COVID-19 Infection: Implications for Perioperative and Critical Care Physicians.

Healthcare systems worldwide are responding to Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), an emerging infectious syndrome caused by the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) virus. Patients with COVID-19 can progress from asymptomatic or mild illness to hypoxemic respiratory failure or multisystem organ failure, necessitating intubation and intensive care management. Healthcare providers, and particularly anesthesiologists, are at the frontline of this epidemic, and they need to be aware of the best available evidence to guide therapeutic management of patients with COVID-19 and to keep themselves safe while doing so. Here, the authors review COVID-19 pathogenesis, presentation, diagnosis, and potential therapeutics, with a focus on management of COVID-19-associated respiratory failure. The authors draw on literature from other viral epidemics, treatment of acute respiratory distress syndrome, and recent publications on COVID-19, as well as guidelines from major health organizations. This review provides a comprehensive summary of the evidence currently available to guide management of critically ill patients with COVID-19.

The effect of Phase 2 of the Premier Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration on incentive payments to hospitals caring for disadvantaged patients.

OBJECTIVE: The Medicare and Premier Inc. Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration (HQID), a hospital-based pay-for-performance program, changed its incentive design from one rewarding only high performance (Phase 1) to another rewarding high performance, moderate performance, and improvement (Phase 2). We tested whether this design change reduced the gap in incentive payments among hospitals treating patients across the gradient of socioeconomic disadvantage. DATA: To estimate incentive payments in both phases, we used data from the Premier Inc. website and from Medicare Provider Analysis and Review files. We used data from the American Hospital Association Annual Survey and Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Impact File to identify hospital characteristics. STUDY DESIGN: Hospitals were divided into quartiles based on their Disproportionate Share Index (DSH), from lowest disadvantage (Quartile 1) to highest disadvantage (Quartile 4). In both phases of the HQID, we tested for differences across the DSH quartiles for three outcomes: (1) receipt of any incentive payments; (2) total incentive payments; and (3) incentive payments per discharge. For each of the study outcomes, we performed a hospital-level difference-in-differences analysis to test whether the gap between Quartile 1 and the other quartiles decreased from Phase 1 to Phase 2. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: In Phase 1, there were significant gaps across the DSH quartiles for the receipt of any payment and for payment per discharge. In Phase 2, the gap was not significant for the receipt of any payment, but it remained significant for payment per discharge. For the receipt of any incentive payment, difference-in-difference estimates showed significant reductions in the gap between Quartile 1 and the other quartiles (Quartile 2, 17.5 percentage points [p < .05]; Quartile 3, 18.1 percentage points [p < .01]; Quartile 4, 28.3 percentage points [p < .01]). For payments per discharge, the gap was also significantly reduced between Quartile 1 and the other quartiles (Quartile 2, $14.92 per discharge [p < .10]; Quartile 3, $17.34 per discharge [p < .05]; Quartile 4, $21.31 per discharge [p < .01]). There were no significant reductions in the gap for total payments. CONCLUSIONS: The design change in the HQID reduced the disparity in the receipt of any incentive payment and for incentive payments per discharge between hospitals caring for the most and least socioeconomically disadvantaged patient populations.

Care coordination in accountable care organizations: moving beyond structure and incentives.

Accountable care organizations (ACOs) are considered by many to be a key component of healthcare delivery system improvement. One expectation is that the structural elements of the ACO model, including clinical integration and financial accountability, will lead to better coordination of care for patients. But, while structure and incentives may facilitate the delivery of coordinated care, they will not necessarily ensure that care coordination is done well. For that, physicians and other healthcare providers within ACOs must possess and utilize specific skills, particularly in the areas of collaboration, communication, and teamwork. In this article, we present strategies in 3 domains--training, support tools, and organizational culture--that ACOs can implement to foster the development of these skills and support their use in clinical practice.