To reappraise or not to reappraise? Emotion regulation choice and cognitive energetics.

Research shows that cognitive reappraisal is an effective emotion regulation (ER) strategy that often has clear benefits. Yet, surprisingly, recent findings demonstrate that people use cognitive reappraisal less frequently than might be expected (Suri, Whittaker, & Gross, 2015). We employ cognitive energetics theory (CET) to explain this puzzling behavior. CET posits that the likelihood of launching any cognitive process is a function of two opposing forces: the driving force (i.e., the motivation to launch the process) and the restraining force (i.e., task difficulty). We thus hypothesized that people choose to use cognitive reappraisal relatively rarely because of the difficulty of implementing it. We also postulated that the decision to reappraise (or not) does not simply depend on stimuli emotional intensity because the latter is associated with both the driving and the restraining forces. In support of our hypotheses, we found that when the images' emotional intensity posed difficulty for reappraisal (i.e., highly intense images), reducing this difficulty by asking participants to merely predict others' (Study 1) or their own choices (Study 2) increased reappraisal choice. Finally, in Study 3, we show that a relatively easy to implement reappraisal strategy was chosen more often than the more difficult one for high (but not low) intensity images. These findings illustrate the relevance of a CET-based motivational analysis to emotion regulation choice. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Evidence for arrogance: On the relative importance of expertise, outcome, and manner.

Arrogant behavior is as old as human nature. Nonetheless, the factors that cause people to be perceived as arrogant have received very little research attention. In this paper, we focused on a typical manifestation of arrogance: dismissive behavior. In particular, we explored the conditions under which a person who dismissed advice would be perceived as arrogant. We examined two factors: the advisee's competence, and the manner in which he or she dismissed the advice. The effect of the advisee's competence was tested by manipulating two competence cues: relative expertise, and the outcome of the advice dismissal (i.e., whether the advisee was right or wrong). In six studies (N = 1304), participants made arrogance judgments about protagonists who dismissed the advice of another person while the advisees' relative expertise (compared to the advisor), their eventual correctness, and the manner of their dismissal were manipulated in between-participant designs. Across various types of decisions and advisee-advisor relationships, the results show that less expert, less correct, and ruder advisees are perceived as more arrogant. We also find that outcome trumps expertise, and manner trumps both expertise and outcomes. In two additional studies (N = 101), we examined people's naïve theories about the relative importance of the aforementioned arrogance cues. These studies showed that people overestimate the role of expertise information as compared to the role of interpersonal manner and outcomes. Thus, our results suggest that people may commit arrogant faux pas because they erroneously expect that their expertise will justify their dismissive behavior.

The rocky road from attitudes to behaviors: Charting the goal systemic course of actions.

The issue of attitude-behavior relations is revisited in light of recent work on motivation and the psychology of goals. It is suggested that for object-attitudes to drive a specific behavior, a chain of contingencies must be realized: Liking must be transmuted into wanting, wanting must evolve into a goal, the goal must be momentarily dominant, and the specific behavior must be chosen as means of goal pursuit. Our model thus specifies a set of mediating processes that transpire between attitudes and behavior. Prior theories of attitude-behavior relations are examined from the present perspective, and its conceptual and empirical implications are noted.

But what if the default is defaulting?

We critically consider the default view of consciousness and decision making, and we explore the implications of this view to the authors' argument. We therefore call for rigorous collection of data regarding the role of consciousness in decisions. We also propose that the section on subliminal effects significantly underestimates existing data and succinctly review relevant findings.

Guess what? Implicit motivation boosts the influence of subliminal information on choice.

When is choice affected by subliminal messages? This question has fascinated scientists and lay people alike, but it is only recently that reliable empirical data began to emerge. In the current paper we bridge the literature on implicit motivation and that on subliminal persuasion. We suggest that motivation in general, and implicit motivation more specifically, plays an important role in subliminal persuasion: It sensitizes us to subliminal cues. To examine this hypothesis we developed a new paradigm that allows powerful tests of subliminal influences as well as stringent assessments of subliminality. The results of two experiments suggest that implicit motivation can enhance the effects of subliminal priming on choice.

Spurious consensus and opinion revision: why might people be more confident in their less accurate judgments?

In the interest of improving their decision making, individuals revise their opinions on the basis of samples of opinions obtained from others. However, such a revision process may lead decision makers to experience greater confidence in their less accurate judgments. The authors theorize that people tend to underestimate the informative value of independently drawn opinions, if these appear to conflict with one another, yet place some confidence even in the spurious consensus, which may arise when opinions are sampled interdependently. The experimental task involved people's revision of their opinions (caloric estimates of foods) on the basis of advice. The method of sampling the advisory opinions (independent or interdependent) was the main factor. The results reveal a dissociation between confidence and accuracy. A theoretical underlying mechanism is suggested whereby people attend to consensus (consistency) cues at the expense of information on interdependence. Implications for belief updating and for individual and group decisions are discussed.