RESUMO
A striking feature of our memories of the personal past is that they involve different visual perspectives: one sometimes recalls past events from one's original point of view (a field perspective), but one sometimes recalls them from an external point of view (an observer perspective). In philosophy, observer memories are often seen as being less than fully genuine and as being necessarily false or distorted. This paper looks at whether laypeople share the standard philosophical view by applying the methods of experimental philosophy. We report the results of five studies suggesting that, while participants clearly categorize both field and observer memories as memories, they tend to judge that observer memories are slightly less accurate than field memories. Our results suggest, however, that in lay thought, the difference between field and observer memories is not nearly as clear-cut as philosophers have generally taken it to be.
Assuntos
Rememoração Mental , Resolução de Problemas , Humanos , FilosofiaRESUMO
What is the relation between episodic memory and episodic (or experiential) imagination? According to the causal theory of memory, memory differs from imagination because remembering entails the existence of a continuous causal connection between one's original experience of an event and one's subsequent memory, a connection that is maintained by a memory trace. The simulation theory rejects this conception of memory, arguing against the necessity of a memory trace for successful remembering. I show that the simulation theory faces two serious problems, which are better explained by appealing to a causal connection maintained by a memory trace. Remembering the personal past is not the same as imagining.
RESUMO
Jordi Fernández (2015) discusses the possible benefits of two types of allegedly distorted memories: observer memories and fabricated memories. Fernández argues that even when memory does not preserve the past, some memories can still provide an adaptive benefit for the subject. I explore Fernández's claims focussing on the case of observer perspective memories. For Fernández, observer perspectives are distorted memories because they do not preserve past experience. In contrast, I suggest that observer perspectives can accurately reflect past experience: observer perspectives are not necessarily distorted memories. By looking at the complexity of the relation between remembering trauma from an observer perspective and emotional closure, I also sound a note of caution against Fernández's assertion that observer memories of trauma can be adaptively beneficial. Finally, I suggest that because observer perspectives are not necessarily distorted, but involve a distinct way of thinking about one's past, such memories can be epistemically beneficial.