Nonprofit conversion: theory, evidence, and state policy options.

OBJECTIVE: To describe the contributions of nonprofit hospitals and health plans to healthcare markets and to analyze state policy options with regard to the conversion of nonprofits to for-profit status. DATA SOURCES/STUDY SETTING: Secondary national and state data from a variety of sources, 1980-present. STUDY DESIGN: Policy analysis. DATA COLLECTION/EXTRACTION METHODS: Development of a conceptual economic framework; analysis of empirical, legal, and theoretical literature; and review of statutes, rules, and court decisions. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: Three main rationales support special status for nonprofits, especially hospitals: charity care, other community benefits, and consumer protection. The main social rationale for for-profits is their incentives for better efficiency. There are reasons to expect that nonprofit and for-profit goals differ; however, measured differences in community hospital cost, prices, and quality between nonprofit and for-profit hospitals are undetectable or inconclusive. Nonprofit hospitals do provide more uncompensated care than for-profit hospitals. Similarities between nonprofit and for-profit hospitals may exist because nonprofits may set norms that for-profits follow to some degree. States have substantial power and discretion in overseeing nonprofit conversions. Some have regularized oversight through new legislation that constrains, but does not eliminate, state officials' discretion. These statutes may be deferential to converting entities and their buyers or may be very restrictive of them. CONCLUSIONS: Overseeing the appropriate disposition of nonprofit assets in individual conversions is extremely important. States should also monitor local market conditions through community benefits assessments and other data collection, however, to accurately assess (and possibly redress) what is lost or gained from conversion. Local market conditions are likely more important in determining hospital behavior than ownership form. Potentially, a mix of for-profit and nonprofit hospitals in a given market may improve market performance due to constraints the two ownership types may exercise over one another. If nonprofits disappear, the states may need to maintain quality and access norms through regulation.

The resurgence of selective contracting restrictions.

As managed care has spread, so has legislation to force plans to contract with any willing provider (AWP) and give patients freedom of choice (FOC). Managed care organizations' selective networks and provider integration reduce patient access to providers, along with provider access to paying patients, so many providers have lobbied for AWP-FOC laws. In opposition are managed care organizations (MCOs), which want full freedom to contract selectively to control prices and utilization. This article comprehensively describes laws in all fifty-one jurisdictions, classifies their relative strength, and assesses the implications of the laws. Most are relatively weak forms and all are limited in application by ERISA and the federal HMO Act. The article also uses an associative multivariate analysis to relate the selective contracting environments to HMO penetration rates, rural population, physician density, and other variables. States with weak laws also have higher HMO penetration and higher physician density, but smaller rural populations. We conclude that the strongest laws overly restrict the management of care, to the likely detriment of cost control. But where market power is rapidly concentrating, not restricting selective contracting could diminish long-term competition and patient access to care. In the face of uncertainty about the impact of these laws, an intermediate approach may be better than all or nothing. States should consider mandating that plans offer point-of-service options, for a separate premium. This option expands patient choice of plans at the time of enrollment and of providers at the time of care, yet maintains plans' ability to control core providers.

Creating a MEDPAR (Medicare provider analysis and review) analog to the RUG-III (Resource Utilization Groups, Version III) classification system.

As Medicare payments for post-acute institutional care continue to rise sharply, policy interest in the clinical characteristics of beneficiaries admitted to nursing homes and their variation across facilities has stimulated research into case mix. Measures of Medicare skilled nursing facility (SNF) case mix are important in relating payments to the care requirements of residents. The Resource Utilization Groups, Version III (RUG-III) classification system uses a new minimum data set that is not currently available nationally. In preparation for a multi-State demonstration, we needed to simulate at least the first-level splits at the national, State, and facility level. Therefore, we developed proxy measures using comparable data available on the National Claims History files. The analog is an easily programmed measure of the acuity/severity of beneficiaries' conditions across a Medicare Part A SNF stay in 75 percent of the SNF providers. This can be a method for estimating changes in case mix over the years, and differences across provider types and States.