The Impact of Shift Work on Diabetes Self-Management Activities.

BACKGROUND: Once a person is diagnosed with diabetes, aggressive management is imperative to minimize poor glycemic control devastating outcomes. However, for some patients reaching optimum blood glucose levels is challenging due to the complexity of diabetes care. To achieve good blood glucose control, patients affected by diabetes must engage in self-care activities that include routine blood glucose check, dietary control, physical activity, medication regimen, and routine medical provider visits. Diabetes-associated self-care activities aimed to reach good blood glucose control can be hindered by multiple factors including shift work. OBJECTIVE: To evaluate self-management activities of individuals affected by diabetes who are employed as shift workers. This study also informs primary care nurse practitioners of the challenges shift workers face in managing their disease. METHODS: This was a cross-sectional descriptive study. Participants were individuals affected by type II diabetes from a single primary care practice (N = 86); 45 were individuals working on the dayshift and 41 worked on the evening/night shift. Each participant completed the diabetes self-management questionnaire and author-developed demographic/supplemental questionnaire. CONCLUSIONS: There were no differences in self-reported diabetes management activities (i.e., physical activity, glucose management, and healthcare use) between the two groups. Thirty-nine percent of participants working shifts reported worse sleep patterns compared to their dayshift counterparts (X 2[1, N = 85] = 8.73, p = .003). Evening/night shift workers also reported more symptoms such as leg pain, fungal infection, numbness of the feet and legs, dizziness, and vision changes (X 2[1, N = 79] = 43.037, p < .001). IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE: A better understanding of the impact that shift work has on diabetes care may help healthcare providers formulate meaningful treatment plans to meet the needs of evening/night shift diabetic workers. The use of a patient-centered medical home is one strategy.

None of the above: A Bayesian account of the detection of novel categories.

Every time we encounter a new object, action, or event, there is some chance that we will need to assign it to a novel category. We describe and evaluate a class of probabilistic models that detect when an object belongs to a category that has not previously been encountered. The models incorporate a prior distribution that is influenced by the distribution of previous objects among categories, and we present 2 experiments that demonstrate that people are also sensitive to this distributional information. Two additional experiments confirm that distributional information is combined with similarity when both sources of information are available. We compare our approach to previous models of unsupervised categorization and to several heuristic-based models, and find that a hierarchical Bayesian approach provides the best account of our data. (PsycINFO Database Record

Not every credible interval is credible: Evaluating robustness in the presence of contamination in Bayesian data analysis.

As Bayesian methods become more popular among behavioral scientists, they will inevitably be applied in situations that violate the assumptions underpinning typical models used to guide statistical inference. With this in mind, it is important to know something about how robust Bayesian methods are to the violation of those assumptions. In this paper, we focus on the problem of contaminated data (such as data with outliers or conflicts present), with specific application to the problem of estimating a credible interval for the population mean. We evaluate five Bayesian methods for constructing a credible interval, using toy examples to illustrate the qualitative behavior of different approaches in the presence of contaminants, and an extensive simulation study to quantify the robustness of each method. We find that the "default" normal model used in most Bayesian data analyses is not robust, and that approaches based on the Bayesian bootstrap are only robust in limited circumstances. A simple parametric model based on Tukey's "contaminated normal model" and a model based on the t-distribution were markedly more robust. However, the contaminated normal model had the added benefit of estimating which data points were discounted as outliers and which were not.

Bayesian models of cognition revisited: Setting optimality aside and letting data drive psychological theory.

Recent debates in the psychological literature have raised questions about the assumptions that underpin Bayesian models of cognition and what inferences they license about human cognition. In this paper we revisit this topic, arguing that there are 2 qualitatively different ways in which a Bayesian model could be constructed. The most common approach uses a Bayesian model as a normative standard upon which to license a claim about optimality. In the alternative approach, a descriptive Bayesian model need not correspond to any claim that the underlying cognition is optimal or rational, and is used solely as a tool for instantiating a substantive psychological theory. We present 3 case studies in which these 2 perspectives lead to different computational models and license different conclusions about human cognition. We demonstrate how the descriptive Bayesian approach can be used to answer different sorts of questions than the optimal approach, especially when combined with principled tools for model evaluation and model selection. More generally we argue for the importance of making a clear distinction between the 2 perspectives. Considerable confusion results when descriptive models and optimal models are conflated, and if Bayesians are to avoid contributing to this confusion it is important to avoid making normative claims when none are intended. (PsycINFO Database Record

On the likelihood of "encapsulating all uncertainty".

The assignment of personal probabilities to form a forensic practitioner's likelihood ratio is a mental operation subject to all the frailties of human memory, perception and judgment. While we agree that beliefs expressed as coherent probabilities are neither 'right' nor 'wrong' we argue that debate over this fact obscures both the requirement for and consideration of the 'helpfulness' of practitioner's opinions. We also question the extent to which a likelihood ratio based on personal probabilities can realistically be expected to 'encapsulate all uncertainty'. Courts cannot rigorously assess a forensic practitioner's bare assertions of belief regarding evidential strength. At a minimum, information regarding the uncertainty both within and between the opinions of practitioners is required.

Structure at every scale: A semantic network account of the similarities between unrelated concepts.

Similarity plays an important role in organizing the semantic system. However, given that similarity cannot be defined on purely logical grounds, it is important to understand how people perceive similarities between different entities. Despite this, the vast majority of studies focus on measuring similarity between very closely related items. When considering concepts that are very weakly related, little is known. In this article, we present 4 experiments showing that there are reliable and systematic patterns in how people evaluate the similarities between very dissimilar entities. We present a semantic network account of these similarities showing that a spreading activation mechanism defined over a word association network naturally makes correct predictions about weak similarities, whereas, though simpler, models based on direct neighbors between word pairs derived using the same network cannot. (PsycINFO Database Record

Learning and choosing in an uncertain world: An investigation of the explore-exploit dilemma in static and dynamic environments.

How do people solve the explore-exploit trade-off in a changing environment? In this paper we present experimental evidence from an "observe or bet" task, in which people have to determine when to engage in information-seeking behavior and when to switch to reward-taking actions. In particular we focus on the comparison between people's behavior in a changing environment and their behavior in an unchanging one. Our experimental work is motivated by rational analysis of the problem that makes strong predictions about information search and reward seeking in static and changeable environments. Our results show a striking agreement between human behavior and the optimal policy, but also highlight a number of systematic differences. In particular, we find that while people often employ suboptimal strategies the first time they encounter the learning problem, most people are able to approximate the correct strategy after minimal experience. In order to describe both the manner in which people's choices are similar to but slightly different from an optimal standard, we introduce four process models for the observe or bet task and evaluate them as potential theories of human behavior.

The structure of sequential effects.

There is a long history of research into sequential effects, extending more than one hundred years. The pattern of sequential effects varies widely with both experimental conditions as well as for different individuals performing the same experiment. Yet this great diversity of results is poorly understood, particularly with respect to individual variation, which save for some passing mentions has largely gone unreported in the literature. Here we seek to understand the way in which sequential effects vary by identifying the causes underlying the differences observed in sequential effects. In order to achieve this goal we perform principal component analysis on a dataset of 158 individual results from participants performing different experiments with the aim of identifying hidden variables responsible for sequential effects. We find a latent structure consisting of 3 components related to sequential effects-2 main and 1 minor. A relationship between the 2 main components and the separate processing of stimuli and of responses is proposed on the basis of previous empirical evidence. It is further speculated that the minor component of sequential effects arises as the consequence of processing delays. Independently of the explanation for the latent variables encountered, this work provides a unified descriptive model for a wide range of different types of sequential effects previously identified in the literature. In addition to explaining individual differences themselves, it is demonstrated how the latent structure uncovered here is useful in understanding the classical problem of the dependence of sequential effects on the interval between successive stimuli.

Leaping to Conclusions: Why Premise Relevance Affects Argument Strength.

Everyday reasoning requires more evidence than raw data alone can provide. We explore the idea that people can go beyond this data by reasoning about how the data was sampled. This idea is investigated through an examination of premise non-monotonicity, in which adding premises to a category-based argument weakens rather than strengthens it. Relevance theories explain this phenomenon in terms of people's sensitivity to the relationships among premise items. We show that a Bayesian model of category-based induction taking premise sampling assumptions and category similarity into account complements such theories and yields two important predictions: First, that sensitivity to premise relationships can be violated by inducing a weak sampling assumption; and second, that premise monotonicity should be restored as a result. We test these predictions with an experiment that manipulates people's assumptions in this regard, showing that people draw qualitatively different conclusions in each case.

The helpfulness of category labels in semi-supervised learning depends on category structure.

The study of semi-supervised category learning has generally focused on how additional unlabeled information with given labeled information might benefit category learning. The literature is also somewhat contradictory, sometimes appearing to show a benefit to unlabeled information and sometimes not. In this paper, we frame the problem differently, focusing on when labels might be helpful to a learner who has access to lots of unlabeled information. Using an unconstrained free-sorting categorization experiment, we show that labels are useful to participants only when the category structure is ambiguous and that people's responses are driven by the specific set of labels they see. We present an extension of Anderson's Rational Model of Categorization that captures this effect.

How do people learn from negative evidence? Non-monotonic generalizations and sampling assumptions in inductive reasoning.

A robust finding in category-based induction tasks is for positive observations to raise the willingness to generalize to other categories while negative observations lower the willingness to generalize. This pattern is referred to as monotonic generalization. Across three experiments we find systematic non-monotonicity effects, in which negative observations raise the willingness to generalize. Experiments 1 and 2 show that this effect emerges in hierarchically structured domains when a negative observation from a different category is added to a positive observation. They also demonstrate that this is related to a specific kind of shift in the reasoner's hypothesis space. Experiment 3 shows that the effect depends on the assumptions that the reasoner makes about how inductive arguments are constructed. Non-monotonic reasoning occurs when people believe the facts were put together by a helpful communicator, but monotonicity is restored when they believe the observations were sampled randomly from the environment.

Erroneous gambling-related beliefs as illusions of primary and secondary control: a confirmatory factor analysis.

Different classification systems for erroneous beliefs about gambling have been proposed, consistently alluding to 'illusion of control' and 'gambler's fallacy' categories. None of these classification systems have, however, considered the how the illusion of control and the gambler's fallacy might be interrelated. In this paper, we report the findings of a confirmatory factor analysis that examines the proposal that most erroneous gambling-related beliefs can be defined in terms of Rothbaum et al.'s (J Pers Soc Psychol, doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.42.1.5 , 1982) distinction between 'primary' and 'secondary' illusory control, with the former being driven to a large extent by the well-known gambler's fallacy and the latter being driven by a complex of beliefs about supernatural forces such as God and luck. A survey consisting of 100 items derived from existing instruments was administered to 329 participants. The analysis confirmed the existence of two latent structures (beliefs in primary and secondary control), while also offering support to the idea that gambler's fallacy-style reasoning may underlie both perceived primary control and beliefs about the cyclical nature of luck, a form of perceived secondary control. The results suggest the need for a greater focus on the role of underlying processes or belief structures as factors that foster susceptibility to specific beliefs in gambling situations. Addressing and recognising the importance of these underlying factors may also have implications for cognitive therapy treatments for problem gambling.

Language evolution can be shaped by the structure of the world.

Human languages vary in many ways but also show striking cross-linguistic universals. Why do these universals exist? Recent theoretical results demonstrate that Bayesian learners transmitting language to each other through iterated learning will converge on a distribution of languages that depends only on their prior biases about language and the quantity of data transmitted at each point; the structure of the world being communicated about plays no role (Griffiths & Kalish, 2005, 2007). We revisit these findings and show that when certain assumptions about the relationship between language and the world are abandoned, learners will converge to languages that depend on the structure of the world as well as their prior biases. These theoretical results are supported with a series of experiments showing that when human learners acquire language through iterated learning, the ultimate structure of those languages is shaped by the structure of the meanings to be communicated.

Open parallel cooperative and competitive decision processes: a potential provenance for quantum probability decision models.

In recent years quantum probability models have been used to explain many aspects of human decision making, and as such quantum models have been considered a viable alternative to Bayesian models based on classical probability. One criticism that is often leveled at both kinds of models is that they lack a clear interpretation in terms of psychological mechanisms. In this paper we discuss the mechanistic underpinnings of a quantum walk model of human decision making and response time. The quantum walk model is compared to standard sequential sampling models, and the architectural assumptions of both are considered. In particular, we show that the quantum model has a natural interpretation in terms of a cognitive architecture that is both massively parallel and involves both co-operative (excitatory) and competitive (inhibitory) interactions between units. Additionally, we introduce a family of models that includes aspects of the classical and quantum walk models.

Learning time-varying categories.

Many kinds of objects and events in our world have a strongly time-dependent quality. However, most theories about concepts and categories either are insensitive to variation over time or treat it as a nuisance factor that produces irrational order effects during learning. In this article, we present two category learning experiments in which we explored peoples' ability to learn categories whose structure is strongly time-dependent. We suggest that order effects in categorization may in part reflect a sensitivity to changing environments, and that understanding dynamically changing concepts is an important part of developing a full account of human categorization.

Better explanations of lexical and semantic cognition using networks derived from continued rather than single-word associations.

In this article, we describe the most extensive set of word associations collected to date. The database contains over 12,000 cue words for which more than 70,000 participants generated three responses in a multiple-response free association task. The goal of this study was (1) to create a semantic network that covers a large part of the human lexicon, (2) to investigate the implications of a multiple-response procedure by deriving a weighted directed network, and (3) to show how measures of centrality and relatedness derived from this network predict both lexical access in a lexical decision task and semantic relatedness in similarity judgment tasks. First, our results show that the multiple-response procedure results in a more heterogeneous set of responses, which lead to better predictions of lexical access and semantic relatedness than do single-response procedures. Second, the directed nature of the network leads to a decomposition of centrality that primarily depends on the number of incoming links or in-degree of each node, rather than its set size or number of outgoing links. Both studies indicate that adequate representation formats and sufficiently rich data derived from word associations represent a valuable type of information in both lexical and semantic processing.

Epistemic trust: modeling children's reasoning about others' knowledge and intent.

A core assumption of many theories of development is that children can learn indirectly from other people. However, indirect experience (or testimony) is not constrained to provide veridical information. As a result, if children are to capitalize on this source of knowledge, they must be able to infer who is trustworthy and who is not. How might a learner make such inferences while at the same time learning about the world? What biases, if any, might children bring to this problem? We address these questions with a computational model of epistemic trust in which learners reason about the helpfulness and knowledgeability of an informant. We show that the model captures the competencies shown by young children in four areas: (1) using informants' accuracy to infer how much to trust them; (2) using informants' recent accuracy to overcome effects of familiarity; (3) inferring trust based on consensus among informants; and (4) using information about mal-intent to decide not to trust. The model also explains developmental changes in performance between 3 and 4 years of age as a result of changing default assumptions about the helpfulness of other people.

Sampling assumptions in inductive generalization.

Inductive generalization, where people go beyond the data provided, is a basic cognitive capability, and it underpins theoretical accounts of learning, categorization, and decision making. To complete the inductive leap needed for generalization, people must make a key ''sampling'' assumption about how the available data were generated. Previous models have considered two extreme possibilities, known as strong and weak sampling. In strong sampling, data are assumed to have been deliberately generated as positive examples of a concept, whereas in weak sampling, data are assumed to have been generated without any restrictions. We develop a more general account of sampling that allows for an intermediate mixture of these two extremes, and we test its usefulness. In two experiments, we show that most people complete simple one-dimensional generalization tasks in a way that is consistent with their believing in some mixture of strong and weak sampling, but that there are large individual differences in the relative emphasis different people give to each type of sampling. We also show experimentally that the relative emphasis of the mixture is influenced by the structure of the available information. We discuss the psychological meaning of mixing strong and weak sampling, and possible extensions of our modeling approach to richer problems of inductive generalization.

Hypothesis generation, sparse categories, and the positive test strategy.

We consider the situation in which a learner must induce the rule that explains an observed set of data but the hypothesis space of possible rules is not explicitly enumerated or identified. The first part of the article demonstrates that as long as hypotheses are sparse (i.e., index less than half of the possible entities in the domain) then a positive test strategy is near optimal. The second part of this article then demonstrates that a preference for sparse hypotheses (a sparsity bias) emerges as a natural consequence of the family resemblance principle; that is, it arises from the requirement that good rules index entities that are more similar to one another than they are to entities that do not satisfy the rule.

Rational approximations to rational models: alternative algorithms for category learning.

Rational models of cognition typically consider the abstract computational problems posed by the environment, assuming that people are capable of optimally solving those problems. This differs from more traditional formal models of cognition, which focus on the psychological processes responsible for behavior. A basic challenge for rational models is thus explaining how optimal solutions can be approximated by psychological processes. We outline a general strategy for answering this question, namely to explore the psychological plausibility of approximation algorithms developed in computer science and statistics. In particular, we argue that Monte Carlo methods provide a source of rational process models that connect optimal solutions to psychological processes. We support this argument through a detailed example, applying this approach to Anderson's (1990, 1991) rational model of categorization (RMC), which involves a particularly challenging computational problem. Drawing on a connection between the RMC and ideas from nonparametric Bayesian statistics, we propose 2 alternative algorithms for approximate inference in this model. The algorithms we consider include Gibbs sampling, a procedure appropriate when all stimuli are presented simultaneously, and particle filters, which sequentially approximate the posterior distribution with a small number of samples that are updated as new data become available. Applying these algorithms to several existing datasets shows that a particle filter with a single particle provides a good description of human inferences.