RESUMO
It is widely assumed that autobiographical memory relies on an integration of episodic memory with the self-model. We hypothesise that self-memory integration depends critically on self-congruence. More specifically, self-incongruent experiences such as those that elicit shame or guilt may be more difficult to integrate. Self-incongruence may affect both the semantic reports of memories and their phenomenological characteristics, in particular their visual perspective (1PP or 3PP, i.e., field or observer perspective), their affective valence, and their perceived centrality. Diary based memories were assigned to 4 categories (shame, guilt, negative, neutral) and were rated for the different phenomenological dimensions. We used a deep neural network, univariate and multilevel models to assess differences and relationships between different variables. We found that memories that elicited shame (but not guilt) showed more pronounced 3PP as compared to other experiences. Shameful episodes also elicited the most pronounced negative affect. A multilevel analysis revealed that the amount of shame that an episode elicited, and its semantic similarity with shame episodes, predicted higher 3PP, while affective valence did not. Our results show that self-incongruence affects memories both at the level of their semantic reports and their phenomenology, and thus contributes to a mechanistic understanding of self-memory integration.
