RESUMO
The objective of this study was to understand how gig-workers interpret the effects of their laboral activity on their wellbeing. We developed a grounded theory based on interviews with 57 Brazilian gig-workers. The results show that (1) workers and gig-work organizations have preferences for work relationships with more autonomy or security; (2) when there is a congruence of preferences, the worker experiences greater wellbeing, and when the preferences diverge, there are episodes of preference violations that, when repeated, reduce worker wellbeing; and (3) however, not everything is a matter of fit: when both individuals and organizations have the same preference (for example, for more autonomy and less security), worker wellbeing may be vulnerable to abuse, for example, in terms of an unsustainable workload. Our study draws attention to an integrated discussion of the benefits and harms of algorithmic management, which allows overcoming a polarized view in which it would be seen only as beneficial or harmful to workers.
RESUMO
Resumo A literatura econômica tem debatido os efeitos dos gastos públicos sobre as chances de recondução dos governantes, apontando que os eleitores tendem a avaliar com um maior peso a performance dos políticos tendo por base seu desempenho no período pré-eleitoral (miopia política). Nesse contexto, este trabalho investiga a influência dos investimentos públicos sobre a recondução dos prefeitos dos municípios do estado do Espírito Santo, entre 2001 e 2012. Por meio da metodologia de regressão logística, os resultados sugerem que os eleitores capixabas, de modo geral, premiam os prefeitos que promovem incrementos relativos de investimentos públicos no período próximo às eleições, o que se mostra consistente com a literatura mais recente de ciclos políticos e de comportamento eleitoral, embora não tenha havido a comprovação empírica de que os eleitores sejam conservadores sob a ótica fiscal.
Resumen La literatura económica ha discutido los efectos del gasto público sobre las posibilidades de reelección de los gobernantes, y señaló que los votantes tienden a evaluar el desempeño de los políticos en función de su rendimiento en el período pre-electoral (miopía política). En este contexto, este trabajo investiga la influencia de la inversión pública sobre la reelección de los alcaldes de los municipios en el estado de Espírito Santo, entre 2001 y 2012. A través de la metodología de regresión logística, los resultados sugieren que los votantes del Espírito Santo en general recompensan a los alcaldes que promueven incrementos en la inversión pública en el periodo cercano a las elecciones, que parece consistente con la literatura más reciente de los ciclos políticos y comportamiento electoral, aunque no había ninguna evidencia empírica de que los votantes son conservadores en el punto de vista fiscal.
Abstract The economic literature has discussed the effects of public spending on the probability of re-election, pointing out that voters tend to evaluate the performance of politics based on the pre-election period (political myopia). In this context, this study investigates the influence of public investments on the re-election of municipal mayors in the state of Espírito Santo, Brazil, between 2001 and 2012. Using Logistic regression, we find that voters from the State of Espírito Santo, in general, reward the mayors who promote increments related to public investment in the period surrounding the elections, which is consistent with results in the political cycles and electoral behavior literature, although no empirical evidence was found that those voters are conservative in a fiscal perspective.
