Practice reduces set-specific capture costs only superficially.

Contingent attentional capture costs are doubled or tripled under certain conditions when multiple attentional sets guide visual search (e.g., "search for green letters" and "search for orange letters"). Such "set-specific" capture occurs when a potential target that matches one attentional set (e.g., a green stimulus) impairs the ability to identify a temporally proximal target that matches another attentional set (e.g., an orange stimulus). In the present study, we examined whether these severe set-specific capture effects could be attenuated through training. In Experiment 1, half of participants experienced training consisting of mostly trials involving a set switch from distractor to target, while the other half experienced training consisting of mostly trials in which a set switch was not required. Upon test, participants trained on set switches produced greatly reduced set-specific capture effects compared to their own pretraining levels and compared to participants trained on trials without a set switch. However, in Experiments 2 and 3, we found that these training effects did not transfer to a new color context or even a single new target color, indicating that they were specific and involved low-level associative learning. We concluded that set-specific capture is pervasive and largely immutable, even with practice.

A bottleneck model of set-specific capture.

Set-specific contingent attentional capture is a particularly strong form of capture that occurs when multiple attentional sets guide visual search (e.g., "search for green letters" and "search for orange letters"). In this type of capture, a potential target that matches one attentional set (e.g. a green stimulus) impairs the ability to identify a temporally proximal target that matches another attentional set (e.g. an orange stimulus). In the present study, we investigated whether set-specific capture stems from a bottleneck in working memory or from a depletion of limited resources that are distributed across multiple attentional sets. In each trial, participants searched a rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) stream for up to three target letters (T1-T3) that could appear in any of three target colors (orange, green, or lavender). The most revealing findings came from trials in which T1 and T2 matched different attentional sets and were both identified. In these trials, T3 accuracy was lower when it did not match T1's set than when it did match, but only when participants failed to identify T2. These findings support a bottleneck model of set-specific capture in which a limited-capacity mechanism in working memory enhances only one attentional set at a time, rather than a resource model in which processing capacity is simultaneously distributed across multiple attentional sets.

Set-specific capture can be reduced by preemptively occupying a limited-capacity focus of attention.

Recent work has shown that contingent attentional capture effects can be especially large when multiple attentional sets for color guide visual search (Moore & Weissman, 2010). In particular, this research suggests that detecting a target-colored (e.g., orange) distractor leads the corresponding attentional set (e.g., identify orange letters) to enter a limited-capacity focus of attention in working memory, where it remains briefly while the distractor is being attended. Consequently, the ability to identify a differently-colored (e.g., green) target 100-300 ms later is impaired because the appropriate set (e.g., identify green letters) cannot also enter the focus of attention. In two experiments, we investigated whether such set-specific capture can be reduced by preemptively occupying the focus of attention. As predicted, a target-colored central distractor presented 233 ms before a target-colored peripheral distractor eliminated set-specific capture arising from the peripheral distractor. Moreover, this effect was observed only when the central distractor's color (e.g., orange) (a) matched a different set than the upcoming peripheral distractor's color (e.g., green) and (b) matched the same set as the upcoming central target's color (e.g., orange). We conclude that the same working memory limitations that give rise to set-specific capture can be preemptively exploited to reduce it.

Involuntary transfer of a top-down attentional set into the focus of attention: evidence from a contingent attentional capture paradigm.

In the present study, we investigated whether involuntarily directing attention to a target-colored distractor causes the corresponding attentional set to enter a limited-capacity focus of attention, thereby facilitating the identification of a subsequent target whose color matches the same attentional set. As predicted, in Experiment 1, contingent attentional capture effects from a target-colored distractor were only one half to one third as large when subsequent target identification relied on the same (vs. a different) attentional set. In Experiment 2, this effect was eliminated when all of the target colors matched the same attentional set, arguing against bottom-up perceptual priming of the distractor's color as an alternative account of our findings. In Experiment 3, this effect was reversed when a target-colored distractor appeared after the target, ruling out a feature-based interference account of our findings. We conclude that capacity limitations in working memory strongly influence contingent attentional capture when multiple attentional sets guide selection.

Made you look! Consciously perceived, irrelevant instructional cues can hijack the attentional network.

Functional neuroimaging studies of endogenous cued attention suggest that a fronto-parietal attentional network keeps track of current task objectives in working memory and enhances activity in posterior sensory regions that underlie the perceptual processing of behaviorally relevant stimuli. Relatively little is known, however, about whether consciously perceived, irrelevant instructional cues can hijack the attentional network, leading to an enhancement of the perceptual processing of irrelevant stimuli. Using a cross-modal attentional cueing task in combination with functional magnetic resonance imaging, we found that such irrelevant cues can indeed hijack the attentional network, as indexed by increased activity in (a) frontal regions that control attention and (b) sensory cortices that underlie the perceptual processing of task-irrelevant stimuli. Furthermore, we found that in left ventrolateral (but not dorsolateral) prefrontal regions, the magnitude of this increased activity varies with whether an irrelevant instructional cue is presented simultaneously with (versus after) a relevant instructional cue. These findings show that consciously perceived, irrelevant instructional cues can activate inappropriate task objectives in working memory, resulting in a hijacking of the attentional network. Moreover, they reveal different time courses of hijacking effects in ventrolateral and dorsolateral prefrontal regions, consistent with models in which these regions make distinct contributions to cognitive control.

The contents of visual memory are only partly under volitional control.

When we look around within a visual scene, is visual information automatically placed in visual memory during each saccade, or can we control which information is retained and which is excluded? We examined this question in five experiments by requiring participants to remember sequentially presented visual shapes or faces-some of which were marked for encoding (targets) and others that were supposed to be ignored (distractors)-over a 1-sec delay. The results show that distractors were retained in visual memory, regardless of stimulus category, suggesting that it is a general phenomenon. Whether or not participants were allowed to prepare for a target or distractor did not modulate distractor intrusion. When attention coupled with eye movements could be used to select targets, distractors were no longer encoded into memory. When eye movements were constrained, distractors once again intruded into memory. These findings suggest that top-down control processes are insufficient to filter the contents of visual memory.

Neuroscientific Evidence About the Distinction Between Short- and Long-Term Memory.

What have neuroscientific techniques contributed to the development of psychological theory about short- and long-term memory? We argue that the contributions have been varied: In some cases, data about brain mechanisms have been vital to the advancement of psychological theory; in other cases, neuroscientific data and behavioral data from normal participants have made equal contributions; and in yet other cases, the data from neuroscientific approaches have actually led psychological theory astray. We illustrate these various contributions by focusing on the relationship of short- to long-term memory.

The mind and brain of short-term memory.

The past 10 years have brought near-revolutionary changes in psychological theories about short-term memory, with similarly great advances in the neurosciences. Here, we critically examine the major psychological theories (the "mind") of short-term memory and how they relate to evidence about underlying brain mechanisms. We focus on three features that must be addressed by any satisfactory theory of short-term memory. First, we examine the evidence for the architecture of short-term memory, with special attention to questions of capacity and how--or whether--short-term memory can be separated from long-term memory. Second, we ask how the components of that architecture enact processes of encoding, maintenance, and retrieval. Third, we describe the debate over the reason about forgetting from short-term memory, whether interference or decay is the cause. We close with a conceptual model tracing the representation of a single item through a short-term memory task, describing the biological mechanisms that might support psychological processes on a moment-by-moment basis as an item is encoded, maintained over a delay with some forgetting, and ultimately retrieved.

Visual working memory is impaired when the medial temporal lobe is damaged.

The canonical description of the role of the medial temporal lobes (MTLs) in memory is that short-term forms of memory (e.g., working memory [WM]) are spared when the MTL is damaged, but longer term forms of memory are impaired. Tests used to assess this have typically had a heavy verbal component, potentially allowing explicit rehearsal strategies to maintain the WM trace over the memory delay period. Here we test the hypothesis that the MTL is necessary for visual WM when verbal rehearsal strategies are difficult to implement. In three patients with MTL damage we found impairments in spatial, face, and color WM, at delays as short as 4 sec. Impaired memory could not be attributed to memory load or perceptual problems. These findings suggest that the MTLs are critical for accurate visual WM.

Working memory for conjunctions relies on the medial temporal lobe.

A prominent theory of hippocampal function proposes that the hippocampus is importantly involved in relating or binding together separate pieces of information to form an episodic representation. This hypothesis has only been applied to studies of long-term memory because the paradigmatic view of the hippocampus is that it is not critical for short-term forms of memory. However, relational processing is important in many working memory tasks, especially tasks using visual stimuli. Here, we test the hypothesis that the medial temporal lobes are important for relational memory even over short delays. The task required patients with medial temporal lobe amnesia and controls to remember three objects, locations, or object-location conjunctions over 1 or 8 s delays. The results show that working memory for objects and locations was at normal levels, but that memory for conjunctions was severely impaired at 8 s delays. Additional analyses suggest that the hippocampus per se is critical for accurate conjunction working memory. We propose that the hippocampus is critically involved in memory for conjunctions at both short and long delays.

Using perfusion fMRI to measure continuous changes in neural activity with learning.

In this study, we examine the suitability of a relatively new imaging technique, arterial spin labeled perfusion imaging, for the study of continuous, gradual changes in neural activity. Unlike BOLD imaging, the perfusion signal is stable over long time-scales, allowing for accurate assessment of continuous performance. In addition, perfusion fMRI provides an absolute measure of blood flow so signal changes can be interpreted without reference to a baseline. The task we used was the serial response time task, a sequence learning task. Our results show reliable correlations between performance improvements and decreases in blood flow in premotor cortex and the inferior parietal lobe, supporting the model that learning procedures that increase efficiency of processing will be reflected in lower metabolic needs in tissues that support such processes. More generally, our results show that perfusion fMRI may be applied to the study of mental operations that produce gradual changes in neural activity.

Associative learning improves visual working memory performance.

The ability to remember visual stimuli over a short delay period is limited by the small capacity of visual working memory (VWM). Here the authors investigate the role of learning in enhancing VWM. Participants saw 2 spatial arrays separated by a 1-s interval. The 2 arrays were identical except for 1 location. Participants had to detect the difference. Unknown to the participants, some spatial arrays would repeat once every dozen trials or so for up to 32 repetitions. Spatial VWM performance increased significantly when the same location changed across display repetitions, but not at all when different locations changed from one display repetition to another. The authors suggest that a major role of learning in VWM is to mediate which information gets retained, rather than to directly increase VWM capacity.