Collaboration Between Infection Prevention and Clinical Education in Response to COVID-19.

With the rapid escalation of COVID-19 educational needs within hospitals, it was imperative for content experts of the infection prevention departments to lean on the expertise of nursing professional development specialists. This article provides a brief overview of how a clinical education and professional development department was deployed to assist and support the COVID-19 response efforts.

Building a Successful Infection Prevention Program: Key Components, Processes, and Economics.

Infection control is the discipline responsible for preventing health care-associated infections (HAIs) and has grown from an anonymous field, to a highly visible, multidisciplinary field of incredible importance. There has been increasing focus on prevention rather than control of HAIs. Infection prevention programs (IPPs) have enormous scope that spans multiple disciplines. Infection control and the prevention and elimination of HAIs can no longer be compartmentalized. This article discusses the structure and responsibilities of an IPP, the regulatory pressures and opportunities that these programs face, and how to build and manage a successful program.

Development of a modified surveillance definition of central line-associated bloodstream infections for patients with hematologic malignancies.

OBJECTIVE: To develop a modified surveillance definition of central line-associated bloodstream infection (mCLABSI) specific for our population of patients with hematologic malignancies to better support ongoing improvement efforts at our hospital. DESIGN: Retrospective cohort study. PATIENTS: Hematologic malignancies population in a 1,200-bed tertiary care hospital on a 22-bed bone marrow transplant (BMT) unit and a 22-bed leukemia unit. METHODS: An mCLABSI definition was developed, and pathogens and rates were compared against those determined using the National Healthcare Safety Network (NHSN) definition. RESULTS: By the NHSN definition the CLABSI rate on the BMT unit was 6.0 per 1,000 central line-days, and by the mCLABSI definition the rate was 2.0 per 1,000 line-days ([Formula: see text]). On the leukemia unit, the NHSN CLABSI rate was 14.4 per 1,000 line-days, and the mCLABSI rate was 8.2 per 1,000 line-days ([Formula: see text]). The top 3 CLABSI pathogens by the NHSN definition were Enterococcus species, Klebsiella species, and Escherichia coli. The top 3 CLABSI pathogens by the mCLABSI definition were coagulase-negative Staphylococcus (CONS), Pseudomonas aeruginosa, and Staphylococcus aureus. The difference in the incidence of CONS as a cause of CLABSI under the 2 definitions was statistically significant ([Formula: see text]). CONCLUSIONS: A modified surveillance definition of CLABSI was associated with an increase in the identification of staphylococci as the cause of CLABSIs, as opposed to enteric pathogens, and a decrease in CLABSI rates.

Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus outbreak in an intensive care nursery: potential for interinstitutional spread.

BACKGROUND: After surveillance surveys documented the absence of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) in our intensive care nursery, an outbreak of MRSA infection occurred there during a 7-month period in 2005. METHODS: Control measures included reinforcement of hand hygiene and contact precautions procedures. Active surveillance cultures were obtained on all neonates, including interinstitutional transfers. A cohort unit was dedicated exclusively for neonates with MRSA. Pulsed-field gel electrophoresis was performed on isolates to determine relatedness. We surveyed transferring hospitals to evaluate MRSA activity and surveillance practices in their nurseries. RESULTS: Twenty-five neonates were colonized with MRSA; 9 of these had clinical infections. Isolates from 18 of 21 neonates from this outbreak and 4 neonates from a previous cluster were identical, including 1 isolate obtained upon transfer from another institution. Admission and discharge logs from a 9-month period showed that 127 of 460 admissions (27.6%) were admitted from 34 hospitals, and 247 of 460 (53.7%) were discharged to 32 hospitals. Among 30 transferring hospitals responding to our survey, MRSA activity occurred in 2 of 28 (7%) level 1 nurseries, 4 of 11 (36%) level 2 nurseries and 6 of 10 (60%) level 3 nurseries. Nine of the 30 hospitals (30%) performed some active surveillance. CONCLUSIONS: Interinstitutional transfer can play a role in the initiation and propagation of MRSA outbreaks in neonatal nurseries. The burden of MRSA in area nurseries and the rate of transfers affect the potential for interhospital spread of MRSA and may justify changes in policy regarding surveillance for MRSA and communication between hospitals.