Right to mental integrity and neurotechnologies: implications of the extended mind thesis.

The possibility of neurotechnological interference with our brain and mind raises questions about the moral rights that would protect against the (mis)use of these technologies. One such moral right that has received recent attention is the right to mental integrity. Though the metaphysical boundaries of the mind are a matter of live debate, most defences of this moral right seem to assume an internalist (brain-based) view of the mind. In this article, we will examine what an extended account of the mind might imply for the right to mental integrity and the protection it provides against neurotechnologies. We argue that, on an extended account of the mind, the scope of the right to mental integrity would expand significantly, implying that neurotechnologies would no longer pose a uniquely serious threat to the right. In addition, some neurotechnologies may even be protected by the right to mental integrity, as the technologies would become part of the mind. We conclude that adopting an extended account of the mind has significant implications for the right to mental integrity in terms of its protective scope and capacity to protect against neurotechnologies, demonstrating that metaphysical assumptions about the mind play an important role in determining the moral protection provided by the right.

Progesterone receptor distribution in the human hypothalamus and its association with suicide.

The human hypothalamus modulates mental health by balancing interactions between hormonal fluctuations and stress responses. Stress-induced progesterone release activates progesterone receptors (PR) in the human brain and triggers alterations in neuropeptides/neurotransmitters. As recent epidemiological studies have associated peripheral progesterone levels with suicide risks in humans, we mapped PR distribution in the human hypothalamus in relation to age and sex and characterized its (co-) expression in specific cell types. The infundibular nucleus (INF) appeared to be the primary hypothalamic structure via which progesterone modulates stress-related neural circuitry. An elevation of the number of pro-opiomelanocortin+ (POMC, an endogenous opioid precursor) neurons in the INF, which was due to a high proportion of POMC+ neurons that co-expressed PR, was related to suicide in patients with mood disorders (MD). MD donors who died of legal euthanasia were for the first time enrolled in a postmortem study to investigate the molecular signatures related to fatal suicidal ideations. They had a higher proportion of PR co-expressing POMC+ neurons than MD patients who died naturally. This indicates that the onset of endogenous opioid activation in MD with suicide tendency may be progesterone-associated. Our findings may have implications for users of progesterone-enriched contraceptives who also have MD and suicidal tendencies.

Neurotechnology to reduce recidivism: Ethical and legal challenges.

Crime comes with enormous costs, not only financial but also in terms of loss of mental and physical health and, in some cases, even loss of life. Recidivism is responsible for a considerable percentage of the crimes, and therefore, society deems reducing recidivism a priority. To reduce recidivism, several types of interventions can be used, such as education and employment-focused rehabilitation programs which are intended to improve psychological and social factors. Another way to prevent reoffending is to influence the offender's brain functions. For example, medication can be offered to treat delusions or to diminish sexual drive. In the near future, innovative neurotechnologies are expected to improve prediction and prevention of reoffending. Potential positive effects of such neurotechniques include a safer society and earlier release of prisoners who are no longer "at high risk" to relapse into criminal behavior. Meanwhile, employing these neurotechniques in the criminal justice system raises fundamental concerns, for example, about autonomy, privacy and mental integrity. This chapter aims to identify some of the ethical and legal challenges of using neurotechnologies to reduce recidivism.

Introduction: On brain and crime.

Crime is a complex phenomenon involving many factors, among which are situational and societal factors. What counts as a crime may also vary across space and time. Often, it is the interplay of several factors that may lead to criminal behavior. Scientifically, brain function is important to consider, first of all because the brain is central to behavior as such, including criminal behavior. Second, because there is increasing evidence for the relevance of specific brain dysfunctions in some criminal behavior, particularly developmental findings related to nonadaptive behavior. Many of our behavioral tendencies are rooted in our childhood (experiences), and this, it appears, is also, at least to some extent, true for nonadaptive behavior. This chapter considers several overarching issues regarding the relationship between-and the science of-brain and crime, some from a conceptual, some from a legal, and others from a developmental perspective.

The various faces of vulnerability: offering neurointerventions to criminal offenders.

In recent years, we have witnessed considerable progress in neurotechnologies that visualize or alter a person's brain and mental features. In the near future, some of these technologies could possibly be used to change neural parameters of high-risk behavior in criminal offenders, often referred to as neurointerventions. The idea of delivering neurointerventions to criminal justice populations has raised fundamental normative concerns, but some authors have argued that offering neurointerventions to convicted offenders could be permissible. However, such offers raise normative concerns too. One prominent worry that is often emphasized in the literature, relates to the vulnerability of convicted offenders in prison and forensic patients in mental health facilities. In this paper, we aim to show that as far as vulnerability is considered relevant within the context of offering medical interventions to offenders, it could contribute to arguments against as well as in favor of these offers.

Minding Rights: Mapping Ethical and Legal Foundations of 'Neurorights'.

The rise of neurotechnologies, especially in combination with artificial intelligence (AI)-based methods for brain data analytics, has given rise to concerns around the protection of mental privacy, mental integrity and cognitive liberty - often framed as "neurorights" in ethical, legal, and policy discussions. Several states are now looking at including neurorights into their constitutional legal frameworks, and international institutions and organizations, such as UNESCO and the Council of Europe, are taking an active interest in developing international policy and governance guidelines on this issue. However, in many discussions of neurorights the philosophical assumptions, ethical frames of reference and legal interpretation are either not made explicit or conflict with each other. The aim of this multidisciplinary work is to provide conceptual, ethical, and legal foundations that allow for facilitating a common minimalist conceptual understanding of mental privacy, mental integrity, and cognitive liberty to facilitate scholarly, legal, and policy discussions.

Structured instruments for insanity defense evaluations: Opportunities and limitations.

Insanity evaluations are often criticized for their-alleged-lack of objectivity, reliability and transparency. Structured tools to guide and support forensic evaluators during these evaluations have been developed-but they are rarely employed in forensic practice. In the present article, we consider the value of these tools for forensic practice in terms of opportunities and limitations. First, we briefly describe different insanity criteria used in Western countries. Next, we will review five structured instruments to guide insanity assessment together with their performance measures. Finally, we draw conclusions on the value of such instruments for forensic practice.

Virtual reality interventions for victims of crime: A systematic review.

In the forensic field, most studies employing virtual reality (VR) interventions have focused on offenders. The validity and safety of VR applications for victims of crime are still unclear. Following PRISMA guidelines, a systematic review on VR interventions for crime victims was performed to assess the efficacy, acceptability by patients, and cost-effectiveness of these interventions compared to in-person care. We identified 34 potentially eligible studies from 188 records obtained from database searches (Medline/Pubmed, CINAHL, PsycINFO, Web of Science, and Scopus); four additional articles were identified via alternative sources. In total, nine articles were included for the qualitative synthesis. Patient satisfaction with VR interventions was found to be equivalent to face-to-face interventions. Both VR exposure and control groups found relief from posttraumatic symptoms, with differences either statistically insignificant or in favor of VR. Despite the increased costs linked to the technology required, VR appears to be a promising alternative to in vivo exposure, but further research is needed. Limitations of the review include the varied experimental protocols, which did not allow us to conduct a quantitative analysis and comparison of findings across different studies, and the generally poor quality of the studies included. Further research, preferably in larger groups, is needed to shed more light on the effectiveness of VR interventions for traumatized victims of crime.

Is Virtually Everything Possible? The Relevance of Ethics and Human Rights for Introducing Extended Reality in Forensic Psychiatry.

Extended Reality (XR) systems, such as Virtual Reality (VR) and Augmented Reality (AR), provide a digital simulation either of a complete environment, or of particular objects within the real world. Today, XR is used in a wide variety of settings, including gaming, design, engineering, and the military. In addition, XR has been introduced into psychology, cognitive sciences and biomedicine for both basic research as well as diagnosing or treating neurological and psychiatric disorders. In the context of XR, the simulated 'reality' can be controlled and people may safely learn to cope with their feelings and behavior. XR also enables to simulate environments that cannot easily be accessed or created otherwise. Therefore, Extended Reality systems are thought to be a promising tool in the resocialization of criminal offenders, more specifically for purposes of risk assessment and treatment of forensic patients. Employing XR in forensic settings raises ethical and legal intricacies which are not raised in case of most other healthcare applications. Whereas a variety of normative issues of XR have been discussed in the context of medicine and consumer usage, the debate on XR in forensic settings is, as yet, straggling. By discussing two general arguments in favor of employing XR in criminal justice, and two arguments calling for caution in this regard, the present paper aims to broaden the current ethical and legal debate on XR applications to their use in the resocialization of criminal offenders, mainly focusing on forensic patients.

Robot Evolution: Ethical Concerns.

Rapid developments in evolutionary computation, robotics, 3D-printing, and material science are enabling advanced systems of robots that can autonomously reproduce and evolve. The emerging technology of robot evolution challenges existing AI ethics because the inherent adaptivity, stochasticity, and complexity of evolutionary systems severely weaken human control and induce new types of hazards. In this paper we address the question how robot evolution can be responsibly controlled to avoid safety risks. We discuss risks related to robot multiplication, maladaptation, and domination and suggest solutions for meaningful human control. Such concerns may seem far-fetched now, however, we posit that awareness must be created before the technology becomes mature.

Closed-Loop Brain Devices in Offender Rehabilitation: Autonomy, Human Rights, and Accountability.

The current debate on closed-loop brain devices (CBDs) mainly focuses on their use in a medical context; possible criminal justice applications have only received incidental scholarly attention. Unlike in medicine, in criminal justice, CBDs might be offered on behalf of the State and for the purpose of protecting security, rather than realizing healthcare aims. It would be possible to deploy CBDs in the rehabilitation of convicted offenders, similarly to the much-debated possibility of employing other brain interventions in this context. Although such use of CBDs could in principle be consensual, there are significant differences between the choice faced by a criminal offender offered a CBD in the context of criminal justice, and that faced by a patient offered a CBD in an ordinary healthcare context. Employment of CBDs in criminal justice thus raises ethical and legal intricacies not raised by healthcare applications. This paper examines some of these issues under three heads: autonomy, human rights, and accountability.

Commercial DNA tests and police investigations: a broad bioethical perspective.

Over 30 million people worldwide have taken a commercial at-home DNA test, because they were interested in their genetic ancestry, disease predisposition or inherited traits. Yet, these consumer DNA data are also increasingly used for a very different purpose: to identify suspects in criminal investigations. By matching a suspect's DNA with DNA from a suspect's distant relatives who have taken a commercial at-home DNA test, law enforcement can zero in on a perpetrator. Such forensic use of consumer DNA data has been performed in over 200 criminal investigations. However, this practice of so-called investigative genetic genealogy (IGG) raises ethical concerns. In this paper, we aim to broaden the bioethical analysis on IGG by showing the limitations of an individual-based model. We discuss two concerns central in the debate: privacy and informed consent. However, we argue that IGG raises pressing ethical concerns that extend beyond these individual-focused issues. The very nature of the genetic information entails that relatives may also be affected by the individual customer's choices. In this respect, we explore to what extent the ethical approach in the biomedical genetic context on consent and consequences for relatives can be helpful for the debate on IGG. We argue that an individual-based model has significant limitations in an IGG context. The ethical debate is further complicated by the international, transgenerational and commercial nature of IGG. We conclude that IGG should not only be approached as an individual but also-and perhaps primarily-as a collective issue.

Forensic Brain-Reading and Mental Privacy in European Human Rights Law: Foundations and Challenges.

A central question in the current neurolegal and neuroethical literature is how brain-reading technologies could contribute to criminal justice. Some of these technologies have already been deployed within different criminal justice systems in Europe, including Slovenia, Italy, England and Wales, and the Netherlands, typically to determine guilt, legal responsibility, or recidivism risk. In this regard, the question arises whether brain-reading could permissibly be used against the person's will. To provide adequate legal protection from such non-consensual brain-reading in the European legal context, ethicists have called for the recognition of a novel fundamental legal right to mental privacy. In this paper, we explore whether these ethical calls for recognising a novel legal right to mental privacy are necessary in the European context. We argue that a right to mental privacy could be derived from, or at least developed within in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, and that introducing an additional fundamental right to protect against (forensic) brain-reading is not necessary. What is required, however, is a specification of the implications of existing rights for particular neurotechnologies and purposes.

The insanity defence without mental illness? Some considerations.

In this paper we aim to offer a balanced argument to motivate (re)thinking about the mental illness clause within the insanity defence. This is the clause that states that mental illness should have a relevant causal or explanatory role for the presence of the incapacities or limited capacities that are covered by this defence. We offer three main considerations showing the important legal and epistemological roles that the mental illness clause plays in the evaluation of legal responsibility. Although we acknowledge that these advantages could be preserved without having this clause explicitly stated in the law, we resist proposals that deny the importance of mental illness in exculpation. We argue, thus, that any attempt at removing the mental illness clause from legal formulations of the insanity defence should offer alternative ways of keeping in place these advantages.

Neuroscience-based Psychiatric Assessments of Criminal Responsibility: Beyond Self-Report?

Many legal systems have an insanity defense, which means that although a person has committed a crime, she is not held criminally responsible for the act. A challenge with regard to these assessments is that forensic psychiatrists have to rely to a considerable extent on the defendant's self-report. Could neuroscience be a way to make these evaluations more objective? The current value of neuroimaging in insanity assessments will be examined. The author argues that neuroscience can be valuable for diagnosing neurological illnesses, rather than psychiatric disorders. Next, he discusses to what extent neurotechnological 'mind reading' techniques, if they would become available in the future, could be useful to get beyond self-report in forensic psychiatry.