O discurso psicanalítico e a filosofia / Psychoanalytic speech and philosophy / El discurso psicoanalítico y la filosofía / Le discours psychanalytique et la philosophie

Este texto pretende apontar algumas possíveis relações entre o discurso psicanalítico e a filosofia. Trata-se, em especial, de mostrar como uma leitura exterior e alheia, que a fenomenologia de um Ludwig Binswanger, um Jean Hyppolite, um Paul Ricœur e sobretudo um Merleau Ponty fazem do discurso psicanalítico, acaba por recortar e deturpar o discurso psicanalítico.

This paper's purpose is to demonstrate some possible relations between psychoanalytic speech and Philosophy. In this paper, the author's main focus is on the way the psychoanalytic speech turns out to be misunderstood and incomplete by the outside, "unconnected" reading and interpretation made by authors like Ludwig Binswanger, Jean Hyppolite, Paul Ricœur, and, especially, Merleau-Ponty, and their Phenomenology.

Este texto pretende mostrar algunas relaciones posibles entre el discurso psicoanalítico y la filosofía. En particular, mostrar como la lectura exterior y ajena que hace la fenomenología de Ludwig Binswanger, Jean Hyppolite, Paul Ricœur y especialmente Merleau-Ponty acaba por recortar y tergiversar el discurso psicoanalítico.

Ce texte vise à montrer quelques possibles relations entre le discours psychanalytique et la philosophie. Il s'agit notamment de montrer comment une lecture extérieure et éloignée, que la phénoménologie d'un Ludwig Binswanger, d'un Jean Hyppolite, d'un Paul Ricœur et surtout d'un Merleau-Ponty font de la psychanalyse, finit-elle par couper et par déformer le discours psychanalytique.

O discurso psicanalítico e a filosofia / Psychoanalytic speech and philosophy / El discurso psicoanalítico y la filosofía / Le discours psychanalytique et la philosophie

Este texto pretende apontar algumas possíveis relações entre o discurso psicanalítico e a filosofia. Trata-se, em especial, de mostrar como uma leitura exterior e alheia, que a fenomenologia de um Ludwig Binswanger, um Jean Hyppolite, um Paul Ricœur e sobretudo um Merleau Ponty fazem do discurso psicanalítico, acaba por recortar e deturpar o discurso psicanalítico.

This paper's purpose is to demonstrate some possible relations between psychoanalytic speech and Philosophy. In this paper, the author's main focus is on the way the psychoanalytic speech turns out to be misunderstood and incomplete by the outside, "unconnected" reading and interpretation made by authors like Ludwig Binswanger, Jean Hyppolite, Paul Ricœur, and, especially, Merleau-Ponty, and their Phenomenology.

Este texto pretende mostrar algunas relaciones posibles entre el discurso psicoanalítico y la filosofía. En particular, mostrar como la lectura exterior y ajena que hace la fenomenología de Ludwig Binswanger, Jean Hyppolite, Paul Ricœur y especialmente Merleau-Ponty acaba por recortar y tergiversar el discurso psicoanalítico.

Ce texte vise à montrer quelques possibles relations entre le discours psychanalytique et la philosophie. Il s'agit notamment de montrer comment une lecture extérieure et éloignée, que la phénoménologie d'un Ludwig Binswanger, d'un Jean Hyppolite, d'un Paul Ricœur et surtout d'un Merleau-Ponty font de la psychanalyse, finit-elle par couper et par déformer le discours psychanalytique.

The modulation of the flash-lag effect by voluntary attention.

In the flash-lag effect (FLE), a flashing object appears to lag behind a moving object when both happen to be physically aligned to each other. According to an earlier account of the FLE (Baldo and Klein 1995 Nature 378 565-566), this perceptual phenomenon would result from differential delays in the perceptual processing of moving and flashing stimuli, presumably involving attentional mechanisms. Here, we have attempted to demonstrate in a more convincing way the participation of voluntary attention as a major component of the FLE. In experiment 1 the observer's attentional set was induced by the spatial probability structure of the visual stimulus. A flashing dot (relative to which the location of a moving dot should be judged) was presented, in separate blocks, at fixed, alternating, or randomly chosen locations. The two former conditions, providing a higher spatial predictability, yielded a smaller FLE than the latter condition, which provided a lower spatial predictability of the flashing dot. In experiment 2 we employed a standard cueing procedure, in which a participant was instructed to shift covertly his/her attentional focus according to a symbolic cue. The cue indicated, with a validity of 80%, the visual hemifield at which the flashing dot would be presented. As predicted by our conceptual model, the mean magnitude of the FLE in the valid trials was significantly smaller than that found in the invalid ones. Therefore, both experiments provided strong evidence supporting the participation of voluntary attention in the FLE. Attentional mechanisms should be seen not as the primary cause of the FLE, but rather as an important modulatory component of a broader process whose spatiotemporal dynamics engenders the FLE and possibly other related phenomena. Even though we elected an account based on the influence of attention on perceptual latencies, our empirical findings are compatible with other theoretical models embraced by the current flash-lag controversy and should be accommodated by every attempt to explain this perceptual phenomenon.

Evidence for an attentional component of the perceptual misalignment between moving and flashing stimuli.

If a pair of dots, diametrically opposed to each other, is flashed in perfect alignment with another pair of dots rotating about the visual fixation point, most observers perceive the rotating dots as being ahead of the flashing dots (flash-lag effect). This psychophysical effect was first interpreted as the result of a perceptual extrapolation of the position of the moving dots. Also, it has been conceived as the result of differential visual latencies between flashing and moving stimuli, arising from purely sensory factors and/or expressing the contribution of attentional mechanisms as well. In a series of two experiments, we had observers judge the relative position between rotating and static dots at the moment a temporal marker was presented in the visual field. In experiment 1 we manipulated the nature of the temporal marker used to prompt the alignment judgment. This resulted in three main findings: (i) the flash-lag effect was observed to depend on the visual eccentricity of the flashing dots; (ii) the magnitude of the flash-lag effect was not dependent on the offset of the flashing dot; and (iii) the moving stimulus, when suddenly turned off, was perceived as lagging behind its disappearance location. Taken altogether, these results suggest that neither visible persistence nor motion extrapolation can account for the perceptual flash-lag phenomenon. The participation of attentional mechanisms was investigated in experiment 2, where the magnitude of the flash-lag effect was measured under both higher and lower predictability of the location of the flashing dot. Since the magnitude of the flash-lag effect significantly increased with decreasing predictability, we conclude that the observer's attentional set can modulate the differential latencies determining this perceptual effect. The flash-lag phenomenon can thus be conceived as arising from differential visual latencies which are determined not only by the physical attributes of the stimulus, such as its luminance or eccentricity, but also by attentional mechanisms influencing the delays involved in the perceptual processing.