Minimal Organizational Requirements for the Ascription of Animal Personality to Social Groups.

Recently, psychological phenomena have been expanded to new domains, crisscrossing boundaries of organizational levels, with the emergence of areas such as social personality and ecosystem learning. In this contribution, we analyze the ascription of an individual-based concept (personality) to the social level. Although justified boundary crossings can boost new approaches and applications, the indiscriminate misuse of concepts refrains the growth of scientific areas. The concept of social personality is based mainly on the detection of repeated group differences across a population, in a direct transposition of personality concepts from the individual to the social level. We show that this direct transposition is problematic for avowing the nonsensical ascription of personality even to simple electronic devices. To go beyond a metaphoric use of social personality, we apply the organizational approach to a review of social insect communication networks. Our conceptual analysis shows that socially self-organized systems, such as isolated ant trails and bee's recruitment groups, are too simple to have social personality. The situation is more nuanced when measuring the collective choice between nest sites or foraging patches: some species show positive and negative feedbacks between two or more self-organized social structures so that these co-dependent structures are inter-related by second-order, social information systems, complying with a formal requirement for having social personality: the social closure of constraints. Other requirements include the decoupling between individual and social dynamics, and the self-regulation of collective decision processes. Social personality results to be sometimes a metaphorical transposition of a psychological concept to a social phenomenon. The application of this organizational approach to cases of learning ecosystems, or evolutionary learning, could help to ground theoretically the ascription of psychological properties to levels of analysis beyond the individual, up to meta-populations or ecological communities.

Function in biooogy: etiological and organizational perspectives / Función en Biología: perspectivas etiológicas y organizacionales

In this paper, we argue for a taxonomy of approaches to function based on different epistemological perspectives assumed with regard to the treatment of this central concept in the life sciences. We distinguish between etiological and organizational perspectives on function, analyzing distinct theories: Wright's selectionist etiological approach and Godfrey-Smith's modern history theory of functions, in the case of the etiological perspective; and Cummins' functional analysis and Collier's interactivist approach to function, among organizational accounts. We explain differences and similarities between these theories and the broader perspectives on function, arguing for a particular way of understanding the consensus without unity in debates about function. While explaining the accounts of function, we also deal with the relationship between this concept and other important biological concepts, such as adaptation, selection, complexity, and autonomy. We also advance an argument for the limits and prospects of the explanatory role of function in evolution. By arguing that changes in functionality are always grounded on changes in systems' organization, we show that function can never explain the origins of traits. Nevertheless, it can explain the spread of traits in populations, but only when we are dealing with functionally novel traits. Finally, we stress that organizational accounts of function are needed to understand how new functions appear by means of changes in systems' organization.

En este artículo, argumentamos a favor de una taxonomía de abordajes del concepto función basada en diferentes perspectivas epistemológicas de acuerdo al tratamiento de este concepto central en las ciencias de la vida. Distinguimos entre perspectivas etiológicas y organizacionales sobre la noción de función, analizando teorías distintas: la teoría etiológica seleccionista de Wright y la teoría de la historia moderna de Godfrey-Smith, en el caso de la perspectiva etiológica; y el análisis funcional de Cummins y el abordaje interactivista de Collier, entre los abordajes organizacionales. Explicamos las diferencias y similitudes entre estas teorías y entre las perspectivas más amplias sobre función, argumentando a favor de una manera particular de comprender el consenso sin unidad en los debates sobre función. Al explicar los abordajes sobre función, examinamos también las relaciones entre este concepto y otros conceptos biológicos importantes, como adaptación, selección, complejidad y autonomía. Además presentamos un argumento sobre los límites y las posibilidades del papel explicativo de función en evolución. Al argumentar que los cambios en funcionalidad están siempre basados en cambios en la organización de los sistemas, mostramos que la función jamás puede explicar los orígines de rasgos. Sin embargo, ella puede explicar el aumento de frecuencia (spread) de rasgos en poblaciones, solo cuando estamos considerando rasgos funcionalmente nuevos. Finalmente, destacamos que abordajes organizacionales de la función son necesarios para comprender como nuevas funciones aparecen por medio de cambios en la organización de sistemas.