How many selves in emotion experience? Reply to Dalgleish and Power (2004).

T. Dalgleish and M. J. Power (see record 2004-15929-012) suggest that J. A. Lambie and A. J. Marcel's (2002) article implicitly presents a unitary view of self in emotion experience and propose that certain clinical phenomena require multiple selves. This reply summarizes Lambie and Marcel's usages of the term self and examines both Dalgleish and Power's gloss of these and their own usages. This indicates that their own central usage of the term misrepresents Lambie and Marcel and is itself an improper usage. More important, examination of the phenomena claimed to require multiple selves suggests that they do not and that Dalgleish and Power may have misread the relevant clinical literature. Finally, Lambie and Marcel's own conception of dissociative phenomena and multiple selves are outlined, and alternative approaches are sketched. In discussing the usages of the term self and interpretation of cognitive and affective disorders, this reply attempts to clarify certain confusions.

Anosognosia for plegia: specificity, extension, partiality and disunity of bodily unawareness.

This study of anosognosia for hemiplegia investigated: whether it is homogeneous; specificity to plegia of unawareness; extension to different kinds of and objects of awareness regarding plegia; partiality of unawareness. Sixty-four hemiplegic stroke patients were assessed with control subjects on (a) motor and somatosensory function, immediately followed by participants' evaluations of performance; (b) conventional structured interview questions addressing awareness of various capacities: (c) Neglect, Mental Flexibility, General Mental State, Verbal Fluency, Short-Term Memory; (d) pre- and post-performance estimates of ability on the last two; (e) estimates of current ability on bilateral and unilateral tasks, addressed by questions in 1st- and 3rd-person forms, explanations of how overestimated tasks would be accomplished, attempts at 3 bimanual tasks and post-attempt estimates of ability on these. Anosognosia for plegia was mostly associated with right-brain damage. No single factor or combination accounted for all patients. Double dissociations indicated that anosognosia can be specific to plegia: and patients do not generally overestimate other abilities. Although unawareness of paralysis and of its consequences appear linked, the latter is more widespread and persistent. Double dissociation showed that concurrent unawareness of movement failures is a separate deficit from these. There was differential awareness of different aspects of plegia. Further, some patients who overestimated current bilateral task ability when asked in 1st-person form did not overestimate when asked how well the examiner, if he was in their current condition, could do each task. This suggests split awareness of a single aspect of plegia. Patients anosognosic on conventional questioning showed two distinctions. (1) Some were unaware of movement failures when they occurred; others were aware but quickly forgot such failures and seem unable to update long-term body knowledge. (2) Some patients' explanations of bimanual task performance reflect unawareness of hemiplegia; others' explanations were bizarre and imply some awareness. The latter group's deficit appears to be nonspecific and linked to right-hemisphere predominance of anosognosia, an account of which is offered. Anosognosia for hemiplegia is not a unitary phenomenon: several factors underlie deficits in bodily awareness.

Consciousness and the varieties of emotion experience: a theoretical framework.

Data reviewed suggest that previous theories of emotion experience are too narrow in scope and that lack of consensus is due to the fact that emotion experience takes various forms and is heterogenous. The authors treat separately the content of emotion experience, the underlying nonconscious correspondences, and processes producing emotion experience. They classify the nature and content of emotion experience and propose that it depends on 3 aspects of attention: mode (analytic-synthetic; detached-immersed), direction (self-world), and focus (evaluation-action). The account is informed by a 2-level view of consciousness in which phenomenology (1st order) is distinguished from awareness (2nd order). These distinctions enable the authors to differentiate and account for cases of "unconscious" emotion, in which there is an apparent lack of phenomenology or awareness.