P200 than agents with ordinary professional roles did; 2) immoral behavior elicited larger LPC than moral behaviors did; 3) for agents with respectable professional roles, the immoral behaviors elicited significantly more positive N2 than the moral behaviors did whereas this difference was not significant for the agents with ordinary professional roles. The immoral behaviors done by agents with respectable professional roles elicited more positive N2 than the immoral behavior done by agents with ordinary professional roles. Moreover, this effect was correlated with the participants' subjective rating of the professional roles' respectable level. These results suggest that 1) the more the agents with respectable professional roles are respected, the more dislikable they became when behaving immorally; 2) the moral stereotype associated with professional roles can influence the early processing stage reflected in N2 but not the later evaluative process reflected in LPC.

Moral contagion: Devaluation effect of immorality on hypothetical judgments of economic value.

Moral contagion is a phenomenon in which individuals or objects take on the moral essence of the people who are associated with them. Previous studies have found that individuals value objects associated with moral and likable people more than those associated with immoral and dislikable people. However, the neural mechanisms underlying this "moral contagion effect" have not yet been explored. In the present study, we combined a novel "Second-hand Goods Pricing" paradigm with functional magnetic resonance imaging to (a) confirm the existence of the moral contagion effect on the hypothetical economic valuation of objects and (b) determine the neural substrates underlying it. Participants were shown second-hand goods, information regarding the moral valence of the previous owner, and an initial price assigned to the object by computer. The participants were then asked to adjust the initial price to one they deemed most reasonable. Behaviorally, we found a significant devaluation effect for immoral owners and a weaker reverse effect for moral owners. Imaging data showed that the devaluation effect was primarily driven by neural responses in the dorsal striatum (mainly the caudate nucleus) that were triggered by high initial prices assigned to the "contaminated" objects. Dynamic causal modeling revealed that the high initial price assigned to "contaminated" objects led to increased effective connectivity from the caudate nucleus to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex-the brain area that integrates values during decision making.

Social Mindfulness Shown by Individuals With Higher Status Is More Pronounced in Our Brain: ERP Evidence.

"Social mindfulness" refers to being thoughtful of others and considering their needs before making decisions, and can be characterized by low-cost and subtle gestures. The present study compared the behavioral and neural responses triggered by observing others' socially mindful/unmindful choices and how these responses were modulated by the social status of the agency. At the behavioral level, observing socially mindful choices made observers feel better, rate the actors as more likable, and behave more cooperatively than did observing socially unmindful choices. Analysis of event-related potentials in the brain revealed that compared with socially unmindful choices, mindful choices elicited more negative feedback-related negativity (FRN). Notably, while this effect of social mindfulness was only significant when the actor's social status was medium and high, it was undetectable when the actor's social status was low. These results demonstrate that the social mindfulness of others can be rapidly detected and processed, as reflected by FRN, even though it does not seem to receive further, more elaborate evaluation. These findings indicated that low-cost cooperative behaviors such as social mindfulness can also be detected and appreciated by our brain, which may result in better mood and more cooperative behaviors in the perceivers. Besides, the perception of social mindfulness is sensitive to important social information, such as social status.