Are There Two Kinds of Reasoners?

There is little consensus about the underlying parameters of human reasoning. Two major theories have been proposed that suppose very different mechanisms. The mental model theory proposes that people use working memory intensive processes in order to construct limited models of problem parameters. Probabilistic theories propose that reasoning is a process by which people use the sum of their existing knowledge in order to generate an estimate of the probability of a conclusion given problem parameters. Following an initial proposition by Verschueren et al., the dual-strategy model supposes that these different approaches to reasoning are in fact an important individual difference. Specifically, a recently developed diagnostic questionnaire has identified two major categories of reasoners: Counterexample reasoners use a mental model form of processing, while Statistical reasoners use a probabilistic form of processing. In the following, I describe results that show that the Counterexample/Statistical distinction affects information processing across a variety of reasoning and judgment tasks. In addition, strategy use correlates with performance on very different kinds of thinking, such as contingency judgments, processing of negative emotions, or susceptibility to social biases. Although this distinction is related to differences in cognitive ability, it has been found to predict performance over and above these differences. More recent results have shown that it is possible to experimentally modify strategy use. These results suggest that strategy use is an important individual difference that can affect performance in a wide variety of contexts.

The effects of strength and activation level of belief on belief-biased reasoning.

The belief bias effect designates the tendency to judge the validity of a conclusion based on its believability. Most studies have compared highly believable with unbelievable conclusions when examining belief-biased reasoning. In two studies, we examine a hypothesis raised by Banks (2013, Cognitive Science, 37[3], 544-577), who postulated that level of activation of belief should affect the extent to which reasoning is biased. Here, a first study found that moderately believable conclusions produced a significant biasing effect, but one that was smaller than with highly believable conclusions. The second study found that activating the category referenced by a conclusion significantly increased the biasing effect of the same conclusion. These results suggest that strength of belief is a necessary parameter of any model of belief bias. They also show that context can affect the extent to which belief affects reasoning.

Can we change how people reason? Effects of instructions to reason differently and reasoning strategy.

Mental model (Johnson-Laird, 2001) and probabilistic theories (Oaksford & Chater, 2009) claim to provide distinct explanations of human reasoning. However, the dual strategy model of reasoning suggests that this distinction corresponds to different reasoning strategies, termed counterexample and statistical, respectively. There is clear evidence that most people have a preference for a given strategy, and that this predicts performance on a variety of forms of reasoning and judgment (Thompson & Markovits, 2021). To date, however, the evidence for this conclusion has been correlational in nature; in the current studies, we manipulated strategy use. To this end, we gave people (N = 885) explicit instructions to reason either using a counterexample strategy or a probabilistic strategy. In two studies, we observed that the ability to follow these instructions was constrained by people's spontaneous strategy use, and that the effect of instructions carried over to two subsequent forms of reasoning (a) belief-biased inferences and (b) base-rate judgments. Finally, the ability to follow instructions was correlated with reasoning accuracy on both tasks. These results provide strong evidence for the underlying reality of the dual strategy model and show that explicit instructions to reason differently can modify performance on different forms of reasoning. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

The paradoxical effects of time pressure on base rate neglect.

Base rate neglect refers to the well-documented tendency for people to primarily rely on diagnostic information to identify event probabilities while discounting information about relative probabilities (base rates). It is often postulated that using base rate information requires some form of working memory intensive processes. However, recent studies have put this interpretation into doubt, showing that rapid judgments can also lead to base rate use. Here we examine the idea that base rate neglect can be explained by the degree of attention paid to diagnostic information, which predicts that having more time should lead to greater rates of base rate neglect. Participants were presented with base rate problems either with a limited time to respond or with no time restrictions. Results show that having more time results in a decrease in base rate use.

Married women with children experience greater intrasexual competition than their male counterparts.

Human males are considered to be more competitive than females. However, females must also compete for resources necessary for their own and their offsprings' survival. Since females use more indirect forms of competition than males, comparing observable forms of competition may be misleading. One critical driver of competition is resource asymmetry. Since competition occurs primarily within sex, reactions to resource asymmetry with same-sex peers should provide an important measure of competitiveness. We asked 596 married participants, 25-45 years of age with at least one child from three different countries to evaluate how same-sex individuals they know would react to a target individual who had a valuable resource that the same-sex individuals did not have. Half the participants evaluated reactions to same-sex targets, while the other half evaluated reactions to other-sex targets. Participants reported that women would react more negatively than men to resource asymmetry with same-sex targets, but not other-sex targets. These results suggest that women may be even more competitive than men in contexts when important resources related to reproductive success are at stake.

Interpretation of ambiguous trials along with reasoning strategy is related to causal judgements in zero-contingency learning.

The dual strategy model suggests that people can use either a Statistical or a Counterexample reasoning strategy, which reflects two qualitatively different ways of processing information. This model has been shown to capture individual differences in a wide array of tasks, such as contingency learning. Here, we examined whether this extends to individual differences in the interpretation of contingency information where effects are ambiguous. Previous studies, using perceptually complex stimuli, have shown that the way in which participants interpret ambiguous effects predicts causal judgements. In two studies, we attempted to replicate this effect using a small number of clearly identifiable cues. Results show that the interpretation of ambiguous effects as effect present is related to final contingency judgements. In addition, results showed that Statistical reasoners had a stronger tendency to interpret ambiguous effects as effect present than Counterexample reasoners, which mediates the difference in contingency judgements.

Reasoning strategies and prior knowledge effects in contingency learning.

Prior knowledge has been shown to be an important factor in causal judgments. However, inconsistent patterns have been reported regarding the interaction between prior knowledge and the processing of contingency information. In three studies, we examined the effect of the plausibility of the putative cause on causal judgments, when prior expectations about the rate at which the cause is accompanied by the effect in question are explicitly controlled for. Results clearly show that plausibility has a clear effect that is independent of contingency information and type of task (passive or active). We also examined the role of strategy use as an individual difference in causal judgments. Specifically, the dual-strategy model suggests that people can either use a Statistical or a Counterexample strategy to process information. Across all three studies, results showed that Strategy use has a clear effect on causal judgments that is independent of both plausibility and contingency.

Reasoning outside the box: Divergent thinking is related to logical reasoning.

When people reason, they do so in a way that suggests they are thinking beyond the premises and actively using background knowledge. This study explored the hypothesis that divergent thinking, a key component of creativity, is a unique predictive factor of logical reasoning. A total of 96 adults completed a divergent thinking task and logical reasoning problems with varying forms and contents. Cognitive capacity was measured as a confounding factor. Individual differences in ideational fluency and originality were derived from the divergent thinking task. As hypothesized, originality was predictive of logical reasoning beyond fluency and cognitive capacity.

Reasoning strategy vs cognitive capacity as predictors of individual differences in reasoning performance.

The dual strategy model posits that reasoners rely on two information processing strategies when making inferences: The statistical strategy generates a rapid probabilistic estimate based on associative access to a wide array of information, and the counterexample strategy uses a more focused representation allowing for a search for potential counterexamples. In this paper, we focused on individual differences in strategy use as a predictor of performance on four reasoning tasks: Belief bias, base rate neglect, conjunction fallacy, and denominator neglect. Predictions from the strategy use model were contrasted with predictions from Dual Process Theories, which suggest that individual differences in performance reflect variations in cognitive ability. In each of four studies, a large number (N ≈ 200) completed one of the above reasoning tasks, a strategy use diagnostic questionnaire, and measures of IQ, cognitive reflection, and numeracy. In three of four studies, individual differences in strategy use predicted differences in reasoning performance when the effects of the other variables were eliminated. Bayesian analysis indicated that none of the individual differences measures predicted a significant portion of variance on the conjunction fallacy task, and that strategy use was a strong predictor on the remaining three tasks. This research suggests that the type of strategy that is adopted paves a road to successful reasoning that is independent of cognitive capacity.

Reasoning strategies determine the effect of disconfirmation on belief in false claims.

The dual-strategy model of reasoning proposes that people tend to use one of two reasoning strategies: either a statistical or a counterexample strategy, with the latter being more sensitive to potential counterexamples to a given conclusion. Previous studies have examined the effects of reasoning strategy in a variety of contexts. In the present study, we looked at the effects of gist repetition and disconfirmation on belief in an unknown claim. This is particularly interesting since there is no single normative analysis of this situation. We examine the hypotheses that (a) increasing gist repetition will result in higher levels of belief with both counterexample and statistical reasoners, and (b) that counterexample reasoners will have lower belief levels following a single disconfirming instance than will statistical reasoners. In a large-scale online study, over 2,000 adult participants received a False Claim procedure along with a Strategy Diagnostic. Results are consistent with the hypotheses. This provides strong evidence that the dual-strategy model captures a clear difference in information processing that is not captured by any normative/non-normative distinction.

Girls exhibit greater empathy than boys following a minor accident.

Hundreds of studies find that girls and women report feeling greater empathy than boys and men in response to adverse events befalling others. Despite this, few non-self-report measures demonstrate similar sex differences. This produces the oft-cited conclusion that to conform to societal expectations of appropriate sex-typed behavior females report higher levels of empathy. Several studies of sex differences in areas of brain activation and on infants' and young children's behavior however provide suggestive findings that self-reports reflect actual underlying sex differences in experiencing concern about others. We demonstrate using behavioral indices that females experience more empathy than males after witnessing an adverse event befall a same-sex classmate. In our study, one member of a pair experienced a minor accident on the way to constructing a tower while a bystander observed. We measured whether bystanders ceased their ongoing activity, looked at the victim, waited for the victim to recover from the accident, and actively intervened to help the victim. Female more than male bystanders engaged in these activities. These behavioral results suggest that an adverse event produces different subjective experiences in females than males that motivate objectively different behaviors, consistent with findings from self-report measures of empathy.

Reasoning strategies explain individual differences in social reasoning.

The dual-strategy model of reasoning suggests that when people reason they can either use (a) a statistical strategy which generates an estimation of conclusion likelihood using a rapid form of associative processing or (b) a counterexample strategy which identifies potential counterexamples to a conclusion using a more conscious working memory intensive process. Previous results suggest that strategy use is a strong individual difference that represents a broad distinction in the way that information is processed that goes beyond deductive reasoning. In 3 studies, we examined if this model could predict individual differences in the processing of social information by examining socially relevant cognitive biases. Study 1 found that strategy use predicted the extent of the self-serving bias. Study 2 found that strategy use predicted use of racist stereotypes even when need for closure was accounted for. Study 3 found that an essentialist prime resulted in a higher level of gender bias among statistical reasoners but that this prime had no effect on counterexample reasoners. These results indicate that the processing distinction between the 2 reasoning strategies underlies individual differences in social biases such as stereotypes, sexism, and racism. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Reasoning strategies predict use of very fast logical reasoning.

The dual strategy model proposes that people use one of two potential ways of processing information when making inferences. The statistical strategy generates a rapid probabilistic estimate based on associative access to a wide array of information, while the counterexample strategy uses a more focused representation, allowing for a search for potential counterexamples. In the following studies, we explore the hypothesis that individual differences in strategy use are related to the ability to make rapid intuitive logical judgments. In Study 1, we show that this is the case for rapid judgments requiring a distinction between simple logical form and for a novel form of judgment, the ability to identify inferences that are not linked to their premises (non sequiturs). In Study 2, we show that strategy use is related to the ability to make the kinds of rapid logical judgments previously examined over and above contributions of working memory capacity. Study 3 shows that strategy use explains individual variability in rapid logical responding with belief-biased inferences over and above the contribution of IQ. The results of Studies 2 and 3 indicate that under severe time constraint cognitive capacity is a very poor predictor of reasoning, while strategy use becomes a stronger predictor. These results extend the notion that people can make rapid intuitive "logical" judgments while highlighting the importance of strategy use as a key individual difference variable.

Reasoning With Conditionals About Everyday and Mathematical Concepts in Primary School.

A research link between conditional reasoning and mathematics has been reported only for late adolescents and adults, despite claims about the pivotal importance of conditional reasoning, i.e., reasoning with if-then statements, in mathematics. Secondary students' problems with deductive reasoning in mathematics have been documented for a long time. However, evidence from developmental psychology shows that even elementary students possess some early conditional reasoning skills in familiar contexts. It is still an open question to what extent conditional reasoning with mathematical concepts differs from conditional reasoning in familiar everyday contexts. Based on Mental Model Theory (MMT) of conditional reasoning, we assume that (mathematical) content knowledge will influence the generation of models, when conditionals concern mathematical concepts. In a cross-sectional study, 102 students in Cyprus from grades 2, 4, and 6 solved four conditional reasoning tasks on each type of content (everyday and mathematical). All four logical forms, modus ponens (MP), modus tollens (MT), denial of the antecedent (DA), and affirmation of the consequent (AC), were included in each task. Consistent with previous findings, even second graders were able to make correct inferences on some logical forms. Controlling for Working Memory (WM), there were significant effects of grade and logical form, with stronger growth on MP and AC than on MT and DA. The main effect of context was not significant, but context interacted significantly with logical form and grade level. The pattern of results was not consistent with the predictions of MMT. Based on analyses of students' chosen responses, we propose an alternative mechanism explaining the specific pattern of results. The study indicates that deductive reasoning skills arise from a combination of knowledge of domain-general principles and domain-specific knowledge. It extends results concerning the gradual development of primary students' conditional reasoning with everyday concepts to reasoning with mathematical concepts adding to our understanding of the link between mathematics and conditional reasoning in primary school. The results inspire the development of educational interventions, while further implications and limitations of the study are discussed.

Reasoning strategies and semantic memory effects in deductive reasoning.

Growing evidence supports the dual-strategy model, which suggests that reasoners have access to both a statistical and a counterexample reasoning strategy. In this paper, we explore further the processes underlying strategy use. We report three studies, the aim of which was to clarify the relation between this model and two forms of everyday reasoning. One of the most robust effects found with conditional reasoning with meaningful premises is the effect of alternative antecedents on the endorsement of AC and DA inferences. In a first study, we presented participants with conditional reasoning problems having more or fewer accessible alternatives as well as our dual-strategy diagnostic questionnaire. As hypothesized, results showed that strategy use had an independent effect on the inferences made with the AC and DA forms, over and above the effect of the number of antecedents, but was not related to responding to the MP and the MT forms. In a second study, we found that this relation extended to reasoning from an incompatibility statement. Finally, a third study showed that this relationship did not hold with probabilistic rather than logical response instructions, suggesting that the way reasoners transform a probabilistic evaluation into a dichotomous judgment is a key determinant of strategy use.

Divergent Thinking Promotes Deductive Reasoning in Preschoolers.

This study explored the hypothesis that preschoolers' deductive reasoning would be improved by encouraging use of divergent thinking (DT). Children of 4-5 years of age (n = 120) were randomly given DT or neutral control exercises before deductive reasoning problems. To allow a stronger test of the hypothesis, half of the children receiving the DT exercises were given explicit examples, which have been shown to reduce ideational originality. Results indicate that, as predicted, DT exercises without examples significantly improved rates of deductive responding, compared to exercises with examples and the control condition. These findings indicate that DT is a key component in the early beginnings of deductive reasoning. Some educational implications are discussed.

Who resists belief-biased inferences? The role of individual differences in reasoning strategies, working memory, and attentional focus.

A common explanation for individual differences in the ability to draw rule-based inferences, when a putative conclusion suggests a competing belief-based inference, is that the ability to do so depends on working memory capacity. In the following studies, we examined the hypothesis that the ability to draw rule-based inferences in belief bias tasks can also be explained by individual differences in reasoning strategies and in the related attentional focus. The dual-strategy model differentiates counterexample and statistical strategies that involve different information-processing styles. In the first study (N = 139), participants completed a working memory task (operation span), a strategy diagnostic questionnaire, and a belief bias task. The results showed that individual differences in strategy use predicted performance in the belief bias problems over and above any effects of working memory capacity, with counterexample reasoners producing rule-based inferences more often than statistical reasoners. In the second study (N = 196), an eye-tracking methodology was used as a process-tracing technique to investigate attentional differences between the two strategies. On problems showing a conflict between rule-based and belief-based information, counterexample reasoners demonstrated longer fixation times on the premises than did statistical reasoners, thus providing direct evidence that individual differences in strategy use reflect different processing styles. These results clearly indicate that individual differences in strategy use are an important determinant of the way that people make inferences when rule-based and belief-based cues are both present.

Reasoning strategy modulates gender differences in performance on a spatial rotation task.

The dual-strategy model of reasoning has proposed that individual differences in reasoning can be understood as due to two general ways of processing information: an analytic, counterexample strategy that examines information for explicit potential counterexamples and an intuitive, statistical strategy that uses associative access to generate a likelihood estimate of putative conclusions. Previous studies have examined this model in the context of basic conditional reasoning tasks. However, the distinctions that underlie the dual-strategy model can be seen as a basic description of more general differences in information processing. A recent study examining interactions between gender and strategy use in processing of negative emotions found that gender differences were modulated by strategy, with the general advantage of females concentrated within statistical reasoners. Two studies were performed to extend this analysis to performance on a mental rotation task for which there also exist clear gender differences. The initial study presented rotation tasks with unlimited time. Results show that males perform better on more difficult rotation tasks than females, with the difference concentrated among statistical reasoners. The second study replicated this using a restricted time (4 s) to make each judgement and showed an increase in the effect of both gender and strategy. This provides additional evidence that the dual-strategy model captures an important individual difference in the general way that information is processed.

The development of fast and slow inferential responding: Evidence for a parallel development of rule-based and belief-based intuitions.

Dual process theories postulate the existence of two levels of processing, Type 1, which uses belief-based cues to make very rapid inferences, and Type 2, which uses more conscious, working memory-based processes that are, in principle, capable of making rule-based judgments. There is a common assumption that Type 1 processes are more rapidly produced, while Type 2 processes take more time. Evidence for this assumption is mixed. Recently, Newman, Gibb, and Thompson (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 43(7): 1154, 2017) have provided clear evidence that very fast responses use a combination of both belief-based and rule-based cues. In these studies, we initially replicated this basic result with adults using a different methodology and extended them to examine in greater detail patterns of change with restricted time. The results also show the same combination of rule-based and belief-based cues in fast responses, and suggest that time constraints differentially affect each form of cue. We then examined the developmental pattern of both fast and slow responding. Children aged between 8 and 10 years of age were examined using the methodology of the initial study. Results show that both developmental patterns and the effect of reduced time on children produce parallel changes in both belief-based and rule-based responding. These results suggest the existence of two simultaneously developing processes, consistent with a dual-strategy model of reasoning.

Conflict Detection and Logical Complexity.

Empirical evidence for the capacity to detect conflict between biased reasoning and normative principles has led to the proposal that reasoners have an intuitive grasp of some basic logical principles. In two studies, we investigate the boundary conditions of these logical intuitions by manipulating the logical complexity of problems where logical validity and conclusion believability conflict or not. Results pointed to evidence for successful conflict detection on the basic Modus Ponens (MP) inference, but also showed evidence for such a phenomenon on the more complex Modus Tollens (MT) inference. This suggests that both the MP and the MT inferences are simple enough for reasoners to have an intuitive grasp of their logical structure. The boundaries of logical intuition might thus reside in problems of greater complexity than these inferences. We also observed that on the invalid Affirmation of the Consequent (AC) and Denial of the Antecedent (DA) inferences, participants showed higher accuracy on the inference that was expected to be more complex (DA), and no evidence for successful conflict detection was found on these forms. Implications for the logical intuition framework are discussed.