Attention to behavioral events during interaction: two actor-observer gaps and three attempts to close them.

In social interactions, people must pay attention to many behavioral events unfolding in themselves and the other person-events that can be observable or unobservable, intentional or unintentional. Three studies explored how people distribute their attention to these different event types and, as a result, build up representations of self and partner during the interaction. Relying on basic principles of attention, the authors predicted 2 actor-observer gaps: Actors pay more attention to unobservable events and less to observable events than do observers, and actors pay more attention to unintentional events and less to intentional events than do observers. Study 1 documents both gaps. Studies 2 and 3 explore factors that might close the gaps, such as relational intimacy and empathy. Implications of these results for the role of attention in attribution and interpersonal behavior are discussed.

Conceptual structure and social functions of behavior explanations: beyond person--situation attributions.

The traditional approach to studying behavior explanations involves treating them as either person causes or situation causes and assessing them by using rating scales. An analysis of people's free-response behavior explanations reveals, however, that the conceptual distinctions people use in their explanations are more complex and sophisticated than the person-situation dichotomy suggests. The authors, therefore, introduce a model of the conceptual structure of folk behavior explanations (the network of concepts and assumptions on which explanations are based) and test it in 4 studies. The modes and features of behavior explanations within this conceptual structure also have specific social functions. In 2 additional studies, the authors demonstrate that people alter distinct features of their explanations when pursuing particular impression-management goals and that listeners make inferences about explainers' goals on the basis of these features.

How people explain behavior: a new theoretical framework.

This article presents a theoretical framework of how people explain behavior. The framework, based on the folk concept of intentionality, distinguishes two major modes of explanation-reason explanation and cause explanation-as well as two minor modes and identifies conditions under which they occur. Three studies provide empirical support for these distinctions. As part of the framework, a detailed model of people's reason explanations is developed, which emphasizes the unique conceptual and linguistic features of reasons. This model points to limitations of traditional attribution concepts, which are examined theoretically and empirically. Finally, the theoretical framework incorporates attribution concepts, which apply to some but not all modes of explanation. Several paths for future research are outlined-on novel topics such as the roles of rationality and subjectivity in explanations and on classic topics such as the actor-observer asymmetry and the self-serving bias.