Corrigendum: Do you hear the people sing? Comparison of synchronized URL and narrative themes in 2020 and 2023 French protests.

[This corrects the article DOI: 10.3389/fdata.2023.1221744.].

Do you hear the people sing? Comparison of synchronized URL and narrative themes in 2020 and 2023 French protests.

Introduction: France has seen two key protests within the term of President Emmanuel Macron: one in 2020 against Islamophobia, and another in 2023 against the pension reform. During these protests, there is much chatter on online social media platforms like Twitter. Methods: In this study, we aim to analyze the differences between the online chatter of the 2 years through a network-centric view, and in particular the synchrony of users. This study begins by identifying groups of accounts that work together through two methods: temporal synchronicity and narrative similarity. We also apply a bot detection algorithm to identify bots within these networks and analyze the extent of inorganic synchronization within the discourse of these events. Results: Overall, our findings suggest that the synchrony of users in 2020 on Twitter is much higher than that of 2023, and there are more bot activity in 2020 compared to 2023.

A combined synchronization index for evaluating collective action social media.

Social media has provided a citizen voice, giving rise to grassroots collective action, where users deploy a concerted effort to disseminate online narratives and even carry out offline protests. Sometimes these collective action are aided by inorganic synchronization, which arise from bot actors. It is thus important to identify the synchronicity of emerging discourse on social media and the indications of organic/inorganic activity within the conversations. This provides a way of profiling an event for possibility of offline protests and violence. In this study, we build on past definitions of synchronous activity on social media- simultaneous user action-and develop a Combined Synchronization Index (CSI) which adopts a hierarchical approach in measuring user synchronicity. We apply this index on six political and social activism events on Twitter and analyzed three action types: synchronicity by hashtag, URL and @mentions.The CSI provides an overall quantification of synchronization across all action types within an event, which allows ranking of a spectrum of synchronicity across the six events. Human users have higher synchronous scores than bot users in most events; and bots and humans exhibits the most synchronized activities across all events as compared to other pairs (i.e., bot-bot and human-human). We further rely on the harmony and dissonance of CSI-Network scores with network centrality metrics to observe the presence of organic/inorganic synchronization. We hope this work aids in investigating synchronized action within social media in a collective manner.

Coordinating Narratives Framework for cross-platform analysis in the 2021 US Capitol riots.

Coordinated disinformation campaigns are used to influence social media users, potentially leading to offline violence. In this study, we introduce a general methodology to uncover coordinated messaging through an analysis of user posts on Parler. The proposed Coordinating Narratives Framework constructs a user-to-user coordination graph, which is induced by a user-to-text graph and a text-to-text similarity graph. The text-to-text graph is constructed based on the textual similarity of Parler and Twitter posts. We study three influential groups of users in the 6 January 2020 Capitol riots and detect networks of coordinated user clusters that post similar textual content in support of disinformation narratives related to the U.S. 2020 elections. We further extend our methodology to Twitter tweets to identify authors that share the same disinformation messaging as the aforementioned Parler user groups.

Cross-platform information spread during the January 6th capitol riots.

Social media has become an integral component of the modern information system. An average person typically has multiple accounts across different platforms. At the same time, the rise of social media facilitates the spread of online mis/disinformation narratives within and across these platforms. In this study, we characterize the coordinated information dissemination of information laden with mis- and disinformation narratives within and across two platforms, Parler and Twitter, during the online discourse surrounding the January 6th 2021 Capitol Riots event. Through the use of username similarity, we discover joint theme endorsements between both platforms. Using anomalously high volume of shared-link matches of external websites and YouTube videos, we discover separate information consumption habits between both platforms, with very few common sources of information between users of the different platforms. However, through analyzing the similarity of the texts with Locality Sensitive Hashing of constructed text vectors, we identify similar narratives between the platforms despite separate consumption of external websites, highlighting the similarities and differences of information spread within and between the two social media environments.

"The coronavirus is a bioweapon": classifying coronavirus stories on fact-checking sites.

The 2020 coronavirus pandemic has heightened the need to flag coronavirus-related misinformation, and fact-checking groups have taken to verifying misinformation on the Internet. We explore stories reported by fact-checking groups PolitiFact, Poynter and Snopes from January to June 2020. We characterise these stories into six clusters, then analyse temporal trends of story validity and the level of agreement across sites. The sites present the same stories 78% of the time, with the highest agreement between Poynter and PolitiFact. We further break down the story clusters into more granular story types by proposing a unique automated method, which can be used to classify diverse story sources in both fact-checked stories and tweets. Our results show story type classification performs best when trained on the same medium, with contextualised BERT vector representations outperforming a Bag-Of-Words classifier.

Active, aggressive, but to little avail: characterizing bot activity during the 2020 Singaporean elections.

Digital disinformation presents a challenging problem for democracies worldwide, especially in times of crisis like the COVID-19 pandemic. In countries like Singapore, legislative efforts to quell fake news constitute relatively new and understudied contexts for understanding local information operations. This paper presents a social cybersecurity analysis of the 2020 Singaporean elections, which took place at the height of the pandemic and after the recent passage of an anti-fake news law. Harnessing a dataset of 240,000 tweets about the elections, we found that 26.99% of participating accounts were likely to be bots, responsible for a larger proportion of bot tweets than the election in 2015. Textual analysis further showed that the detected bots used simpler and more abusive second-person language, as well as hashtags related to COVID-19 and voter activity-pointing to aggressive tactics potentially fuelling online hostility and questioning the legitimacy of the polls. Finally, bots were associated with larger, less dense, and less echo chamber-like communities, suggesting efforts to participate in larger, mainstream conversations. However, despite their distinct narrative and network maneuvers, bots generally did not hold significant influence throughout the social network. Hence, although intersecting concerns of political conflict during a global pandemic may promptly raise the possibility of online interference, we quantify both the efforts and limits of bot-fueled disinformation in the 2020 Singaporean elections. We conclude with several implications for digital disinformation in times of crisis, in the Asia-Pacific and beyond.

Analyzing Public Opinion and Misinformation in a COVID-19 Telegram Group Chat.

We analyze a Singapore-based COVID-19 Telegram group with more than 10000 participants. First, we study the group's opinion over time, focusing on five dimensions: participation, sentiment, negative emotions, topics, and message types. We find that participation peaked when the Ministry of Health raised the disease alert level, but this engagement was not sustained. Second, we investigate the prevalence of, and reactions to, authority-identified misinformation in the group. We find that authority-identified misinformation is rare, and that participants affirm, deny, and question misinformation. Third, we explore searching for user skepticism as one strategy for identifying misinformation, finding misinformation not previously identified by authorities.