An investigation of reasoning by analogy in schizophrenia and autism spectrum disorder.

Relational reasoning ability relies upon by both cognitive and social factors. We compared analogical reasoning performance in healthy controls (HC) to performance in individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), and individuals with schizophrenia (SZ). The experimental task required participants to find correspondences between drawings of scenes. Participants were asked to infer which item within one scene best matched a relational item within the second scene. We varied relational complexity, presence of distraction, and type of objects in the analogies (living or non-living items). We hypothesized that the cognitive differences present in SZ would reduce relational inferences relative to ASD and HC. We also hypothesized that both SZ and ASD would show lower performance on living item problems relative to HC due to lower social function scores. Overall accuracy was higher for HC relative to SZ, consistent with prior research. Across groups, higher relational complexity reduced analogical responding, as did the presence of non-living items. Separate group analyses revealed that the ASD group was less accurate at making relational inferences in problems that involved mainly non-living items and when distractors were present. The SZ group showed differences in problem type similar to the ASD group. Additionally, we found significant correlations between social cognitive ability and analogical reasoning, particularly for the SZ group. These results indicate that differences in cognitive and social abilities impact the ability to infer analogical correspondences along with numbers of relational elements and types of objects present in the problems.

Tracking cognitive phases in analogical reasoning with event-related potentials.

Analogical reasoning consists of multiple phases. Four-term analogies (A:B::C:D) have an encoding period in which the A:B pair is evaluated prior to a mapping phase. The electrophysiological timing associated with analogical reasoning has remained unclear. We used event-related potentials to identify neural timing related to analogical reasoning relative to perceptual and semantic control conditions. Spatiotemporal principal-components analyses revealed differences primarily in left frontal electrodes during encoding and mapping phases of analogies relative to the other conditions. The timing of the activity differed depending upon the phase of the problem. During the encoding of A:B terms, analogies elicited a positive deflection compared to the control conditions between 400 and 1,200 ms, but for the mapping phase analogical processing elicited a negative deflection that occurred earlier and for a shorter time period, between 350 and 625 ms. These results provide neural and behavioral evidence that 4-term analogy problems involve a highly active evaluation phase of the A:B pair.

The neural organization of perception in chess experts.

The human visual system responds to expertise, and it has been suggested that regions that process faces also process other objects of expertise including chess boards by experts. We tested whether chess and face processing overlap in brain activity using fMRI. Chess experts and novices exhibited face selective areas, but these regions showed no selectivity to chess configurations relative to other stimuli. We next compared neural responses to chess and to scrambled chess displays to isolate areas relevant to expertise. Areas within the posterior cingulate, orbitofrontal cortex, and right temporal cortex were active in this comparison in experts over novices. We also compared chess and face responses within the posterior cingulate and found this area responsive to chess only in experts. These findings indicate that the configurations in chess are not strongly processed by face-selective regions that are selective for faces in individuals who have expertise in both domains. Further, the area most consistently involved in chess did not show overlap with faces. Overall, these results suggest that expert visual processing may be similar at the level of recognition, but need not show the same neural correlates.

An fMRI investigation of cognitive stages in reasoning by analogy.

We compared reasoning about four-term analogy problems in the format (A:B::C: D) to semantic and perceptual control conditions that required matching without analogical mapping. We investigated distinct phases of the problem solving process divided into encoding, mapping/inference, and response. Using fMRI, we assessed the brain activation relevant to each of these phases with an emphasis on achieving a better understanding of analogical reasoning relative to these other matching conditions. We predicted that the analogical condition would involve the most cognitive effort in the encoding and mapping/inference phases, while the control conditions were expected to engage greater prefrontal cortex (PFC) activation at the response period. Results showed greater activation for the analogical condition relative to the control conditions at the encoding phase in several predominantly left lateralized and medial areas of the PFC. Similar results were observed for the mapping/inference phase, though this difference was limited to the left PFC and rostral PFC. The response phase resulted in the fastest and most accurate responses in the analogy condition relative to the control conditions. This was accompanied by greater processing within the left lateral and the medial PFC for the control conditions relative to the analogy condition, consistent with most of the cognitive processing of the analogy condition having occurred in the prior task phases. Overall we demonstrate that the left ventral and dorsal lateral, medial, and rostral PFC are important in both the encoding of relational information, mapping and inference processes, and verification of semantic and perceptual responses in four term analogical reasoning.