RESUMO
Economic policies that concentrate wealth and aggravate socioeconomic inequalities often have negative impacts on human rights. For example, evidence points to the unequal impact of austerity measures-such as the defunding and privatizing of health care-on already disadvantaged groups and individuals. Despite its detrimental impacts, austerity often appears as a necessary evil in times when difficult choices must be made. Justified through arguments of trickle-down economics to support growth, the realization of human rights is postponed. Human rights are sidelined as guidelines that inform rather than limit such measures. The assumption that wealth concentration and the consequent reduction of human rights standards may be justified suggests a problematic conception of equality in human rights law. In this paper, I critically examine the way that this assumption informs the exclusion of distributive considerations from the scope of equality within human rights law. I identify and evaluate the emerging interpretations of equality beyond the legal-technical notion of equal treatment and the prohibition of discrimination and the extent to which equality in human rights may take on a distributive function in combating policies of wealth concentration such as austerity.
