RESUMO
Bayesian decision theory suggests that optimal decision-making should use and weigh prior beliefs with current information, according to their relative uncertainties. However, some characteristics of borderline personality disorder (BPD) patients, such as fast, drastic changes in the overall perception of themselves and others, suggest they may be underrelying on priors. Here, we investigated if BPD patients have a general deficit in relying on or combining prior with current information. We analyzed this by having BPD patients (n = 23) and healthy controls (n = 18) perform a coin-catching sensorimotor task with varying levels of prior and current information uncertainty. Our results indicate that BPD patients learned and used prior information and combined it with current information in a qualitatively Bayesian-like way. Our results show that, at least in a lower-level, nonsocial sensorimotor task, BPD patients can appropriately use both prior and current information, illustrating that potential deficits using priors may not be widespread or domain-general.
